



Daily Report

Soviet Union

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Gerasimov 14 Mar Briefing on World Issues

Military Inspectors in Norway

LD1403164790 Moscow TASS in English 1558 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—"Under provisions of the document from the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the Soviet Government approached the Norwegian Government on March 12 with a request to inspect military activity being conducted on Norwegian territory," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Upon receiving the positive answer to the request, a team of Soviet military specialists today arrived in Norway and began the inspection.

Aspin's Comments on Nuclear Arms

LD1403182890 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov today likened the recent statements by Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Congress, to "the wind of changes" destroying the most unassailable bastions of former views.

The American legislator said, in part, that in present-day conditions the United States and its allies in Europe were in a position to repulse a threat from the East without resorting to nuclear weapons.

Such statements demonstrate that the nuclear deterrence concept is developing a crack, Gerasimov noted. "The East and the West are rapidly meeting each other halfway, not in the search for confrontation but in the desire to foster cooperation and create integrative structures of European security, and tactical nuclear weapons possession in Europe is becoming senseless. Military strategies cannot remain the same without them," Gerasimov said.

He drew attention to the disappointment expressed by Aspin over the discrepancy between the unclassified variant of the report submitted to the congress by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its secret variant.

"We, too, do not understand this double standard, which is a vestige of old approaches to relations with the USSR," Gerasimov noted.

"On the one hand, doubt in the success of perestroika is publicly declared, which serves as a pretext for requesting additional allocations for military spending, including nuclear weapons modernisation. On the other, it is confidentially argued that the decline in military might is inevitable and may bring about a change in the military strategy."

German Question

LD1403165290 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov described the recent statement by NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner as "one of many judgements by Western politicians on the German question."

Asked about the USSR's reaction to Woerner's statement that Soviet troops could stay in a unified Germany within an agreed-upon time-frame, Gerasimov stressed that "it makes no sense now to comment on each argument: whether or not Germany stays in NATO and, if it does, whether or not there will be NATO troops or Soviet troops on the territory of the German Democratic Republic."

"The 'two plus four' mechanism (the GDR, FRG and the four victor powers) has been created to examine this problem. They agreed to address and solve together the foreign aspects of the possible unification of Germany," Gerasimov added.

"The presence of foreign troops on German territory is a foreign aspect of the problem," which will be discussed within the framework of the created mechanism.

Warsaw Pact Group Meeting

LD1403165690 Moscow TASS in English 1632 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The Warsaw Treaty multilateral group for information exchanges was met in Moscow on March 13, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing today.

It discussed the situation in Europe, including the preparation for the summit of 35 countries-participants in the conference for security and cooperation in Europe, scheduled for 1990.

Gerasimov also said that the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers would meet in Prague on March 17, 1990 to discuss the German issue.

Chemical Weapons Beyond Borders

LD1403175790 Moscow TASS in English 1642 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—"The Soviet Union did not and does not have chemical weapons beyond its borders. It did not hand them over to anyone, including Angolans and Cubans, and does not intend to do so," Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He commented on the recent FRANCE PRESSE report that the Angolan Government troops allegedly use Soviet-made chemical weapons to fight the UNITA group.

Gerasimov added that "the USSR continues to advocate an early conclusion of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons, provided effective international verification."

Talks With Pakistan on Afghanistan

*LD1403180990 Moscow TASS in English 1644 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—Participants in the recent Soviet-Pakistani consultations in Moscow have reaffirmed their desire to achieve a political settlement of the Afghan problem.

The consultations involved Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov and his Pakistani Counterpart Tanwir Ahmad Khan.

Commenting on the consultations at a briefing here today, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said that the parties expressed mutual readiness to promote inter-Afghan dialogue.

This dialogue, in the parties' opinion, should aim at forming a broad-based government to reflect the interests of all segments of Afghan society and ensure Afghanistan's status as a peaceful, independent, non-aligned and friendly state.

"The sides supported using the existing potential of bilateral cooperation more fully and effectively in a variety of areas," Gerasimov added.

In discussing developments in Kashmir, participants in the consultations agreed that settlement of any problem, including that in Kashmir, should be achieved by peaceful means.

The attention of the Pakistani representative was drawn to the availability of the necessary legal basis—the Simla agreement, signed by Pakistan and India in 1972,—for settling this problem.

TASS Summary

*LD1403184190 Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—"Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's participation in the festivities to mark the proclamation of Namibian independence will be centrepiece of his African tour beginning on March 18," Deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry African Countries' Department Boris Asoyan told a briefing here today.

He said that in Windhoek Shevardnadze would have several meetings with the country's leaders, specifically, President Sam Nujoma, and politicians from other countries. A meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is also expected.

The ten-day tour will take Shevardnadze, apart from Namibia, to Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria.

Gerasimov informed journalists that under provisions of the document from the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, a team of Soviet military specialists today arrived in Norway and began the inspection of military activity on Norwegian territory.

Gerasimov said that Bulgarian Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov would pay a working visit to the USSR from March 15 to 16. He was invited by the Soviet leadership.

"The Soviet Union did not and does not have chemical weapons beyond its borders. It did not hand them over to anyone, including Angolans and Cubans, and does not intend to do so," Gerasimov said.

He commented on the recent FRANCE PRESSE report that the Angolan Government troops allegedly use Soviet-made chemical weapons to fight the UNITA group.

Gerasimov added that "The USSR continues to advocate an early conclusion of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons."

Gerasimov informed journalists that, as mutually agreed, foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation member-countries will meet in Prague on March 17 to discuss the German question.

Participants in the recent Soviet-Pakistan consultations in Moscow along the Foreign Ministry line have reaffirmed their desire to achieve a political settlement of the Afghan problem.

Commenting on the consultations, Gerasimov noted that the parties expressed mutual readiness to promote inter-Afghan dialogue.

A session of the Soviet-Turkish Commission to check the state of the border between the two countries ended in Ankara today. The sides signed an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in building hydro-engineering facilities to prevent or correct diversions in the flow of border rivers.

Adamishin Discusses German Unification Talks

*LD1403231390 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev] After it was decided in Ottawa on 13 February this year that talks on the problem of Germany would be conducted in accordance with the "two plus four" formula, some people in the FRG attempted to interpret this as follows: First, they said, the two German states would strive to reach agreement on unification between themselves, and later—

already at the concluding stage—the four victorious powers would give their okay practically to the fait accompli. However, time, the development of events, and common sense have set everything in its proper place. Here is Viktor Kondratyev:

[Kondratyev] The talks, whose first stage began today at the FRG Foreign Ministry, will proceed simultaneously with the intra-German unification process that has begun. All aspects of this problem that concern not only the Germans must be thought through most carefully. It is important to create favorable prerequisites in order to reduce to a common denominator such problems as a peace treaty with a unified Germany. Bonn is at present against such a treaty. The military-political status is the primary issue. It is no secret that the FRG and other Western countries would like to see the present territory of the GDR within NATO. This all betokens a complex and stubborn discussion and new ideas and options. [Video shows participants in talks arriving and seated at roundtable; Video goes on to show interview with A.L. Adamishin, USSR deputy foreign minister]

[Kondratyev] Anatoliy Leonidovich, could you preliminarily sum up today's meeting?

[Adamishin] A very important thing is that the six are not retreating into themselves. For instance, if there is discussion of borders, which very greatly effects our ally and neighbor the Republic of Poland, there is already general agreement—and indeed we put forward this initiative—that the Republic of Poland in one way or the other, which still has to be agreed, will take part. Perhaps there is indeed an opportunity to resolve this very complex matter in a civilized way, that is to say in a way—and I have in mind the essence of the matter—so that it benefits the Germans, their neighbors, and European security.

[Kondratyev] The participants in the talks were received today by FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. [Video shows talks participants meeting Genscher]

Falin, Journalist Debate German Unity

PM1403111990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dialogue between Dr of Historical Sciences V.M. Falin and PRAVDA journalist V.I. Mikhaylov under the rubric "Dialogue Between a Historian and a Publicist": "Two Germanies, One Europe?"]

[Excerpts] Among the dramatic events in East European countries close to us the changes in the GDR have probably had the greatest repercussions. They have awakened hopes in some people—and not only among the Germans—but anxieties in others. Few people can remain unconcerned when the usual concepts have gotten mixed up and development overflows not only philosophical and state borders, but also the boundaries of the military-political blocs of East and West.

What will happen now? Will the processes that have begun, if they assume a turbulent nature, not affect the chief nerve of European stability—the balance of interests achieved with such difficulty on our continent? Or, on the contrary, will rapprochement between the two German states give a strong positive boost to all-European development? The duality of thoughts, emotions, and presentiments is particularly strong in countries singed by war, such as France, Britain, Poland, Yugoslavia, and, of course, the Soviet Union. The following words are even encountered in readers' letters to PRAVDA on the 45th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War: "What were we fighting for?!"

Dr. of Historical Sciences Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, who has for long years been actively involved in shaping Soviet policy on central European affairs, and Vladimir Ivanovich Mikhaylov, PRAVDA commentator on international affairs and participant in the war and later in peaceful building in East Germany, have attempted to answer this and many other questions. [passage omitted]

German Rapprochement—Boon or Misfortune?

V.M.: In former times German unity had an agonizingly difficult birth. It was established not as the result of national concord but by force. The existence of the empire of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm culminated in World War I. Hitler's empire culminated in World War II. The Weimar Republic, after existing for 15 years, petered out in a mad surge of nationalism.

The experience of those united Germanies cannot be consigned to oblivion. Why? Militarism has repeatedly begun preparing for a new war by "gathering German lands." It cannot be allowed ever again to hitch the German national dream of unity to its chariot and to drive it on by shouting "Deutschland ueber alles." Historical experience is a steadfast thing. And it is hardly surprising when "German reunification," which has begun to appear on the horizon, is perceived as an alarm signal—to differing degrees in countries which suffered from a German invasion: as a tocsin in Poland, for example.

If the prescriptions of the past are dangerous and German rapprochement is now proceeding like "an unscheduled train," should the emergency brake be applied, perhaps? But will this be beneficial for Europe?

V.F.: There are several dimensions to this question. One dimension directly inherits the experience of two world wars. World War I showed that military means are not suitable for resolving political, economic, and national tasks, that the time for military trials of strength was past, and that the policy of force must be consigned to the archives. But, unfortunately, there were circles which conceived the intention of outwitting history. What did World War II decide from the viewpoint of those who began it? Nothing! It created a mass of problems for the aggressor countries but also, alas, no fewer problems for the victor states.

How did those who stood at the cradle of the anti-Hitler coalition conceive of the future of Europe and the world? Here are the thoughts of President Roosevelt, which he shared in 1942. First thesis: The world economy cannot be healthy while the arms race continues. Second thesis: The world situation cannot be stable while military rivalry persists. Third thesis: For lasting, sound peace it is necessary to disarm all states with the exception—I continue Roosevelt's thought—of three or four states. Among them he named the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. As a possible fourth—China. These states should have at their disposal comparatively small mobile forces, which would be used jointly or in contact with each other to nip in the bud any aggression, wherever it might begin. And this must continue for at least 50 years, Roosevelt continued, until peoples and states learn to live under conditions of peace.

V.M.: Having lost half a century in fruitless quarreling, we are now returning to these ideas, with the possible exception of the last, debatable one.

V.F.: Was the decision to split Germany and Europe in order to use the western part of them against the USSR the very best one, proceeding from the long-term interests of the United States? And are there any solid reasons for preserving the confrontation on the Elbe nowadays? It is my profound conviction that this was unjust and unwise then, and is all the more so now. If the opinion exists that it is necessary to stop shadowboxing with the past and to learn something sensible, we must take care to prevent a repetition of past mistakes. And the very first thing to do for this is to abandon the "position of strength" policy, which has been the source of all misfortunes.

There are no weighty reasons for regretting the start of the process of the two German states' unification. On one condition: This will not mark the continuation of the policy of confrontation but the start of surmounting the split in Europe. It will help to create structures here which will separate a period of peaceful civilization from the period of nonpeaceful civilization, which is receding into the past, and provide reliable guarantees that things in Europe will never again reach the point of military conflicts. If development proceeds in this way, the USSR will resolve the problem of its national security, for whose sake our country and people made so many sacrifices.

"Anschluss" Instead of Reunification

V.M.: I would call all these not "conditions" but preconditions. They do not restrict either the GDR or the FRG or put their future association in an unequal position. On the contrary, for the first time in German history they open up scope for peaceful creation, for the real "living space" which the Germans can "win" not to the detriment but to the benefit of themselves and others.

Now, regarding the nature of rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG. I believe that the basic principle of European states' rapprochement—the principle of the

sides' equality and mutual benefit—applies to them too. Not only because their signatures are on the Helsinki Final Act. The genuine unification of the GDR and the FRG can be productive for the Germans and for Europe only on equal terms. It is not a question of numbers—there is no way you can equalize the 17 million in one state and the 59 million in the other—but of qualitative indicators, the level of society's sociopolitical development and spiritual wealth. Both sides have something to exchange here.

But, frankly speaking, I am concerned today at such facts as the unceremonious trespassing on the GDR election campaign by FRG figures of various ranks. As though it were a question of elections already in a united German state. I have not heard of GDR politicians and statesmen having an opportunity to intervene in election battles in the FRG.

Or take economic relations. For decades FRG politicians vowed that they would "do everything" and "spare no expense" to bring "reunification" nearer. The "wall" between the two states has fallen. And what now? Where is the aid for "brothers and sisters" in the GDR? They have brought their republic up to 10th place among the industrially developed states without the billions of dollars that fell to the FRG's lot. In this way they created their own miracle, albeit not such a brilliant one. But in order to prevent unification becoming annexation—an "Anschluss"—they need support now, not later. But, instead of support, everything that can be bought up cheaply in the GDR is being transferred to the West across open borders. Some people seem to want to let the republic bleed profusely and to "save" it by laying their hands on it.

I believe that it would be naive and dangerous to close our eyes to the way attempts are being made—to the accompaniment of prophecies of the GDR's "inevitable collapse"—to use the critical sentiments now prevailing there for the total negation of everything that has been done under the sign of socialism and to turn restructuring in the East German state into the funeral of the very idea of social renewal on German soil. Why dangerous? Above all, because this would revive illusions as to the possibility of securing the realization of mercenary political plans by force, albeit at present by means of economic pressure.

If this continues, the GDR and the FRG will hardly succeed in taking a new role in history and setting an example of cooperation and equitable peaceful rapprochement between states with different social systems.

V.F.: When, as you rightly point out, a stronger state imposes its will on another, less economically significant state, this is not unification but a kind of absorption of one by the other. Let us call things by their proper names.

It is still a question of unification. Of combining the two states' interests, which is particularly complex in this case because the interests and values of two different social systems have to be balanced.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that, as is acknowledged in the GDR itself and partly in the FRG, the GDR not only is not inferior to the FRG in terms of development but also surpasses it with regard to a number of very important parameters. Let us take the system of social protection, upbringing, education, and cultural funding. The FRG has scored impressive successes in the development of technology and science, in road construction, communications, etc. In these spheres it is far out in front. Maybe the combining of GDR and FRG values is of concern to some people in the West because a new, still more dynamic state is arising. This must not trouble us.

I believe that we could welcome such a development, again on the condition that we will be clearly aware how predictable the united Germany's policy will be and what duties and responsibility the German state will assume in order to make peace in Europe stable. In other words, how the process of the new German state's formation will be synchronized with the processes of creating the common European home, i.e. the new Europe in which every people will be able to live without anxiety about its peaceful tomorrow.

Security Above Everything

V.M.: Rapprochement between the German states is opening up before them the possibility of closer cooperation in accelerating the main streams of the all-European process, including disarmament talks. For this is also in the interests of their further rapprochement.

But does the indissoluble causal link between the German question and the security both of neighbors and of other states begin at times to elude certain figures in Bonn? Thus, in FRG coverage of Chancellor H. Kohl's recent Moscow visit they excised from the Soviet side's statement on the Germans' right to resolve their own national question the mention of the need to take account of the fact that this question does not exist in isolation but in a political, historical, geographic, and even psychological linkage with the interests and rights of other peoples. People in countries which were subjected to German aggression cannot forget from where the war came.

I recall that Chancellor Adenauer did something similar. On returning to Bonn, he used his trip to Moscow to glorify his own persona as the "liberator of German soldiers from Russian captivity," forgetting also to mention an absolute "trifle"—his pledge to develop relations with the USSR. And so they fell victim to that "absent-mindedness" for long years.

Or what definition can be made of the plans to include the united Germany in NATO and to move the border of this military bloc from the Elbe to the Oder? How would the West react, for example, if the East were to propose moving the zone of the Warsaw Pact countries to the FRG's western borders—i.e. to the borders of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland? Probably as a provocation. And they would be right.

They attempt to weaken the explosiveness of such plans with a "promise" technically not to advance NATO troops eastward to the Polish border. The authors of these assurances evidently believe that people in Europe have already forgotten how under the Treaty of Versailles German troops were prohibited from being sent west, into the Rhine region, and how easily that decision was overturned.

V.F.: In the West there are various circles, various forces. They do not think identically. There is a desire—to observe this—to extend NATO's sphere of operation to the GDR. It is not a new idea. It was officially formulated some time in 1954. It is now being galvanized. Here is a typical example where, when they say "one," what they mean is "two," "three," or "10." They say "yes" to a united Germany but do everything to ensure that such a Germany does not exist. To advance demands that are known to be unacceptable is equivalent to once again dooming the cause of unification to failure.

M.S. Gorbachev has declared with fitting clarity that a united Germany's involvement in NATO is absolutely ruled out. Attempts to violate or bypass the objective interdependence between German unification and the all-European process threaten to blow to pieces the positive processes in Europe which have come into being and are gathering momentum. The USSR cannot allow this.

What do I think must be done under all conditions? First, a line must be drawn under World War II. It is necessary to put an end to the state of legal uncertainty and create a clear-cut legal basis for a new stage of postwar development, namely—I will repeat—a peaceful stage, Europe's peaceful future. Consequently, it is necessary to conclude a German peace treaty. It must enshrine definite values and define principles, particularly and primarily the principles relating to the inviolability of borders. This is a vitally important question for Poland, for the Soviet Union, for Czechoslovakia, and for all other neighbors of Germany, in the west, the north, and the south. This must not be toyed with, and there must be full clarity.

As long as there is no peace treaty, no one and nothing will be able to rescind the rights and duties of the four powers, their responsibility for Germany, or the settlements of the war and postwar period which are a part of international law and are enshrined and reflected in the UN Charter. If you want to perpetuate these rights, say so bluntly and do not play, for such a game is too dangerous. But if, as the Soviet Union proposes, we must draw a dividing line, a watershed between the past and the future, then let us be consistent and honest.

The second point. Today we must not just speak of the common European home. We all live under one roof and under the same sky, and we largely have the same concerns in life. And if we drag old trash into this common European home with its glass walls, no one will have either comfort or repose in this home. We must

decide what we will leave outside this home. Decide without delay, for the hour of truth has struck!

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact will probably be preserved for a while, although they have to be turned from primarily military organizations into mainly political organizations. A period of adaptation and accustomation to the new situation will be required. Troop withdrawal itself is a complex matter. But it is far more complex to restructure military thinking. Conversion of industry is a very difficult task, but conversion of thinking is 10 times harder. Asymmetry in armaments is very dangerous. But asymmetry in military doctrines is 100 times more dangerous. The peoples will determine from asymmetries in approaches and goals who jut proclaims new thinking and who actually practises it.

V.M.: If we want the sacrifices of the generations singed by war not to have been in vain and the concepts "peace" and "eternal" to finally unite as a single whole in the consciousness of future generations, every people must understand that, however burning its national problems may be, security stands above everything—your own security and another's.

World Response to Presidency Debate Viewed

PM1403151590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p1

[IZVESTIYA Press Service roundup of world reaction to USSR Congress of People's Deputies debates: "There Must Be a Power Capable of Resisting Unexpected Developments"]

[Text] Once again, as has happened many times before over the past months, reports on events in the Soviet Union have pushed all other news of international politics into the background in world news bulletins and the world press.

A great deal of attention is being given to the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which has been in session for two days already and is discussing the main issue of the moment: introducing the institution of presidency in the Soviet Union. In an article on this subject, the Paris newspaper LE MONDE stresses the need for "a power in Moscow that is free to act and capable of resisting unexpected developments." In the opinion of this newspaper's Moscow correspondent, a strong presidency will ensure three advantages: Instructions will come not from the CPSU Central Committee Politburo but from the president; the administration of the state will be concentrated in the hands of a responsible, elected leader; and there will be an opportunity to create a focal point of stability in a period of instability.

REUTER correspondent Jonathan Lyons expresses the opinion in his commentary that the president of the Soviet Union will have powers extremely similar to and, in some respects, even broader than those enjoyed by the U.S. or French head of state. "The Soviet president," the

REUTER dispatch says, "will have the power to introduce a state of emergency and appoint and dismiss ministers." According to the agency, M.S. Gorbachev already enjoys the title of president as chairman of parliament, but his powers are limited and largely formal.

Giving detailed reports on the progress and nature of the discussion that has developed at the congress, agencies point out that on the main issue—whether to introduce a presidency or not—there are virtually no differences of opinion: The overwhelming majority of people's deputies are inclined toward voting in favor of this innovation. At the same time, as the commentaries stress, the discussion has revealed a number of conflicting approaches, primarily on the problem of how to conduct the first presidential election: at the congress, or by universal direct ballot. REUTER points out, incidentally, that the second option—a national vote—is envisaged in the draft for all subsequent elections.

"In addition to the institution of the new executive post," UPI writes, "deputies must also discuss the question of ending the Communist Party monopoly. The introduction of a presidency and establishment of a multiparty system will require amendments to the Soviet Constitution, which in turn will require a two-thirds majority vote taken at a full Congress of USSR People's Deputies."

Reporting on the discussion at the congress, UPI says: "The debates on Monday, when radical deputy Yuriy Afanasyev launched a vicious attack on the founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin, have been followed by political maneuvering. Liberal legislators were furious at Afanasyev and said that his crude comments have damaged their campaign."

In their reports and commentaries on the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the foreign mass media point out that its work has been made more difficult by the decision of the Lithuanian parliament, which has proclaimed national independence. As West German ARD Television stresses, the Lithuanian parliamentary declaration has not solved all standing issues concerned with the republic's secession and self-determination. Vilnius and Moscow, the television report said, have a great many problems to resolve before a full settlement can be reached.

News agencies are citing official and unofficial reactions (considerably more of the latter) by states and foreign politicians to the step taken by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. A White House statement read out by press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, UPI reports from Washington, contains an appeal to the Soviet leadership to "respect the will of the citizens of Lithuania" but does not speak directly of recognition. In response to journalists' questions, Fitzwater added this to the statement: "We have never recognized the incorporation of that republic into the Soviet Union. When an independent

government is finally formed, we will recognize it, but this still must be discussed with the Soviet Union."

BBC Television put the following question to British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Waldegrave: "Does Britain intend to officially recognize Lithuania as an independent state?" "I do not think," he replied, "that any quick decision is going to be taken on this matter, but we undoubtedly welcome the greater freedom with which the Baltic peoples are determining their future. It also goes without saying that we approve of the fact that Gorbachev has made it clear that talks (on the question of Lithuanian independence) are possible. But I think there will be some lengthy discussions before a really independent state emerges, if, indeed, that is the final outcome."

Waldegrave went on to say this: "Judging by the situation that now exists, I think we would have to answer no (to Lithuania's possible request for recognition—editorial note), because, although we are delighted by these events and welcome the steps that have been taken, it is still not possible at present to speak of the existence of a really independent state. No one is disputing the Lithuanian people's legal right to work for self-determination. But when it is a question of recognizing a state, that state must really exist, be viable, and meet those conditions defined by us, the French, and others...."

REUTER reports from Budapest that Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn has said that Lithuania's declaration of independence could jeopardize stability in Europe and the rest of the world.

A statement distributed by the French Foreign Ministry says that "France expresses the wish for a new relationship to be established through negotiations between the USSR and Lithuania, whose parliament has proclaimed independence." Finland's assistant secretary of state for foreign affairs said in an interview with a Finnish news agency that "it is quite possible that Finland will recognize Lithuanian independence. However, the Lithuanian leadership and Moscow must first reach an agreement between themselves on how secession from the Soviet Union is going to be implemented." The Swedish foreign minister stressed in a statement: "We work on the basis that the Lithuanian people's legal rights to self-determination must be exercised in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the Helsinki document." He described the Lithuanian parliamentary declaration as "a clear expression of the strong will of the people." The Norwegian News Agency reports that the Norwegian prime minister has voiced the hope that "this process will not have a negative impact on stability in the region, the policy of reforms, and improved East-West relations."

United States & Canada

White House 'Apparatchiks' Role Viewed

PM1403110190

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 March 1990 Morning Edition carries on page five under the headline "American Apparatchiks. They Have Serious Power" a 2,200-word New York report by own correspondent A. Shalnev. The report begins by describing the power wielded by the "White House apparatchiks," the most influential members of the president's staff, of whom he considers there are 150-200. "But that is quite a lot when you consider the power they have but which is not envisaged at all either by laws or by the constitution." Shalnev then outlines the role played by national security advisers and other aides in the Nixon and Reagan administrations who often bypassed the secretary of state and other cabinet members, citing the "Iran-Contras" operation as an example of the power of the apparatus and apparatchiks in America and giving an account of the influence of Donald Regan on President Reagan and Nancy Regan's part in his dismissal. The report continues:

"George Bush's White House is different. In part because the characters of the people are different and relations in various triangles and polygons are not taking shape as they did under Reagan and, of course, because Bush is not Reagan."

"Let me explain. It does not occur to any of the apparatchiks, even the most daring, to do something behind the back of Secretary of State James Baker who has perhaps become the first State Department leader in several administrations to concentrate in his hands the foreign policy 'doings,' moving others back into secondary roles. It is not only that Baker is a gifted politician who has a brilliant knowledge of all the ins and outs in Washington. The point is also that he is a very old and very close friend of the president."

"Brent Scowcroft, the national security aide, is also unlike many of his predecessors: He lacks the passionate desire to be only in the lead, to be only in the leading roles, a desire which pathologically distinguished Kissinger and Brzezinski. He knows his limits. He knows his functions—the functions of a coordinator but not a judge, an adviser but not a doer."

"John Sununu, head of the apparatus of White House staffers. He is ambitious. But his loyalty to the president is stronger than his ambitions."

"And finally George Bush. In contrast to the incompetent Reagan who, as his recent evident in the 'Iran-Contras' case confirmed, perhaps really did not have any idea of what was being done not only in U.S. foreign policy but even under his nose, in the White House, Bush knows everything, or nearly everything. In contrast to

Reagan aides for him are just aides. But never guides. The decisions Bush takes are his own decisions and no one else's."

"The power of the apparatus in the White House today is thus not what it was a few years ago. But there is power, and very serious power. I have already written that the decision to invade Panama was taken within an extremely narrow circle—of six or seven people among whom it seems only three were 'from the side'—the defense secretary, the secretary of state and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All the rest were apparatchiks."

"And no one from Congress, although Congress alone constitutionally has the right to declare war."

"In Panama, it is true, war was not declared. But an action was perpetrated there envisaged by the law on the power of entering into war. Section 2 (a) of this law adopted in 1973 stresses the pressing need for the 'collectivity of judgment' of the executive and legislative branches of power in situations where matters reach the point of using U.S. forces in military operations. Was this law observed? No: The legislators learned of the aggression three hours before U.S. troops landed in Panama. What collectiveness of judgment was there...."

"Should we interpret this as meaning that the U.S. president and his apparatchiks, having secretly taken a decision and implemented it, had violated the law—if not its letter then its spirit? Congress and the court, called on to monitor the constitutionality and legality of the actions of the executive power, kept silent. It is true that I do not rule out the possibility that law suits may be brought against the administration by members of some public organizations, accusing the administration of acting illegally in the Panama action. But when will that be? And the deed has already been done. A deed in which a very powerful role was played by the apparatchiks, the people about whom there is not a single word in the constitution."

"In conclusion I shall note that many thousands of U.S. apparatchiks from the State Department, Defense department, and many other departments, from Congress, from legal bodies, people who are just as effective and active in their spheres as the White House apparatchiks, have remained outside the framework of this article. They are a separate subject."

Solarz Comments on USSR Asia-Pacific Policy

LD1403150590 Moscow TASS in English 1350 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Washington March 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir R. Matyash:

The "Vladivostok spirit" has had a positive effect on the overall military and political situation in the vast region adjacent to the Pacific Ocean and promoted a peaceful

resolution of conflicts and realisation of measures in the field of disarmament, said Congressman Stephen Solarz evaluating the Soviet Union's Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk peace initiatives.

Solarz presided over hearings that began at the subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on Tuesday. The hearings deal with the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The immense changes that have taken place in the global strategic situation as a result of the latest events in the Soviet Union and East Europe are a faultless indicator that the time has come to take arms control measures in Asia, he said.

It was precisely the Soviet Union, not the United States that displayed a great interest in the possibility of reaching arms control accords and elaborating confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region, Solarz noted.

When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk speeches put forward a number of specific proposals to normalise the situation in Asia, the United States kept silent and has yet to respond to these proposals. The U.S. attitude cannot but give rise to regret, he said.

The U.S. congressman criticised Washington's Far East and South East Asian policies, qualifying them as lacking foresight and perspective in terms of the need to take arms control measures involving naval arms.

He spoke out in favour of reaching negotiated agreements with the Soviet Union to end the arms race in Asia.

He said this would strengthen security and stability on the continent and meet the interests of the United States.

The question of whether the United States should enter the naval arms control sphere, which was not previously covered by negotiations, cannot but be the subject of concern, he said, adding that he believes that the answer should clearly be in the affirmative.

Remarks by Ronald Lehman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reiterated traditional stands about American military presence ostensibly promoting the maintenance of stability in Asia.

He nevertheless had to recognise, however, that such steps by the Soviet Union as the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, by agreement with the United States, had a positive effect on the situation in the region.

Bilateral discussion of East Asian security issues between the Soviet Union and the United States, he said, illustrates the two countries' balanced approach to realities in the region.

At the same time Lehman reiterated the administration's stand, which is increasingly coming under fire. It boils down to an unwillingness to begin talks on naval arms cuts and on the reduction of naval activity.

Having recognised that proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev cover such spheres as a freeze on nuclear arms in Asia, Admiral Charles Larson, commander of the U.S. sixth fleet, said in particular that the Soviet Union announced unilateral cuts in its armed forces, which diminished its offensive capability with regard to China and thereby removed one obstacle to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

It is also quite clear that the Soviet Union is reducing its presence in South East Asia by withdrawing Soviet Navy combatant ships from Vietnam's Camranh Bay, Larson said.

He believes that these measures make it possible to strengthen stability and security in Asia and reduce the risk of war in the region.

At the time the American admiral opposed any talks on naval arms cuts, again showing the Pentagon's desire to keep a large number of U.S. strategic offensive arms in the Pacific area.

According to the DEFENCE NEWS, the United States has 200 combatant ships in the region, including seven aircraft carriers and 32 versatile nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles trained directly on the Soviet Union.

U.S. Enlists Japan in Funding 'Neoglobalism'

PM1303154590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov "Viewpoint": "Who Is Going to Pay for Neoglobalism?"]

[Text] A group of advisers to Violeta Chamorro, winner of the recent presidential elections in Nicaragua, visited Washington not long ago and then held four days of talks in Tokyo. They discussed the question of urgently giving the new Nicaraguan government \$1 billion in aid.

Bewildered questions may arise in this connection. First, is it right to do this kind of business with someone who is not due to officially assume presidential office until 25 April? Second, why have the negotiations on aid begun with Japan rather than the United States, despite the fact that Uncle Sam swore to favor the Nicaraguans with his generosity in the event of the Sandinists' defeat?

The explanation is quite simple. We are seeing the first tangible result of the U.S.-Japanese summit meeting in California and a concrete example of the "global partnership" announced by its participants. The U.S. president complimented his guest on the fact that Japan has promised to give \$2 billion to Poland and Hungary and has expressed willingness to give aid to Nicaragua and Panama. "Wherever we look—to East Europe or Central

America," Bush said, "the United States and Japan are working hand in hand, contributing to transformations which aim to establish democracy and a market economy."

Japan was the first of the "big seven" powers to display a common sense approach to the realities of the Latin American economy. The interest shown by Japanese business in the new possibilities offered by the East European market is also natural. However, Washington has succeeded in adroitly refocusing Tokyo's efforts in a direction advantageous to itself.

The U.S. Administration is now up against an excruciating dilemma. There are a growing number of states to which it would be advantageous to give aid in order to draw them into the orbit of U.S. influence. But it is not possible to increase allocations, given the present federal budget deficit. The only possibility is the \$14 billion-plus offer in the previous fiscal year. But some 80 percent of this amount is already earmarked for the traditional recipients of U.S. aid. These are primarily Israel and Egypt (given just over \$3 billion and \$2 billion respectively) and also Turkey, Greece, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Attempts to cut the usual share apportioned to Tel Aviv and Cairo or to increase aid to foreign states by cutting the Pentagon budget have encountered stubborn resistance.

Meanwhile, Washington has already promised \$1 billion to the new Panamanian government (the damage caused by the U.S. invasion is double this amount). Violeta Chamorro has requested another billion. It is tempting to use injections of dollars to strengthen U.S. positions in East Europe as well. But where are the funds for this going to come from? Capitol Hill has long had a ready answer to this question: Let the Japanese pick up the tab—after all, last year they sold goods to the Americans worth \$93 billion and only bought goods worth \$44 billion from the United States.

Japan gave South Korea preferential loans and credit worth \$4 billion dollars in the past, under pressure from across the ocean. Then it had to act as the initiator of the "mini Marshall plan" for the Philippines in order to help the Pentagon to hold onto its military bases in that country. Last year, the U.S. Congress adopted a resolution which urged Tokyo to pay all the costs of the U.S. military presence on the Japanese islands, which annually reach a total of approximately \$7 billion. During his recent visit to Asia, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney officially proposed that Japan increase its share of this expenditure from \$2.4 to \$4.5 billion.

So, Washington is no longer demanding that Japan more actively arm itself. Now it wants it to be more generous in handing out money. Not only for the purpose of strengthening U.S. positions in the Far East. It is now a question of East Europe and Latin America as well, of "strategic aid to friendly regimes" on all continents. Washington is urging Tokyo to act as treasurer for the

policy of neoglobalism: That is the practical outcome of their talks on a "global partnership."

China

USSR, PRC Sign 1990 Trade Volume Agreement

OW1403015490 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] According to news from Beijing, Soviet-Chinese Government talks on the signing of the 1990 trade volume agreement are being held there. Our station's observer Andreyev writes:

In the past 10 years, the volume of trade between the two nations increased more than fourteenfold to reach 2.4 billion rubles in 1989. During this time, the exchanged goods have diversified and the structure of trade has also changed. The Soviet Union increased its exports of machinery and equipment to China, which now account for nearly 50 percent of total exports to China. Chinese organizations love to buy Soviet power equipment, sedans, aviation technology, railway carriages, welding machines, and other equipment. The Soviet Union also exports to China nonferrous and ferrous metals, timber, chemical products, fertilizer, and [words indistinct] know-how.

The Soviet Union imports from China mainly clothing, knitwear, fur, down products, shoes, cloth, [word indistinct], and other consumer goods—which are all traditional Chinese export commodities and are very popular with Soviet consumers. China also provides the Soviet Union with agricultural products. China's supply of choice wolfram, silver, [words indistinct], and talcum powder is also important to the Soviet Union.

The two nations' border economic and trade cooperation are growing smoothly. Since a governmental agreement on developing direct cooperation between Soviet republics, oblasts, and (?factories) and Chinese provinces and autonomous regions was signed in 1988, direct cooperation developed rapidly and involved the increased use of advanced forms of cooperation, such as (?building joint factories) through a division of labor in production. Many local organizations have signed agreements to establish joint ventures, such as the opening of a Harbin restaurant in Khabarovsk, a Beijing restaurant in Moscow, and an Inner-Mongolian restaurant in (Yilkuske), and the establishment of (?water heater) plants in Tashkent and (Alamutu) and a construction firm in [words indistinct]. So far, a total of 10 Soviet-Chinese joint ventures have been built.

According to preliminary data, contracts signed by Soviet and Chinese organizations last year concerning economic and trade affairs or direct cooperation projects are valued at approximately 700 million rubles. Economic cooperation, including the practice of providing a whole set of equipment and design work and dispatching experts, has played an increasingly important role in the

development of trade between the Soviet Union and China. Even though the sum of money involved is not much, the potential for development is great. Just recently, the Soviets signed cooperation agreements with a number of large Chinese enterprises and units, including Jixian and Nanjing thermal power plants, Wuhan's Anshan Iron and Steel Company, Jiyang and Jixing coal dressing plants, and Shanghai and Harbin gas factories. The Soviet Union is to provide 500-million watt and 300-million watt generating units to Jixian and Nanjing thermal power plants respectively and will continue to furnish facilities for factories with a bearing on the national economy such as [words indistinct]. During the ongoing Beijing talks, a 1990 trade volume agreement will be signed, paving the way for the development of Soviet-Chinese economic and trade relations in the new decade.

The fact that our two nations have similar socio-economic backgrounds, share geographic closeness, complement each other economically, and undertake reforms which proceed chiefly in the same direction, demonstrate the broad possibilities for our two nations to further expand economic and trade cooperation. This cooperation will play a favorable role in our efforts to consolidate mutual understanding and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

Sixth CPC Central Committee Plenum Ends

PM1303151390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "CPC Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Beijing, 12 Mar—The sixth plenum of the CPC Central Committee, 13th convocation, was concluded here today. The resolution "On Strengthening Ties Between the Party and the People's Masses" adopted at the plenum, the XINHUA agency notes, contains a demand that all party organizations pay particular attention to resolving the problems that are causing the the most concern to the country's population and that can be resolved in the current conditions.

The document calls for the improvement in the democratic mechanism for drawing up and carrying out decisions, the continuation of the practice of close ties between the leaders and the people's masses, the improvement of socialist democracy and legality, the development of "the spirit of selfless struggle," and the education of the masses in the spirit of Marxism. The CPC Central Committee demanded that all party members maintain high vigilance, struggle persistently against negative phenomena such as bureaucratism, subjectivism, formalism, and corruption, and restore and develop the best traditions and style of party work.

It was stressed that the 1990's is a key decade in China's development. Despite kaleidoscopic changes in the world arena as well as temporary difficulties within the country, we will be invincible if we regulate our affairs,

particularly if we manage to develop the national economy, it was noted at the plenum.

The report notes that Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Permanent Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, made addresses at the plenum.

Li Ruihan Meets Cinematography Chairman

LD0803165890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0622 GMT 8 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Tomilin]

[Excerpt] Beijing, 8 March—The cinema is an important tool for communication and for deepening mutual understanding between people. This thought was stressed at a meeting held today in Beijing between Li Ruihan, member of the standing committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, and A.I. Kamshalov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography. [passage omitted]

New Study of PRC Foreign Policy Reviewed

PM0703150790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[B. Barakhta "Book Review": "From History to the Present Time"]

[Text] "China and the Outside World" (Footnote) (Ye.P. Bazhanov: "Kitay i Vneshniy Mir." Moscow, 1990. "International Relations" Publishing House) is the only book of its kind. It will certainly attract attention from a wide range of the reading public. This is the first Soviet work on PRC foreign policy in the last 10 years in which the international activity of the Chinese leadership is examined from positions of the new thinking—objectively, not blinded by dogmatism and confrontation.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Ye. Bazhanov, the author of the book, builds his research into the foreign policy of our great neighbor on personal observations, conversations and interviews with Chinese political figures, scholars, diplomats, journalists, and economic workers, and diverse and rare written Chinese sources—including declassified official documents, archive materials, leaders' memoirs, and statements by current Chinese leaders.

The materials cited from USSR Foreign Ministry archives and the memoirs of persons involved in working out Soviet policy toward China are interesting. A broad range of documents and sources of Hong Kong, Taiwanese, U.S., Japanese, and British origin, which are original and have not figured earlier in our historiography, is used. The pages in the book which reveal the whole truth about the frictions between Mao Zedong and Stalin in the 1930's and 1940's, the secret contacts

between Chairman Mao and White House emissaries during World War II, and the conflicts between Mao Zedong and N.S. Khrushchev are absorbing. It is natural that the author pays a lot of attention to Beijing's foreign policy at the modern stage.

The obvious virtue of the book is the presentation of deep scientific analysis in simple and clear language.

USSR-PRC Hold Second Round of Border Talks

*LD2302093390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0622 GMT 23 Feb 90*

[Text] Beijing, 23 feb. (TASS)—The second round of talks of the Soviet-Chinese group of diplomatic and military experts took place in Beijing from 8 to 22 February. The Soviet part of the group is headed by G.V. Kireyev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Socialist Countries of Asia Administration, and the Chinese part by Liu Guanzhi, deputy director of the PRC Foreign Ministry's USSR and East European Department.

The discussion on the guiding principles for mutual reduction in armed forces and for strengthening confidence in the military sphere in the area of the Soviet-Chinese frontier was continued.

The sides consider that reduction in armed forces and the strengthening of confidence in the military sphere in the area of the Soviet-Chinese frontier bear important significance for the development of goodneighborly relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The talks passed off in a businesslike atmosphere.

Meetings took place between the Soviet representatives and Tian Zengpei, deputy PRC foreign minister, and Colonel General Xu Xin, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in which V.Ya. Vorobyev, USSR charge d'affaires in the PRC, participated. The sides agreed to continue the talks.

Future Talks Planned

*LD2302195990 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 23 Feb 90*

[Text] In Beijing Soviet-Chinese talks on cuts in armaments and on promoting measures of trust along the common border have been held. Details in this dispatch from our Beijing correspondent, Vladimir Kulikov:

[Kulikov] Those were not easy talks. During the long years of the military confrontation along the Soviet-Chinese border there have appeared many problems. Life has once again confirmed the whole truth that it is much more complex to build relations than to put up military fortifications.

Speaking to our correspondent the head of the Soviet delegation, Genrikh Kireyev, who is a department chief at the Foreign Ministry, said the talks are the beginning of a long path toward further dialogue about reducing

armed forces and strengthening trust in the military area along the Soviet-Chinese border. Their aim is to give practical meaning to the accords reached in May last year during the summit of the two countries in Beijing.

The head of the Soviet delegation added that the talks were satisfactory both for us and for the Chinese colleagues. They were held in a business-like, constructive and frank atmosphere. That enabled the two sides to understand better each other's stands, to picture the stands more clearly. So, this paves the way for more talks which will begin shortly. Measures to reduce armed forces and promote trust will improve further the situation along the Soviet-Chinese border and will raise the level of trust between the USSR and China to a new level.

All this will be a big contribution to solving security problems in the Asian and Pacific region. For the first time in 30 years Soviet and Chinese military officials, said Genrikh Kireyev, have not only met at the negotiating table but have visited military installations. Chinese officers have been welcomed at an armor division and inspected combat aircraft. We have visited the armor academy and a Chinese infantry division. The head of the Soviet delegation believes that the level the Chinese Army is at responds to present-day requirements. The Chinese Army pays close attention to electronics and has computers at its service.

PRC's Interest in Civilian Aircraft Noted

*OW0503122490 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 1400 GMT 17 Feb 90*

[Report by station reporter (Moyicheyev): "Soviet Aircraft in China"; from "Along the Road of Friendship and Cooperation" program]

[Excerpts] Listeners, let us review the history first. China first used a Soviet civilian aircraft, the Il-18, in 1963. Later, An-2 and An-24 passenger planes as well as (An-26) cargo planes entered into service in China. I believe that many of our listeners are familiar with these aircraft. I would like to mention something else. Cooperation between the Civil Aviation Administration of China [CAAC] and the Soviet All-Union Aviation Export Company goes back 25 years. The supply of aircraft and parts to China continued even during the period when difficulties were experienced in the relations between the two countries.

In an interview with Comrade (Belodolodov), official of the All-Union Aviation Export Company, I asked him which aircraft Chinese aviation experts have shown an interest in.

(Belodolodov) said: Chinese aviation experts currently are showing a strong interest in Tu-154 and Yak-12 aircraft. For example, we have provided China with Tu-154M aircraft manufactured by the (Tubishuv) Aircraft Manufacturing Plant. Since 1985, the company has manufactured 24 Tu-154M airplanes ordered by Chinese

aviation experts. The company also will deliver a batch of Tu-154M airplanes this year. In addition to displaying existing models at the Beijing International Aviation Fair last October, the Soviet Union also displayed models of third-generation aircraft, including Il-96's, Tu-204's, and Il-114's, which will be put into production within the next two or three years. Our Chinese comrades have expressed a strong interest in these new airplanes and are awaiting the prototypes before they make their final decision. [passage omitted]

(Belodolodov) concluded: I believe that contacts between Soviet and Chinese aviation experts will continue in the future.

Runaway Train Crashes at Border Station

PM1403103390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Mar 90 Moscow Edition p 6

[Own correspondent Yu. Balakirev report: "Drama on the Border"]

[Text] Rassypnaya Pad-Grodekovo—A freight train belonging to China has crashed at the junction of the Far Eastern and East China Railroads.

It is thought that the Chinese engineers had either waited too long or had fallen asleep and failed to apply the main brakes, and the old, coal-powered locomotive could not hold back its ten heavy cars. The train picked up speed with each kilometer from the city of Suifenghe and hurtled through three tunnels. Sparks flew from the wheels. Eight cars broke away, some were derailed on Chinese territory, and one was derailed right on the border. The locomotive and the two other cars tore into the Soviet station of Rassypnaya Pad....

Meanwhile, a diesel locomotive with a carful of dozing shift workers, tunnel guards, and a border detail was approaching the "runaway train" from another station—Sosnovaya Pad. The locomotive was being driven by engineer N. Ovchinnikov. Fortunately for the engineer and his passengers, the switch on the border was set for a siding—as is stipulated at times when no trains are expected from China.

"The locomotive and the cars were derailed, plowed across the ground for a short distance, and started rolling down a slope," N. Ovchinnikov said. "The ambulance called out from the rayon center could not reach the high embankment because of the rough ground. It was towed by a four-wheel-drive border vehicle. Doctors at the rayon hospital got in touch with Vladivostok, from where the chief of the burns unit choppered in. By evening, specialists had arrived from a Chinese burns unit. It was while they were there that the engineer Liu Hang, who had received third-degree burns, died. Soviet and Chinese doctors fought for five days for the life of the young stoker Lei You. They could not save him."

Assistant engineer Ke Chang is still alive.

Northeast Asia

Further Reportage on MPRP Plenum Activities

New Mongolian Party Leader Elected

LD1403185790 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar March 14 TASS—The plenum of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) elected Gombojabyn Ochirbat, 61, the party's new general secretary.

He had headed the ideological department of the MPRP Central Committee and worked as chairman of the Central Council of Mongolian Trade Unions.

Over the past two years, Ochirbat has represented the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in the international Communist magazine THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM.

'Much Younger' Politburo Chosen

LD1503000390 Moscow World Service in English
2200 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Mongolia's Communist Party agreed on Thursday [as heard] to give up its monopoly on power and choose a new, younger leadership at its Central Committee plenary meeting. [passage omitted] The plenum also chose an entirely new and much younger five-man Politburo. None of its other full members is more than 50 years old, in what analysts called a reflection of the party's determination to bring in new blood before the general elections due later this year. The plenum also called an extraordinary party congress for 10 April to select a new Central Committee.

'Monopoly on Power' Renounced

PM1403121590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 8

[TASS report: "J. Batmonh Speech"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 13 Mar—J. Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and chairman of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] People's Great Hural Presidium, has delivered the report "The Contemporary Political Situation and Its Assessment" at the Eighth MPRP Central Committee Plenum, which has opened here.

This plenum has been convened, he said, because of the political development in the country, which has assumed a particularly active nature recently. Having defined the tasks of restructuring at the Fifth Central Committee Plenum (1988), the MPRP is pursuing a policy of renewing society's socioeconomic and political life. The Mongolian Democratic Union and other public associations advocate an accelerated pace of renewal. Their demands for the disbandment of the MPRP Central

Committee and the government, the dissolution of the People's Great Hural, the adoption of a new MPR Constitution, and the improvement of the state system on a democratic basis are well known. The MPRP basically sets the same tasks in renewing society and itself.

The main speaker named the bureaucratic-edict system as the chief cause of society's present complex state. MPRP history, J. Batmonh emphasized, does not consist entirely of mistakes and distortions, as some of our opponents present it. The successes that the people have scored over 70 years under the MPRP's leadership cannot be totally denied. It is equally wrong to ascribe the mistakes of Choybalsan, Tsedenbal, and their entourage to the whole party. The MPRP has remained the vanguard of society, has not deviated from its general line, and adheres firmly to the position of restructuring, he said. Despite the difficulties, the masses support the MPRP, and restructuring is gathering momentum.

Without radical measures, the Mongolian leader emphasized, there is a danger that we will approach crisis point. Difficulties must be surmounted not with rallies and demonstrations but through the consolidation of all progressive forces and creative labor.

One of the most important tasks at the contemporary stage is the joint elaboration of a socioeconomic program to ensure the country's stability and development.

Mindful of the situation today and of the wishes for restructuring to be accelerated, J. Batmonh said, the Politburo proposes to convene an extraordinary party congress 10 April and also to bring forward the next congress.

J. Batmonh submitted a proposal to drop the point in the preamble to the Constitution and in Article 82 which proclaims the leading and directing role of the MPRP. This step does not mean our party's abandonment of its vanguard position in society, he emphasized. The MPRP must and can prove its leading role by practical deeds for the people's benefit and the country's interests.

The MPRP is renouncing its monopoly on power and is ready to cooperate with all political forces to create a rule-of-law state and humane, democratic socialism. The individual and his interests have been and will remain the focus of the party's activity, and we will not deviate from this, J. Batmonh emphasized.

The party Central Committee general secretary reported that the Politburo and secretaries of the MPRP Central Committee had decided to resign.

The main speaker proposed involving all political forces in drawing up a draft new MPR Constitution, adopting it on the basis of nationwide discussion, bringing forward the elections to the People's Great Hural from 1991 to this year, and delimiting the functions of party and state authorities.

A debate developed on the report. The plenum is continuing its work.

DPRK Paper Denies 'Fourth Tunnel' Allegations

PM0903122390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS dispatch: "NODONG SINMUN Denial"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 8 Mar—In a commentary published today, the newspaper NODONG SINMUN denies the DPRK's complicity in the "fourth tunnel" under the demilitarized zone discovered in South Korea. The author of the commentary interprets the reports to this effect as a "provocative political display in pursuit of unseemly aims."

The newspaper rebuts Seoul's claims about plans for North Korean "aggression" by means of such tunnels, noting that the DPRK "has no intention of invading the South," which is borne out by Pyongyang's efforts aimed at the unification of the motherland. If a threat of aggression exists on the Korean peninsula, it comes from the South, NODONG SINMUN emphasizes.

TASS on U.S.-ROK 'Team Spirit' Exercises

LD1403201490 Moscow TASS in English 1942 GMT
14 Mar 90

[by TASS correspondent Vladimir Kuchko]

[Text] Seoul March 14 TASS—The U.S.-South-Korean "Team Spirit-90" large-scale maneuvers entered their key phase with an operation to land troops near the South Korean port of Pohang in Kyongsang-pukto Province early this morning.

The maneuvers involve about 60,000 U.S. servicemen, including 43,000 soldiers from the Pentagon contingent that is permanently stationed in South Korea, and units moved from the United States and U.S. military bases in Japan.

Some 120,000 South Korean officers and men are participating in the "Team Spirit-90" exercises. Twenty six ships led by the aircraft-carrier Carl Vinson and the flagship Blue Ridge of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and some 225 combat aircraft are taking part in the maneuvers.

The "Team Spirit" maneuvers have been conducted annually since 1976. This year, however, the number of participants was reduced by 10 per cent.

The group of foreign military observers at the "Team Spirit-90" exercises was extended to include representatives of Poland.

The main phase of the exercises will last two weeks. However, since the troop movement begins in January and ends in April-May, the maneuvers actually extend over several months.

DPRK Responds to ROK-U.S. Maneuvers

LD1403135190 Moscow World Service in English
1310 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpts] In South Korea the "Team Spirit 90" exercise, held together with the United States, is gaining momentum. [passage omitted] What's the reaction to the exercise from North Korea? Radio Moscow's Pyongyang correspondent Mikhail Kretov reports.

At 1900 local time, all the lights in Pyongyang suddenly went out. Sirens wailed. A civil defense exercise began. Such exercises have been held with increasing frequency. All units of the Korean Popular Army, the Volunteer Corps, and the Young Red Guard were put on the alert. This measure is a response to the U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" exercise.

Pyongyang believes that exercise is to blame for another worsening of the situation in the Korean peninsula. Seoul argues that the exercise is purely defensive, and poses no threats to the security of North Korea. The other day, says Mikhail Kretov, I made a trip to the 38th parallel to make a report about the concrete wall crossing the Korean peninsula from east to west. As I stood on a watchtower I saw vast areas of scorched land through a telescope and heard the thunder of long-range guns. A North Korean army colonel who accompanied me said that was the "Team Spirit" exercise. He added that the United States imperialists and the Seoul Administration sought to frustrate peaceful construction in North Korea; the Korean people's efforts for a withdrawal of American troops from South Korea; and for independent, peaceful reunification.

ROK Buildup May Force Countermeasures by North

SK1103075390 Moscow International Service in Korean
1100 GMT 10 Mar 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] South Korea is expected to (carry out) its 5-year program for modernizing its Armed Forces.

Station commentator (Sergei Tereskov) writes that a sharp increase (?is expected) in Seoul's military potential during the nineties.

"The total amount of money needed in the current 5-year plan for modernizing the South Korean Armed Forces is expected to be more than \$24 billion," writes (Sergei Tereskov) who quoted U.S. Army General Louis Menetrey as saying this in the magazine [name indistinct]. This figure is twice as high as had been spent during the 1985-1989 period. A considerable part of this figure will be spent on the purchase of weapons.

This year alone, South Korea is expected to buy weapons worth \$1.5 billion from the United States, and another \$275 million will be spent on purchasing weapons from other countries.

(Sergei Tereskov) continues to write: One gets an impression of whether South Korea's military ambitions are growing with each passing day. No sooner had the bill for the (?allocation) of \$3 billion to finance the import of 120 [word indistinct] U.S. assault fighters—F-18's—been voted on than South Korea already was hurriedly pushing for the signing of an agreement on the purchase of (?several hundred) Hawks—UK-made fighter-bombers.

According to a recent report by the West German news agency [name indistinct], Seoul also plans to buy another 50 West German-made military aircraft, [name indistinct].

(?An examination of reports) clearly show that Seoul has now laid bare its ambitions to equip its (?Air Force) with ultra-modern aircraft. Seoul also shows that it has ambitions to (?increase the capabilities) of its F-4 and F-5 fighter-bombers by modernizing them.

Seoul's ambitious military program is not limited to its Air Force. Seoul plans to add new destroyers and anti-submarine aircraft to its arsenal in the early and middle nineties. It is also paying attention to building its own submarine forces.

Seoul is expected to buy a West German-made submarine [name indistinct] before the end of this year. The ROK's (?fleet) will be equipped with about 10 such battle ships.

South Korea's white paper on defense, published last week, stated that the goal behind such a modernization of its Armed Forces is to develop a military parity with the DPRK by the end of the century.

Nevertheless, many Western military experts note that (?something close to an approximate military balance) has long existed between the North and South.

Under such circumstances, South Korea's program for modernizing its Armed Forces, which will be carried out over the next 10 years, may force the DPRK to at least take countermeasures, in order not to give it the opportunity of (?guessing) that South Korea is insisting on having military superiority. However, the 10-year military (?program) does not necessarily correspond only to South Korea's complex interests.

In conclusion, (Sergei Tereskov) wrote: The Korean people are taking a decisive initiative in the reunification of the country.

Causes of Korean Division Discussed in Moscow

SK1103113890 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 10 Mar 90

[Text] As was reported some time ago, the first Soviet-South Korean academic symposium on the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK was held in Moscow.

The participants in this symposium took an interest in historical issues, in particular the responsibility of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for causing the Korean division. During this hour, you will hear about comparatively less well-known facts of the Korean division in consideration of the views expressed in the symposium.

(Mikhail Smirnov), a historian who participated in the symposium, said:

Here I would like to mention one aspect which played a particularly important role in the fate of the Korean people, and which caused the so-called Korean question. In our country, we have for years referred to the Korean division and the confrontation between the two Korean states as the Korean question. What I would like to mention is the order issued by the Daihinei [headquarters of the supreme command of the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II] dated 1 February 1945. Please remember this date. Because of this order, the Japanese Army stationed in Korea was reorganized. With this order the Japanese Army stationed in Korea north of the 38th parallel belonged to the Kanto Army, and the Japanese Army deployed in South Korea was placed under the 17th Field Army Command that received orders from the Daihinei. The purpose of this reorganization of the Japanese Army in Korea was said to be for reinforcing the troops in case the Soviet Army should attack Korea, and in case the U.S. Army conducted a landing operation on the Japanese territory. Therefore, the Soviet Army, which participated in the war with Japan, had to battle against the Kanto Army deployed in Manchuria and North Korea, and the U.S. Army had to conduct landing operations on the Japanese Islands and on Korea south of the 38th parallel. This was what happened then, as has been known.

Here I would like to appraise the foresight of the Japanese people and the work of the Japanese intelligence service. The Japanese intelligence service may have anticipated the surprise attack on Japan by the allied countries. Here let us turn our attention to the Daihinei order of 1 February 1945. It was winter 1945. There was no doubt how the European war would end. Politicians were interested in what the postwar world structure should be. Although the conflict between the anti-Hitler allied countries was becoming more and more apparent, this conflict was overshadowed by the need for ultimate victory in the war. The war was in its final stage, and it was agreed what joint action the allied countries would take if fascist Germany surrendered. It seems that the Japanese were well aware that the internal conflict would split the anti-Hitler alliance, and that there would not be a single front in the postwar world structure.

(Mikhail Smirnov) continued: What kind of Korea was more desirable to Japan? It was apparent that a strong unified Korea was not desirable to Japan, which was now defeated and weak. A divided Korea would not pose a threat to Japan. Korea would be occupied with its own problems, allowing Japan to remain a state safeguarding

the political security of Korea, and Japan's role in the Far East would be [word indistinct].

Then how could Japan achieve this? It was clear that it could achieve this objective if it could induce the Soviet Union and the United States into a head-on clash against each other on the Korean peninsula. Now it is clear why the Japanese Army was reorganized in Korea.

The Soviet Army applied itself mainly to operating its ground forces in Manchuria, while the U.S. Army had to conduct a landing operation. It is not surprising that a meeting concerning this issue, held in the U.S. Defense Department, took up as a main topic of discussion how to make an operational distinction between the Navy and the Air Force of the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the reorganization of the command system of the Japanese Army. Relevant military documents were prepared along the same principle.

The consequences of this development are well known. Japan's role in this development is well known, (Mikhail Smirnov) added.

This view supplements the explanation on the situation that existed immediately before and after the defeat of Japan during World War II. This view, though it may not be correct, provides a clue to the roles played by all parties involved in the Korean question. We will introduce to you some other views as well, which were presented to the academic symposium held in Moscow.

Commentary Describes Visits to North, South Korea

SK0803065490 Moscow International Service in Korean
1100 GMT 6 Mar 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] In an article carried by the Soviet magazine *NOVOY VREMYA*, station reporter (Leonid Blessy) wrote about the impression his visits to North Korea and South Korea have made on him.

He wrote: I was standing on the other side of Panmunjom. [words indistinct] In the midst of the officers of the Korean People's Army who surrounded me, I looked across at the American tourists talking noisily among themselves at the observation stand. This is what I saw in Panmunjom standing in the Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] between the DPRK and the ROK.

There (?the soldiers of the two sides stood face to face), according to the armistice agreement signed between the two sides. I climbed up to the observation post in the ("Freedom House") to see the very place standing [words indistinct].

The Korean people seemed to compare letting [word indistinct] see the DMZ to combat action. Compared to [word indistinct], (?U.S. soldiers and their ROK visitors looked like South Korean people).

If this amounts to a (?militant treatment) for the North Korean people, it is very (empty), boring job to the South Korean people.

Since a cautious approach between Moscow and Seoul began a few years ago, Soviet publications [words indistinct].

Firm relations of alliance and ties between parties are in place. We do not know in what state they are and [word indistinct]. However, we can see that the two sides can hardly promote dialogue between them.

On the one side are Moscow reformists [as heard] who try to restructure the very foundation of society and on the other are Kim Il-song, the great leader of the people who is bent on maintaining (?the status quo), and dear leader Kim Chong-il, his son and an officially designated successor to him. To have the power of state inherited is a unheard of phenomenon in the modern world.

Moscow is taking pains to avoid (?appearing to be cold) to Pyongyang. This being the case, central publications [words indistinct].

Already, public publications and, publications in the Baltic Republics in particular, are reprinting articles from the Western publications that have long been describing North Korea in blacker color than they used to paint Romania during the Ceausescu's time.

[Passage indistinct] In this context, [word indistinct] can become a partner with the allies of the ROK which is not only rapidly developing, but also moving from authoritarian system to democracy.

The Soviet Union has long been called on to establish diplomatic relations with Seoul. The Soviet Union needs this for economic purposes. The ROK is not only recognized as a little Japan, but also is seeking new markets. Trade and economic interests are not [words indistinct].

Korea's [word indistinct] is the legacy of the cold war and (?the United States) is not the only one to blame for this.

In any case, it is an anachronistic act for the two powerful countries to draw a line of demarcation between them, saying "you support the South and we support the North." This is very dangerous.

Drawing a line of demarcation is creating [word indistinct] perpetuating the division of Korea. The magazine NOVOY VREMYA noted that as long as Pyongyang and Seoul sense the support coming respectively from Moscow and Washington, the two sides will make no move to come close to the other.

Foreign Sources Cited on Kim Il-song Resignation
SK1003020290 Moscow International Service in Korean
1330 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] Japan's KYODO reported that DPRK President Kim Il-song will resign on 25 April, when he reaches the age of 78.

Meanwhile, another report from Beijing, citing Chinese Government sources, indicated that Kim Il-song will turn over his power to Kim Chong-il, his son who is presently a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Worker's Party of Korea.

Pilgrimage To Honor DPRK Leaders Reported
PM1303091790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Hikes to Chong-il Peak"]

[Text] During the period 2 through 8 March, more than 1,200 students of more than 100 of the republic's higher educational institutions made a hike to Chong-il Peak near Mount Paektu-san. The peak was given this name in honor of Kim Chong-il—son and heir of Kim Il-song, general secretary of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea] Central Committee and president of the DPRK.

The newspaper NODONG SINMUN, organ of the WPK Central Committee, reported Friday that the almost 200km route passed through places that "preserve traces of the glorious, brilliant revolutionary history of the great leader [vozhd]" Kim Il-song.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

PRAVDA Views Vietnam's 'Path of Renewal'
PM1403163590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent M. Domogatskikh dispatch: "Vietnamese Breakthrough"]

[Text] Hanoi, March—Vietnam needed just four years in order to—as a result of the implementation of radical reforms—halt the uncontrollable rise of prices, stabilize the population's living standards, and lead the economy out of the critical state which threatened to result in the system's social and political collapse. That was the time of difficult quest for a way out of the critical situation, the time of the Sixth CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Congress, which announced boldly and openly that the economy could not be managed like this any longer, and that it was time to start a renewal of thinking in the sphere of economics and cadre policy. The party forum voted for a new policy although by no means everyone agreed with it, since some saw the congress decisions as a threat to their privileges and methods of management.

Two years were spent on translating the general directives of the congress into specific proposals, the main one being to break down the existing system of supply based on the rigid fixing of norms for raw and other materials for enterprises on the one hand, and for foodstuffs and consumer goods for the population on the other hand. A system whereby inefficient branches of the state sector received subsidies to cover their losses had prevailed for decades.

The ration system also applied the brakes on the recovery of social life. By releasing food and commodities at low prices—a kilogram of rice frequently cost the same as two copies of a newspaper—the state took a great burden upon itself here, too, because it purchased the food itself at considerably higher prices.

And when sages looked at the existing system with a detached eye, they held their heads and said: How far will we get with such management? There was only one possible conclusion: to resolutely repudiate the system of subsidies, funds, plan appropriations, and switch to economic accountability and self-financing, to market relations both in the sphere of material supply to the economy and supplies to the population.

The state managed to create reserves of food at the cost of great tension and, having realized that it could withstand competition with private trade, renounced ration cards and transferred to average market prices. Wages were raised accordingly. And something surprising happened: Prices started falling on the market. Now, for example, a kilogram of rice costs between one-third and one-fifth of what it cost in 1985.

Whereas the question of supplying the population was resolved painlessly, reform in the sphere of managing the state industry proceeded with difficulty. The government's "unpopular measures"—economic accountability, self-financing, and market relations in the supply and sale of production—caused panic, there was a deluge of complaints that the economy was being undermined, and a collapse of the "foundations of socialism" was predicted. This panic began primarily among leaders who lived and did not mind living in a state of economic mismanagement.

This confusion was aggravated by the fact that the removal of restrictions on trade, including trade with foreign countries, caused an influx into the country not just of consumer goods and food products, but also of industrial materials and articles of higher quality than domestic industry produced. The high prices and the low quality of domestic goods prevented them from being sold. No one was any longer forcing people to "buy what was in stock."

Over several months, the warehouses of enterprises overstocked by many hundreds of billions of dong. Unprofitable plants and factories started to cut production or close down. Time was needed for technological restructuring, to either produce new output or to radically improve old output. At the same time, economic

accountability required that production programs be brought into line with the numbers of workers and employees. This was the most painful phase of renewal, since the huge army of almost five million unemployed people increased by another 700,000.

The overstocking caused alarm among the country's leadership. The CPV general secretary appealed to the people to buy more Vietnamese goods. But the situation was successfully improved only by the middle of 1989, and it can be said that in that time the country's economy took an important step in the direction of stabilization, and a way out of the protracted crisis was outlined. The indicators of the tumultuously developing industry in the nonstate sectors sharply improved. In 1989 it provided 79 percent of consumer goods or over 40 percent of the overall value of the country's industrial production.

All sectors of the mixed economy developed successfully because equal conditions based on market principles were created for them, both in supply and in distribution. The attempt to introduce tougher tax norms in certain types of activity was rejected by the National Assembly at the end of last year.

A sensible but strict regime for economizing in everything—resources, funds, and materials—is in place in the country. Even members of the CPV Central Committee Politburo, swapping "Volga" for "Zhiguli" cars, were also included in this economy campaign.

People who have not visited Vietnam for two or three years would not recognize this country. The waiting lines have disappeared. Recently one of the leaders of the republic said half-jokingly: "One waiting line remains in our country—the one at the savings bank, where people want to pay money into their accounts." This is true. The high interest rate on term accounts and other savings accounts (between nine and 12 percent) has helped attract the population's free resources worth many billions and ease tension in the market.

The changes that have taken place in the economy have changed foreign business circles' view of Vietnam. They understand that a country which has increased its exports by 40 percent in a year and has placed 1.5 million tonnes of rice on the world market for the first time in history, is of interest to foreign partners. Vietnam lies fourth in the world in the volume of peanuts it exports. Finally, thanks to the first joint enterprise in the petroleum industry—the Soviet-Vietnamese "Vietsovpetro" company which exported over 1 million tonnes of petroleum—Vietnam has, as it were, officially announced its membership in the world club of "black gold" exporters. In addition, Vietnam is putting tropical agricultural products and ready-made clothing on the world market.

So, all this is attracting Western businessmen to Vietnam. Last year, over a thousand delegations visited this country and, figuratively speaking, carried out a reconnaissance into the future. And although contracts

for joint projects are as yet not large, things will not stop there. After all, it was not because of tourist interest that more than 100 foreign firms representing the interests of over 300 companies wanted to base themselves in Vietnam.

Business people believe that normal trade and economic relations will be strengthened by joint banking activity. The banks of Indonesia, France, the FRG, Japan, and other countries have already made proposals to Vietnam with respect to cooperation in this sphere.

I asked an old friend about the attitude of Soviet bankers in this respect. From his polite reply, I understood that Soviet bankers are looking at Vietnam through old dusty spectacles. And they are not showing any desire to work in Vietnam. This does not apply only to bankers, though. Last fall Vietnam offered us 300,000 tonnes of rice, which would be oh, so very useful in the current food situation. But USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations "experts" rejected the offer out of hand: You see, the quality of the rice is not the same, there is more chaff than in American rice, and the transportation is complicated. But my comrade who is working in Vietnam on economic problems between our countries, was ruthless in his conclusion: Why go to Vietnam when you can go to America or Canada? And arrange a deal there. Never mind that the transportation of calves from overseas [zamorskaya telushka] will cost the state double—the money doesn't come from your own pocket, and it means a contract with America. That sounds good!

I understand Nguyen Co Thach, deputy chairman of the Vietnamese Council of Ministers, who said, again very politely, in a conversation with a correspondent, that in Soviet-Vietnamese relations forms of cooperation must start improving and becoming more efficient.

In this connection, I would also like to mention another aspect of our relations. The fast growth of Vietnamese exports testifies that the country has taken the fetters off trade and has rejected licenses and quotas. But why then is the volume of trade with the West growing twice as fast as with our country? Vietnam is interested in buying large quantities of our nitrogen fertilizers, plant protection agents, petroleum products, trucks, spare parts for equipment used in their country, air conditioners, refrigerators, and consumer goods. And to supply us in return with coffee, tea, rice, meat, high-value tropical agricultural and forestry products, as well as the traditional goods that it exports. But we are restricted by the resolution on quotas even on goods of which we have sufficient quantities and, as a result, we lose out.

If I say that this year Vietnam will supply almost 100 million rubles' worth of personal computers to the Soviet Union, which are being produced by a joint Vietnamese-French enterprise, does this not confirm that Vietnam is different today from what it was a few years ago? And we, Vietnam's old and good friends and largest trade partners, ought to understand and draw one conclusion:

Relations between our countries must improve and not be restricted or, still worse, break down.

After all that has been said, have we given the impression that there are no problems or difficulties in Vietnam? There are both. And in great quantities. Even today, Vietnam is one of the 25 poorest countries in the world, and the annual per capita income does not exceed \$200. The population receives approximately 15 kg of meat and fish annually per capita. In comparison with wages, the prices of many commodities are inaccessible to workers and employees. But the fact that meat and rice, vests and pants, bicycles and motorcycles, and tableware and cloth can be bought at any time if you have the money, is creating a completely different moral climate from before.

The Vietnamese are worried by the growth in crime, corruption, and speculation, and by the deterioration of public order. The party is discussing the theses for the upcoming CPV Central Committee plenum in March. Communists and nonparty members at meetings are discussing the changes in several East European countries and the Soviet Union, and there is an ongoing quest for a way to prevent a development of events that would destabilize the situation. This is being discussed both in high offices and in street snack bars.

The country is living a difficult life in which light and dark shades alternate. But one thing is important—it has embarked on the path of renewal and is taking decisive steps on this path.

Soviet Presence, History at Cam Ranh Bay Noted

PM1403124190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Second Edition p 7

[M. Domogatskikh article in response to reader's letter carried under the "Dialogue" rubric: "Our Base in Vietnam"—first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] I learned by chance from D. Kosyrev's article (PRAVDA 28 January 1990) that there are Soviet aircraft and ships at Cam Ranh Bay (SRV). Hitherto I had heard nothing about our having troops and a naval base in Vietnam. Would you please explain why we have this base?

[Signed] Yu. Shendrik, Krasnodar.

Our correspondent in Vietnam answers this question.

Cam Ranh Bay is a 30-square-mile, deep-water harbor, of which there are not so many in the world. And that is precisely why the United States, embroiled in its long, inglorious war against the Vietnamese people, decided to use it in the sixties as a base for mounting military operations against the national liberation forces in South Vietnam. On the eve of the U.S. expeditionary corps' flight from Vietnam, 50,000-100,000 tonnes of weapons, munitions, food, and combat and everyday equipment were shipped out of the base's depots.

As the documents show, the United States planned to turn the Cam Ranh peninsula into a kind of Hong Kong or Macao on the shoreline of Vietnam. But the Vietnamese people thwarted those plans. In spring 1975 the combat banner of the People's Liberation Forces of Vietnam was raised above the destroyed U.S. base of Cam Ranh Bay.

Four years after the victory the Soviet Union received in Cam Ranh Bay, with the SRV Government's assent, part of the territory and facilities to set up a material and technical support station for its Pacific Fleet. Submarines and surface ships put in there after long training voyages for rest and repair and to take on fuel, water, and food.

The Western mass media started comparing Cam Ranh Bay with America's Subic Bay base in the Philippines. Seeking to intimidate people with the "Soviet threat" and the "Soviet Fleet's naval expansion," they completely ignored the size and power of the American base at Subic Bay. In 1988, during his visit to Krasnoyarsk, M.S. Gorbachev put forward an initiative aimed at easing tension in the region. "If the United States eliminates its military bases in the Philippines," he stated, "the USSR will be ready, by agreement with the SRV Government, to relinquish the fleet material-technical support station in Cam Ranh Bay."

The Soviet Union unilaterally announced a reduction in the strength of its armed forces in the eastern part of the country and their transfer to a purely defensive structure. This also affected Cam Ranh Bay. The USSR began reducing its presence in the region. At the end of 1989 MIG-23 and TU-16 aircraft were withdrawn from Cam Ranh. There now remains an air detachment there with a variable complement of 6-10 planes.

However, the United States, ignoring the Krasnoyarsk initiative, is seeking to retain its military presence in the Philippines.

Near East & South Asia

USSR Denies Role in Afghan Coup Attempt

PM1403193590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 8

[Unattributed report: "Tanay's Groundless Claims"]

[Text] Former Afghan Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanay, who fled to Pakistan following the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the legitimate government in Kabul, has issued a statement giving his version of recent events in Afghanistan. As AFP reported, Tanay claims that the reason the putsch was defeated was Soviet aerial bombing of their [as published] headquarters, as a result of which radio communications were cut and control of the army subunits involved in the revolt was disrupted. Tanay also alleged that during the putsch President

Najibullah took refuge in the Soviet embassy, from where he led combat operations together with Russian advisers.

An IZVESTIYA correspondent called the USSR Foreign Ministry and asked for a comment on the former Afghan defense minister's statement. In a ministry spokesman's words, Tanay's claims are groundless. "They are so absurd that they do not even warrant commenting on. We know incontrovertibly that during the revolt President Najibullah was not in the Soviet Embassy. Not a single Soviet aircraft participated in combat operations. The government suppressed the putsch with its own forces."

Vorontsov, Pakistan's Khan Hold Talks 11-13 Mar

LD1403164590 Moscow TASS in English
1547 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—Soviet-Pakistani consultations were held in Moscow from March 11 to 13. Taking part in them was First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Yuliy Vorontsov and Pakistani Secretary for Foreign Affairs Tanwir Ahmad Khan.

The sides discussed in a businesslike and sincere atmosphere the present state of Soviet-Pakistani relations and prospects for their development. They went on record for the fuller and more effective utilization of the existing commercial, economic, scientific, technological and cultural potential, for cooperation in new areas.

Particular attention was paid to questions linked with the situation in Afghanistan. The Soviet side stressed that an early and comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan problem would contribute substantially to the general improvement of the situation in the region and to the deepening of bilateral Soviet-Pakistani relations.

Both sides reaffirmed their desire to achieve a political settlement of the issue and their readiness to promote the inter-Afghan dialogue in order to establish a broadly representative government. This would reflect the interests of all sections of Afghan society and would ensure Afghanistan the status of a peaceful, independent, non-aligned state, friendly towards all nations.

The Pakistani representatives' attention was drawn to the urgent need to release and return home Soviet war prisoners held by the Afghan armed opposition and to purely humane aspects of the issue.

Ahmad Khan expressed Pakistan's readiness to help solve this problem.

The Pakistani representative informed the Soviet side about the situation in Kashmir. The sides agreed that the settlement of any problem, including the Kashmir issue, should be achieved only by peaceful means and by the sides directly concerned.

Agreement was reached to continue regular consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries.

Commentary on U.S.-Iranian Relations, Hostages

*NC1403124090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Station commentary]

[Text] Washington and Tehran are continuing their restless, mutual recognition of each other's policies. The two countries' mass media reported U.S. President Bush's efforts to phone Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Someone already phoned Bush from Tehran claiming to be the president of Iran, but this person was a fake. Our commentator writes on this:

In relation to this, one may agree with an Iranian newspaper's view that the atmosphere of trying to establish contacts between Tehran and Washington very vividly reminds us of the situation before the Irangate scandal. In both cases, both sides tried and are trying to hide their efforts and to keep their political transactions secret.

What is the reason for the secrecy that both countries' leaders are pursuing? At first glance, the explanations given on this seem convincing. After all, each time secret contacts and talks are revealed, the intention behind them is said to be releasing Western hostages who have been captured by pro-Iranian Shiite organizations in Lebanon. This is an extremely intricate and acute matter. After all, the revelation of such contacts may harm those whom the terrorists have taken captive.

However, both sides' remarks on the fact that the hostage talks have nothing to do with reviving diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran make one cautious. I do not want to say that feelings of humanitarianism and compassion are innately strange to Washington and Tehran. Definitely U.S. and Iranian political figures do not lack such feelings. However, humanitarian issues are logically coupled with improving relations between the governments. It is impossible for the hostages to be saved when the diplomatic confrontation continues. Also, experience shows that sometimes the fate of the Western hostages in Lebanon has been solved contrary to Tehran's wish. The White House is well aware of this. Nevertheless, it feigns that the fate of the hostages in Lebanon is completely in the Iranian leadership's hands.

The possibility that the hostage issue is only a pretext for talks on normalizing Iranian-U.S. relations appears more logical, but there are difficult problems in this. The Iranians' anti-American feelings have not yet decreased. These feelings were a reaction to the cooperation between the United States and the shah's antinational regime. These feelings exacerbated especially after the revolution and the economic and political siege that the United States and its allies imposed on Iran. Washington's refusal to return the shah's family's assets, which

have been frozen in American banks, has enraged the Iranians. The U.S. military's suppressive operations during the Iran-Iraq war also harmed the Iranians' national pride and respect.

Currently, the White House is counting on the rivalry among conflicting groups in Iran. One of these groups is ready to make ideological and political concessions and to approach the West. Some American statesmen hope that this group will win, but this is not a far-sighted calculation. This calculation ignores fundamental Iranian interests, and normalizing Iranian-U.S. relations cannot progress if Iran's fundamental interests are not considered.

Andreyev on UN Human Rights' Report on Iran

*NC0103125390 Moscow in Persian to Iran
1100 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] A report on the situation of human rights in Iran was published in Geneva on Monday [26 February]. This document was prepared by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, special representative of the UN Human Rights Committee, who visited Tehran recently. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev studies the conclusions drawn by this report and writes:

This spectacular 76-page document was studied at the UN Headquarters early on Monday morning. Many were impatiently waiting for it, and the Iranian diplomats in Europe reported to Iran about the text of this document immediately after it was published.

This is not surprising. This document was of immense significance as far as Iran's international credibility was concerned. As you know, during the past few years, the United Nations has strongly criticized the Islamic Republic for trampling on human rights and Tehran was condemned for persecuting its political opponents and for the mass execution of political prisoners. The members of the Italian parliament, Britain, the United States, and the European Community demanded that Iran be expelled from the United Nations and that all ties be severed with the Islamic government.

It was under such conditions that the Iranian leadership decided to invite the UN human rights representative. In Tehran's opinion, this visit would refute the various reports on suppressions in Iran. Meanwhile, the Iranian opposition organizations tried to use the visit by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl's delegation to Iran for propaganda attacks on the government. For example, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization in Europe and in the United States started a propaganda campaign against the regime and organized demonstrations and hunger strikes. In short, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl's visit became the nucleus of a strong political struggle in which the great variety of forces were involved.

The feeling is that the conclusions drawn in this report are the outcome of a specific compromise. The prologue to the document says that a deep schism and discord emerged in the Iranian society during an emotional revolutionary period, and armed struggle—with extremely destructive consequences—became one of the characteristics of this schism. In the opinion of the committee headed by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the violent nature of the domestic political conflicts in Iran inevitably led to terrorist methods. The report confesses that the Islamic government resorted to group executions in order to achieve its objectives. The UN representative on human rights pointed out that he has discussed this with Iran's officials on several occasions.

Reynaldo Galindo Pohl also stressed that in his opinion the extent of violence in the regime's policy has lessened. The UN Human Rights Committee said that group executions are gradually decreasing, even though many prisoners—possibly numbering a few hundred—are still awaiting execution. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl refuted reports on the torture of prisoners, pointing out that what was seen in the Evin prison do not prove that such allegations are true. Moreover, the report also does not state anything about a large number of regime opponents in the Iranian prisons. But it seems that insufficient documentation is presented to explain this.

In short, the conclusions drawn by this committee are extremely cautious. But these conclusions have neither increased nor decreased Tehran's credibility on the international scene.

PRAVDA Cites Reports on Disorders in Tehran

*PM0203122190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Disorders in Tehran"]

[Text] London, 28 Feb—An Iranian opposition organization has blamed the Iranian authorities for the fact that "Islamic revolutionary guards" killed at least 10 people during disorders that assumed an antigovernment character in Tehran on 16 February. As reported by REUTERS, the Mojahedin-e Halq organization has stated that the bodies of the murdered were secretly buried in one of the city's cemeteries a few days after the event.

REUTERS also cites an opposition source to the effect that antigovernment acts subsequently spread to other Iranian cities.

Tehran, 28 Feb—The Iranian newspaper JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI has roundly condemned the propagators of "mendacious rumors" about the events that took place in Tehran's 100,000-seat stadium. That day, the newspaper points out, the police arrested 30 hooligans for throwing stones at cars and buildings near the stadium. Disorder broke out as a result of football fans' protesting the canceling of the match because of unfavorable weather conditions.

As JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI comments, the "malicious propaganda of imperialist mass media is designed to sow discord and divide the people."

Article Criticizes Shamir's Plan on Soviet Jews

*PM0103115990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4*

[Article by An. Stepanov under the rubric "Observer's Notes": "Choice Without Choice"]

[Text] Every day hundreds and thousands, if not millions, of people throughout the world cross state borders in search of work, a more dignified life, and a better application for their abilities. Sometimes they are driven by hunger, fear, persecution by the authorities, and ethnic conflicts. For instance, a phenomenon like the interstate migration of manpower has become entirely familiar, one of the components of the worldwide economic integration process.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations after the war says that every citizen has the right to leave his country and to return freely. Under the conditions of perestroika and the creation of a genuinely rule-of-law state our country is consistently advancing toward making this provision part of its national legislation. A special draft law is being prepared in the USSR Supreme Soviet on the subject.

But an unprecedented propaganda campaign has already been launched around the expanding emigration of Soviet Jews. The Israeli ruling circles and those who protect them in Europe and across the ocean are trying to use this topic in their own unseemly interests.

The statement by Y. Shamir, Israeli premier and leader of the "Likud" bloc, to the effect that "God has always come to the assistance of the Jewish people at the most difficult moment" and that it is from precisely this viewpoint that he sees the prospect of the settlement in the next five years of up to 500,000 Soviet Jews in Israel which, he says, will help implement in practice the dream of a "Great Israel," has had a bombshell effect in the Arab world. People there rightly assessed these words as a call to settle the new immigrants on the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel and gripped by the uprising—on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip.

The implementation of these plans, that is the de facto annexation of Palestinian lands, not to mention the fact that it is in flagrant contradiction with universally recognized norms of international law, would strike a blow to the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the fair solution of the Palestinian problem and would open a new chapter in the sorry history of military confrontations in the Near East.

Y. Shamir obviously cannot fail to be aware of this, but he nonetheless embarks on a deliberate act of political provocation. Especially since, as the Israeli press writes,

proceeding from real opportunities, it is possible to settle and provide work for only 25,000-30,000 immigrants a year. So that the call for mass immigration is in many respects a bluff. At the same time this act of provocation pursues a number of aims: Sinking the peace process in the region and, if not wrecking it completely at least gaining from its participants the terms most advantageous to "Likud"; preventing Soviet-U.S. cooperation in the solution of the Near East conflict on a just basis with a consideration for the interests of both Israelis and Arabs and primarily of the Palestinian people; appeasing the "hawks" in his own party bloc and at the same time halting and, if that is successful, reversing the trend toward the change in Israeli public opinion in favor of peace talks with the Palestinians and in favor of the formation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel; and driving a wedge in the Soviet Union's friendly relations with the Arab world.

Y. Shamir's plans generated the greatest fears among the Arab states bordering on Israel and, of course, among the Palestinians themselves. According to Jordanian reports, during the years of occupation Israel has already moved 46,000 people from the West Bank and Gaza. If there is a mass expulsion of the Palestinian population from here, there will simply be nowhere for it to go except Jordan. That is, Y. Shamir's long-standing idea that the Palestinians already have their own state—Jordan, where they comprise the majority—will be implemented in practice.

The leaders of a number of Arab countries have demanded that a pan-Arab summit conference be urgently convened to examine "the problem of the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel." Here the situation is being dramatized to some extent and claims are heard that "the flood of settlers which is on the point of surging into Israel is no less serious a threat to the Arab world than that state's formation in 1948." For the sake of objectivity I shall report that, according to Israeli figures, last year about 13,000 Jews arrived in the country from the Soviet Union (which is approximately 16 percent of those who left) and over 5,000 arrived during January of this year. AFP reports that of the total number of settlers from the USSR about 11 percent live in the region of Greater Jerusalem, whose Eastern Arab part Israel annexed in 1980. Actually, 0.01 percent of immigrants from our country now live in settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza.

Unfortunately, in speculating on the Arab public's entirely justified anxiety, some figures and propaganda organs in the Arab world who support the Palestinian uprising mainly verbally are eagerly raising a din about the "Soviet-U.S.-Israeli plot against the Arabs" and are trying to dictate to the Soviet state the kind of laws it should establish in its own country. It is hard to explain this campaign as anything but the desire to earn dubious political capital. Libyan leader M. al-Qadhafi gave the proper assessment of this campaign, stating that he supports the convening of an emergency pan-Arab conference as long as it is not directed against the USSR.

Otherwise the conference will become a "plot against the Arabs" and will deprive them of "an ally and friend." Proceeding from this principled position, the Soviet Union asked that a session of the UN Security Council be convened to examine Israel's illegal actions in settling the occupied territories.

As for the United States and its declared adherence to the universal observance of human rights, a dual standard shows in Washington's approach. On the one hand a spokesman for the State Department states that the United States has not rendered and will not render any aid in the settling of Soviet Jews on the occupied territories and denounces the above-mentioned statements of Y. Shamir, but on the other hand, Washington provides Israel with \$3 billion in military and economic aid every year which, of course, cannot fail to facilitate the work of the Israeli "fishers for souls" and "developers of a land without people by a people without land."

Actually, we should obviously not portray the Jewish emigres as "lambs" who are being driven they know not where. It must be supposed that they take the decision to leave for Israel while in their right minds and they must naturally know the consequences of this step. I do not want to lay it on too thick but they will have to experience the hardships of the difficult adaptation to life in Israel, all the "pleasures" of serving in an army of occupation, the fierce competition for jobs under conditions of 12 percent unemployment, and the hostile attitude of those strata of working people whose material prosperity is steadily declining, for reasons that include the reallocation of budget funds to provide amenities for the new arrivals.

In that case if, instead of being "welcome guests to the promised land" Jews from the USSR become colonists and occupiers on the land of another people—the Palestinian people—then the uninvited arrivals will inevitably come up against resistance from that people, who enjoy the unanimous support of the world public.

'Conspiracy' With U.S. on Emigration Denied

JN0103192490 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1745 GMT
1 Mar 90

[Text] Al-Shariqah, 1 Mar (WAKH)—Feliks Nikolayevich Fedotov, Soviet Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates [UAE], has denied the existence of a U.S.-Soviet conspiracy regarding Jewish emigration, describing such reports as lies.

The Soviet ambassador was cited by today's issue of AL-KHALIJ newspaper published in al-Shariqah as saying there was a U.S.-Israeli conspiracy, because Washington shut its doors to the Jewish emigrants when Moscow allowed this emigration.

Defending his country's policy of permitting Jewish emigration, the Soviet ambassador said most Jewish

emigrants from the Soviet Union do not want to go to Israel, but to other places, specifically the United States and other Western states.

He said that the settlement of Soviet Jews in the occupied territories is considered a blow to all political efforts to settle the Middle East crisis. He explained that Moscow fully understands Arab concerns on the emigration issue as well as the dangers it will create.

However, the Soviet ambassador reaffirmed that Moscow would not change its policy of permitting Soviet Jewish emigration. He indicated that there is coordination between his country and Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat and the PLO on all issues, including the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Briefing Outlines Shevardnadze Tour of Africa

LD1403160190 Moscow TASS in English 1526 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—"Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's participation in the festivities to mark the proclamation of Namibian independence will be centrepiece of his African tour beginning on March 18," deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry African Countries' Department Boris Asoyan told a briefing here today.

"The granting of independence to Namibia is a momentous event that caps the colonial period in Africa and is an important stage in the African people's 30-year-old struggle for political independence," Asoyan stressed.

He said that in Windhoek Shevardnadze would have several meetings with the country's leaders, specifically, President Sam Nujoma, and politicians from other countries. A meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker is also expected.

Asoyan noted that this was a groundbreaking visit by the Soviet foreign minister to tropical Africa. The ten-day tour will take him, apart from Namibia, to Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria.

In each of these countries he will meet leaders to discuss bilateral relations and interaction on the international scene. Emphasis will be put on the situation in the south african region, especially on settling the situation in Angola and Mozambique, and rapid changes in South Africa.

Shevardnadze will be accompanied by a large group of Soviet journalists representing TASS, NOVOSTI press agency, the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY newspaper and the popular Vzgl'yad Central Television programme.

Student Demonstrators Appeal to Gorbachev

PM1203134190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent S. Demidov dispatch: "We Need Peace! Demonstrations in Addis Ababa"]

[Text] Addis Ababa, 11 Mar—Chanting the slogans "Stop the Bloodshed!" and "We Need Peace, Unity, and Progress!", students from Addis Ababa University marched through the streets of the capital. From the University campus the columns of young people carrying national flags and banners moved toward the diplomatic missions of a number of foreign states.

Approaching the Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia, the demonstrators read out an open letter from the university students to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. They appealed to him to use every opportunity to help solve their innumerable problems—from the famine that has again gripped several regions in the republic to the internecine war that is tearing the country apart. "We ask the leader of this great, friendly country," the students' message said, "to use all your influence to put a stop to our people's misfortunes and suffering." The text of the letter was presented to Yu. Nikitenkov, Soviet consul [as published] in Ethiopia.

The demonstrators then moved toward the British Embassy and the U.S. diplomatic mission. The U.S. charge d'affaires was handed an appeal to U.S. President G. Bush.

Subsequently tens of thousands of Addis Ababa's residents gathered in Revolution Square. At a rally organized by the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) metropolitan province committee the actions of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigre People's Liberation Front, which have launched active combat operations against government forces in the republic's northern and other regions in recent months, were condemned. The speeches voiced a resolve to rebuff these opposition groupings. Those present approved the government's intention to strive to settle the conflict around the negotiating table.

Vorontsov Meets Heads of Diplomatic Missions

PM0203172790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, met 28 February with the heads of diplomatic missions from the African "front-line" states—Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Tanzania—as well as representatives of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO Namibia).

Angolans Cited on U.S. Arms Supplies

LD0203115990 Moscow TASS in English 1148 GMT
2 Mar 90

[Text] Launda March 2 TASS—"The terrorist UNITA [National Union for Total Independence of Angola] group is using money received from the U.S. Government to recruit mercenaries in Europe and the United States. They will be used in an attempt to restore UNITA's control over Mavinga, a strategically important locality in south-eastern Angola," Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro de Kashtu Van-Dunen said here.

Mavinga, which was under UNITA control for many years, was taken by the Angolan Army early this February.

In an interview with the Mozambique news service, the [as received] Van-Dunen denied reports that government troops resorted to chemical weapons during their offensive in the south-eastern part of the republic.

"This operation," he stressed, "pursued the purpose of achieving complete victory over UNITA and compelling it to give up its policy of war. The Angolan Government is doing everything possible to resume peace negotiations as quickly as possible".

"U.S. military advisers are urgently delivering various cargoes to UNITA rebels," said a spokesman of an Angolan delegation that came to Washington to convince the United States to stop aiding the anti-government UNITA group and thereby contribute to a political settlement of the Angola conflict. "These cargoes have arrived at a port in Zaire and are being flown from there to UNITA bases. There are at least eight U.S. military advisers supervising this operation," the spokesman noted.

RSA Interest in Regional Stability Noted

MB0803091990 Moscow in English to Southern Africa
1900 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Igor Potovski commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] The meeting of the tripartite commission—Angola, Cuba, and South Africa—on control in the settlement in South-West Africa has ended in Luanda.

According to the sources close to the participants in the meeting, the main question of discussion that ended the two-day meeting in Luanda concerned the situation in Namibia. Commentary by Igor Potovski:

That meeting was the last on the eve of the promulgation of independence of Namibia, and that, naturally, determined the priority of the questions discussed and the assessments given in Luanda. What predominated in them was, evidently, the general satisfaction both with the course of the commission's work and the UN activities during the transitional period.

The participants at the meeting congratulated the special representative of the general secretary of the United Nations with the results of his work in Namibia. According to the assessments of the commission, the step taken by the governments of Angola and Cuba, which have resumed the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from the territory of Angola, was also positive.

No less positive was the reaction to the information on the prospects of direct talks between the Angolan Government and the antigovernment grouping, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. I hope that this will happen in several days, the head of the South African delegation in Luanda, Neil van Heerden, said.

Probably the situation in Angola was the only factor, but a substantial one that darkened the general picture. An Angolan representative said that in Namibia, too, there cannot be stability or peace as long as war continues to be waged near its borders.

You cannot probably say today that the optimistic forecasts concerning the talks between the two sides in Angola testify to sharp changes in the situation. It is, however, the possibilities of beneficial changes that are standing behind them.

The position of UNITA has not changed, but after the military failures near Mavinga after the headquarters of Savimbi, in Jamba, was bombed, the initiative of a cease-fire and talks, nonetheless, comes from UNITA. That is important.

But, it seems the most weighty cause for a careful optimism can be considered to be the changes in the positions of the adherents of UNITA. The general director of the South African foreign ministry, Neil van Heerden, said that the talks between the government of Angola and UNITA will be held not in Zaire and not with the mediation of President Mobutu.

The role of Pretoria is becoming an evidently priority role, after the recent visit to Luanda of the South African foreign minister, Roelof Botha. According to Van Heerden, South Africa now has contacts with both sides, and that is a very convenient position in any talks. Besides that, the South African diplomat said that President dos Santos also reacted very favorably to Roelof Botha's proposal on the role of Pretoria in the settlement of the conflict in Angola.

The conclusions that can be drawn from all that are simple: The tough line of the United States, which just recently manifestly predominated and told seriously on the actions of Savimbi, President Mobutu, and on the course of the entire process of talks as a whole, did not justify themselves. [sentence as heard]

If the present changes and the viewpoints speak about the realization of that reality, that is already a positive (?factor). In any case, Pretoria, in the present situation in

South Africa and the region as a whole, are evidently very interested in the stability of the situation in the south of the continent.

East Europe

Troops in Poland Said Necessary for Security

LD1403212890 Moscow TASS in English 2112 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw March 14 TASS—Further presence of Soviet troops in Poland is required by the process of formation of the system of European security, the Polish Government's spokesman for the press Malgorzata Neza-bitowska told a news conference here.

Commenting on the decisions adopted by the Tuesday [13 March] meeting of the Polish Defence Committee, she said that a delay in the withdrawal of Soviet troops had been prompted by Polish security interests. She also pointed out that only airforce squads whose presence is inconvenient for the residents of the nearby areas should be evacuated.

Polish Concerns Over Border With Germany Noted

PM1403140190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Starukhin: "German Question" and Polish Response: Blue Border Along the Odra-Nysa...."]

[Text] Warsaw, 13 Mar—There is clearly nothing more delicate or painful in relations between states than the question of the precise demarcation of territory.

The most unsuitable, even uninhabitable, plot of land or stretch of water of no significance to anyone may, as is well known, serve as a cause for years of controversy, mutual hostility, and even armed conflict. But we are now talking about something far greater—about the immutability of a border running for several hundred kilometers between the Republic of Poland and a future, as yet unknown Germany.

The border "flows" along the swift-running, serpentine River Nysa. It continues its course along the River Odra—as a result of an agreement reached in the ashes of World War II, unleashed by Hitlerite fascism. This border was described as definitive and immutable. So whence the grounds for disquiet? The point is that the word "immutable" exists on paper, but the realities of world development often show that borders do change, and the frontier in this region of Europe has shifted more than once. Moreover, it seems no accident that West German political leaders always seek to avoid discussing this question and fail to undertake to directly confirm and enshrine guarantees of this territorial immutability in an interstate document.

Poles pinned enormous hope here both secretly and openly on the long-prepared and oft-postponed visit to their country by Chancellor Kohl. Last year the chancellor visited Warsaw, but did not seem to consider himself fully authorized to talk seriously about the border. But now, on top of that, there is the rapidly developing question of the unification of the two Germans.

Can neighbors feel calm if they wake up one day to see on the map the outline of the very power which launched a war half a century ago?

The "two-plus-four" formula, in the Poles' opinion, requires an addition. Of course, the shape of the united Germany should be determined primarily by the Germans themselves plus the four victorious powers. However, as the Polish Committee of Victim-Cities and Peace-Cities stated the other day: "Nothing about us, without us." Discussion of the German-Polish border is clearly bound to worry the Poles. And now that Soviet troops are beginning to leave the countries of East Europe and the places they are stationed, there is a sudden silence in Poland, where only yesterday the public would sometimes suggest to our military that they return home. Our army cannot, of course, become a bargaining chip. Neither a moral one or any other kind. At the same time it is crystal clear to everyone that the host country feels calmer at the moment with external military support.

But a guarantee is necessary for many reasons.... For the vagueness and omissions concerning the German-Polish border are seen by politicians in a far broader perspective. L. Miller, general secretary of the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic Central Executive Committee, put it this way in the newspaper TRYBUNA: "There is no Polish border problem, but there does exist a problem of European peace now and in the future."

In discussing the existing borders some FRG figures describe them not as historically formed, but as "imposed" borders, borders which "encroach" upon the nation's interests.... Here the main aspect of the "border formation"—the unheard-of barbaric, genocidal aggression without precedent on our planet carried out from German soil—has a veil drawn over it, as it were.

But are there no forces urging revenge in the FRG today, and who can assure Poland that they will not grow in number and strength...? Yet all the people who suffered were also protected by borders. In other words, the present borders cannot do their job if they are unreliable. And when Helmut Kohl—apparently an experienced politician—made a gaffe and said not long ago that the inviolability of the borders can only be guaranteed if the Poles renounce reparation for the damage caused them as a result of Hitler's aggression and if they provide appropriate rights to the German national minority in Poland... In short, a trade-off! But such things are not traded. The chancellor did, it is true, correct himself shortly afterwards. And the opinions of the leaders of the

four powers and the other countries in some way involved in the "German question" and the broad strata of the public of Europe agree that the unification of the two German states is possible only if there is a guarantee of the inviolability of the borders and all-European security. That alone is acceptable.

Charge of Hungary Pullout Delay Rebutted

PM1403114990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 8

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "Hungary: Full Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begun"]

[Text] Hajmasker-Budapest—Hajmasker Train Station, 1100 hours. The train which will set out for the Soviet border station at Chop in two hours' time has already been loaded. Hundreds and hundreds of the same or similar trains will be heading home practically every day, as IZVESTIYA reported yesterday.

"As the intergovernmental agreement lays down, the withdrawal of our troops from Hungary is to be completed in full by the end of June 1991," Colonel V.V. Koreshev, chief of the political directorate, said. "According to preliminary estimates, 540,000-560,000 tonnes of freight has to be brought out. Some 950 railroad trains will be required just to move the hardware, and a further 117 to transport personnel. Impressive figures, certainly."

The troop withdrawal is only beginning but, according to my military interlocutors, the mass of problems which will be encountered is already becoming apparent. It has come to light that of the 17,000 servicemen's families (50,000 people) heading home, 11,000 families do not have their own accommodation, and 10,000 schoolchildren will have to be found places. The problems have already been raised, and their resolution brooks no delay.

The first stage, according to Col. V.V. Koreshev, is to be completed by the end of 1990. During this time primarily offensive arms are to be withdrawn, chiefly from western and central regions of Hungary, which will make up in all 70 percent of the combat units and hardware.

It is no secret—and IZVESTIYA has already written about this—that a large section of the Hungarian opposition has been demanding a reduction in the time taken to withdraw the Soviet troops. Figures from the Union of Young Democrats even brought their posters to the station to see off a troop train. Right on the platform they began trying to demonstrate to journalists that the timetable is excessively long. Can the troops be withdrawn more quickly? Not only have our military people been replying to this question in recent days, but so have Hungarian Government experts together with Hungarian Foreign Minister G. Horn, who declared after signing the agreement in Moscow that the schedule is as tight as possible.

"We are prepared to make our calculations available to the new Hungarian government which will be formed after the elections," V.V. Koreshev said, "and to discuss this question with it. So to say that the Soviet side is deliberately prolonging its troop withdrawal is to disregard the existing realities and the complexity of the problems to be resolved."

And the realities are such that, in addition to the withdrawal of hardware and personnel, many complexities will also certainly arise with the property being left behind by our units—apartment blocks, barracks, schools, etc. Those that were leased by our troops are reverting to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense.

...The send-off ceremony for Major Zorin's battalion at Hajmasker Station comes to an end. Marching tunes are played. The order is given to entrain. A final question before the long journey: What is the soldiers' mood?

"In general, not bad," Private V. Reshenko from Krivoy Rog says. "Although it is all proceeding rather hurriedly, because we learned of our departure only a few days ago; but a soldier always wants to go home, to the motherland."

Romania's Celac Praises Relations With USSR

LD1403134490 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT
13 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Morozov]

[Text] Bucharest March 13 TASS—Sergiu Celac said that his recent visit to the Soviet Union was serious, constructive and well prepared, in an interview with the ADEVARUL newspaper.

The visit served to promote new Soviet-Romanian relations, he said.

Talks focused on specific issues and produced tangible results that will be evident in the near future, he said.

Asked if the Soviet Union planned to cut deliveries of raw materials to Romania, Celac said he saw no such signs during his one-day stay in Moscow. The Soviet side had no intentions of reducing its deliveries, despite certain internal difficulties, he said.

Bilateral economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Romania is expanding. A Soviet Government commission has been set up to coordinate economic ties with Romania. The commission is headed by a deputy prime minister.

Cooperation involves goods exchanges and the production of goods in Romania with Soviet raw materials and electricity, helping create more jobs for Romanian workers.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Visits Moscow 15 Mar
*LD1503063690 Moscow TASS in English 0607 GMT
15 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—Bulgarian Prime Minister and Communist Party Supreme Council member Andrey Lukanov arrives in Moscow on a working visit today. He was invited by the Soviet Government.

Soviet people welcome the arrival of Andrey Lukanov and express confidence that "his visit will help deepen comprehensive cooperation between the USSR and Bulgaria and cement Soviet-Bulgarian friendship," PRAVDA writes today.

PRAVDA carries the guest's biography and photograph.

Bulgarian Leaders Thank Soviets for Greetings

*PM1403143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1*

[Bulgarian leaders' greetings to USSR leadership bodies]

[Text] To the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers

On behalf of the Bulgarian people and ourselves we thank you for your cordial congratulations and wishes on our national holiday—the day of Bulgaria's liberation from the Ottoman yoke.

We are convinced of the need to ensure that all the positive and valuable elements in Bulgarian-Soviet relations are not only preserved but also developed and renewed and that the age-old abiding values of friendship between our people are strengthened and enriched. This accords with the interests of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and our striving for radical democratic transformations and will promote mutual understanding, cooperation, and security in Europe and the world.

[Signed] Petur Mladenov, chairman of the Bulgarian State Council;

Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

Gerasimov, Others View German Unification

*PM1403104890 London BBC Television Network
in English 2130 GMT 12 Mar 90*

[Panel discussion with Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov, in Moscow; Otfried Hennig, FRG deputy minister for inter-German relations; Senator Richard Lugar, "chairman of the U.S. Senate Arms Control Observer Group"; former French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson; and former UK Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine, in the studio, by presenter David Dimbleby, on BBC 1 "Panorama" program following a report by Fred Emery entitled "Who's Afraid of Germany"—no date given]

[Text] [Dimbleby] Well now, we're going to discuss some of the wider issues in this whole business of the uniting of the two Germanys. We asked the British Foreign Office to have a spokesman here, but they have refused. I am, however, joined by Michael Heseltine, former defense secretary; and we have spokesmen from the three other powers who are guarantors of the settlement after the Second World War and of the West German Government. And I'd like to start, if I may, with you, Gennadiy Gerasimov, from Moscow. This quotation that Gunter Grass uses: "When we think of Germany and about finding our way we must also think of Auschwitz: It's not just history; it still affects us today. We Germans haven't forgotten it, nor have our neighbors." Is that megalomania, what you in the Soviet Union fear from a united Germany?

[Gerasimov] This is certainly true, this observation is certainly true for us: It's psychological, it's emotional. You can use logic, and you can argue that Germans are different now—there is no Hitler inside. But we do remember, especially older generation and of course even the younger generation: They had all the hardships of the war years; they do remember that Germany attacked us, and we paid a very high price for our victory. So it's this psychological momentum which must be taken into account by politicians.

[Dimbleby] But is it therefore psychological and not, in your view, a real danger or a real threat that's posed: Is it simply political psychology in the Soviet Union?

[Gerasimov] Political psychology is also political factor: You must take it into account. As to the real danger, it is not here today, we hope, but there is no guarantee for tomorrow. That's why we are concerned.

[Dimbleby] Well, let's hear from some of the other countries involved. Claude Cheysson, former French foreign minister, do you see a danger from the French point of view, or concern from the French point of view, about the reuniting or the uniting of the two Germanys?

[Cheysson] No, certainly not, but I think it is very important that one should not forget what happened. You see, history has a tendency to repeat itself unless the course can be changed. I think what was very important when we started the Community is that we were trying to find a new course for history. In fact, we are doing exactly the contrary of what was done in Versailles after the First World War. At that time Germany was isolated, Germany was condemned to pay sanctions and what. The result is that the Weimar Republic could not, could not succeed. We ourselves prepared the ground for Hitler and Nazism: I think it's very important not to forget that. So remember the past—not only the bad parts of the past but the reasons why one came to the bad.

[Dimbleby] Michael Heseltine, isn't some of the language that's been used—particularly here in Britain—about the danger, or the perceived threat, from a united Germany actually rather offensive to Germany?

[Heseltine] I don't think you can write history out of people's memories. There are people who feel profoundly concerned, as Mr. Gerasimov and Claude Cheysson have so rightly said, but the important point about what we've done in Europe over the last half century is built on the determination of people who lived through the Second World War—the visionaries of the prisoner of war camps and the resistance movements—that we would create a different framework. The whole point of putting together the iron and steel industries of the six European countries after the war was to stop them being harnessed ever again for national war purposes. The inspiration of the European Community was to give a sense of purpose which was different to the national rivalries of history, and that seems to me the important message to have in our sights: How do we continue to work together in the new opportunities that Mr. Gorbachev's foreign policy has opened up for us that were never there for the whole of the postwar world?

[Dimbleby] Well now, Ottfried Hennig, as deputy minister for inter-German relations for the West German Government and involved very closely in these things, do you find offensive—or even possibly potentially politically dangerous—the kind of language that these countries are using about unity?

[Hennig] I think it would be fair to look at the whole history. There were centuries, many centuries, when we, the German people—and the Russian people, for example, but also the Baltic States, the Baltic peoples—had very good and positive relations, when masterpieces of European art were built together. Of course we had 12 very bad, catastrophic, years, and our responsibility for Auschwitz is not a doubt: This is the case, and this will always be the case, that we have the responsibility for that.

[Dimbleby] So what do you say now to these countries?

[Hennig] But nobody should overlook the fact that for 45 years now we Germans have proven as democrats, as standing on the right side—the side of freedom, the right of democracy, the right of self-determination. We have chosen the way towards Europe—what Claude Cheysson said is very, very true—and we have decided to be very close partners with the French people, with the British people, with all our European partners; and this European-mindedness has not always been seen positively from Britain. We will continue with that, and we will always remain on the side of freedom. I think you can be very sure about that.

[Dimbleby] Mr. Gerasimov, is that not a sufficient reply and guarantee for the Soviet Union?

[Gerasimov] The sufficient reply would be an all-European home: This is the idea which may be implemented in the future. We now see the progress of all-European integration—you talked about European integration but actually had in mind West European integration. Now we think that East Europe and West Europe are moving towards each other and that we must

find ways to find... to build up this... some kind of political structure where Germany will be no danger to anybody, not to neighbors.

[Dimbleby interrupts] But what about....

[Gerasimov] The question of borders comes into the picture—the question of borders.

[Dimbleby] You're talking of the Polish border there, which I was going to come to later, but can we just....

[Gerasimov interrupts] Not only, not only the Polish border: our own border, too.

[Dimbleby] Well, we'll come to those borders in a moment, but what about the basic German position—which is that a united Germany should remain a member of NATO—to which the Soviet Union objects. What is it that you object to in that: Isn't that actually safer?

[Gerasimov] We object to it now because we want to retain stability and balance in Europe; we want the European process to continue in a balanced way; and if you add a united Germany to NATO, then it's imbalance, in our view. So the only way out is to change the character of this alliance and the Warsaw Pact alliance, to make it more political; to find some ways to cooperate with each other; and then maybe to change the nature of these alliances, maybe even to dissolve these alliances.

[Dimbleby] Well, let's stick on this point because it's a key one; let me, before I come back to you.... In Germany: Senator Lugar, you were with Chancellor Kohl today.

[Lugar] Yes.

[Dimbleby] What is the American position on this? You are one of these allies that are going to have to agree this thing. Do you think it's right that a united Germany should remain in NATO? Or how would you deal with the fears Mr. Gerasimov has expressed?

[Lugar] I think it's very important that the united Germany remain in NATO—really, all of Germany remain in the European Community. Obviously these are stabilizing factors, without any doubt. I would just make a historical point that the United States certainly remembers the holocaust, and we think about this frequently, but we remember also Helmut Schmidt in 1979 at the London conference of NATO talking for the so-called two-track decision, in which NATO countries committed themselves to Pershing-2's in Germany in 1983, and the Germans under Helmut Kohl followed through. And I would submit that we would not be enjoying this particular period of freedom and democracy and openness in Europe had there not been this constancy via all of our friends in NATO—but especially the English, the Italians, the Germans—at a critical point. And because of that, you know, we think carefully about that stability that's being discussed, and Germany as very much a part of that in NATO.

[Dimbleby] Well, how do you intend to respond, then, to what Mr. Gerasimov has said—that they don't, in the Soviet Union, envisage the possibility of a United Germany remaining in NATO?

[Lugar] Well, I would hope that as President Bush and President Gorbachev discuss this—or at the ministerial level, Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker discuss it—they will come to a different point of view. Very clearly, a neutral Germany of 80 million people outside of any security system is not a desirable situation with the Soviet Union or anyone else, so clearly Germany is not going to be a part of the Warsaw Pact, which is disintegrating. So logically the NATO focus is the one we ought to be looking at.

[Dimbleby] Michael Heseltine.

[Heseltine] The essence of the problem is that if you have a neutral Germany, you actually are asking the Americans to take their troops back across the Atlantic, and you have decoupled the Atlantic from Western Europe. Nothing could be more destabilizing if you look at our history: It has been one that gives you no grounds for believing that we would be safer in such a situation under the harsh realities that the Russians can withdraw their troops a few hundred miles to their own country. The Americans are on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. So I don't think it is realistic, and certainly not desirable, to see Germany outside the NATO alliance. Now, where I think the issues are worth positive exploration is: Is there some way in which a united Germany—which we shall see sooner rather than later—could accept some system whereby there's a buffer zone in the present East German republic whilst NATO retains its forces in the Federal Republic. If there was some process whereby that was possible and in which the Soviet Union played a role in a monitoring context, it may be that there was a confidence-building arrangement which could satisfy the Russians. But I think it's important—Mr. Gerasimov will not deny it, I'm sure—that you have had hundreds of years in which the instinct of Russian foreign policy has been to push its frontiers further and further away from Moscow. One cannot look forward and assume that the lessons of history have been written out of the context.

[Dimbleby] Mr. Gerasimov, I'd like you, if you would, just to go on listening for a moment, because I want to bring in the other two, and then I'll come back to you, because I know you're anxious to come in. Yes, Mr. Cheysson.

[Cheysson] Yes, it's quite striking that at the beginning of this discussion the German, the French, and the Brit all agreed that we had to come to some kind of political integration. How could there be political integration if the security position of Germany is different from that of the others? That's my first point. The second is: NATO is what it is now, and we still need it for a while—don't forget that the armed forces in Britain... in, sorry, in the

USSR, are pretty strong. NATO will be something different in the future—when, I do not know—and it's within that NATO of the future that we have to see whether the whole of Germany belongs or not. In between we have NATO as it is, and the West part of Germany is part of NATO and must remain part of NATO, and there must be as part of the political integration a certain integration between conventional forces in Western Europe.

[Dimbleby] Now, Ottfried Hennig, do you see a way out of this problem, and a way of satisfying the concerns of the Soviet Union, which consists of having the East part of Germany as in some way not quite in the same relationship to NATO as the West part of Germany when the two are united—which to some people may seem a wildly impractical proposal. But is that the way forward, as far as you're concerned?

[Hennig] I think that the solution is not so complicated as you might think. Nobody wants a neutralized Germany: It will only be 76 million, but I think it's too much to be neutralized....

[Dimbleby interrupts] Well, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would like a neutralized Germany: Mr. Gorbachev has said so.

[Hennig] I'm not so sure whether this is really the last word, and I think that we should try to make it clear to the Soviet Union that we, the Germans, still need the protection of NATO. This is a very fundamental point: The world is too dangerous not to have NATO. We would invite the Polish people, the Hungarian people, if they continue their way to democracy—and I think they will do—to join our integration. It will not only be a West European integration: It's a European integration. And then, let's find a way to respect the Soviet demand for security. And I think this is possible—to find a way to construct the European order of peace where all these factors are combined. I think we can do that in the next month.

[Dimbleby] Well, Mr. Gerasimov, you've heard various proposals for ways of supposedly meeting your position on this. Do they?

[Gerasimov] Well, mainly these arguments are borrowed from the past: In my view, it's an outdated past. They approach the security problem from your own point of view—Western point of view. You talk about the security of the West as opposite to the security the East, which means a division in Europe. Our approach is different, which also coincides with the last words which I have heard—that we must have European integration including not only Eastern Europe, but the Soviet Union itself. And then maybe these arguments about the necessity for Germany to stay in NATO because of some kind of danger from the East will fade away.

[Dimbleby] But this is a long-term proposal, isn't it? We're actually here talking, also.... I mean, what happens in the next month or two?

[Gerasimov] We have so many changes already in Europe, and Chancellor Kohl, when he is Moscow... when he was in Moscow, he argued about two tracks—one track, German unification; the other track, European integration—and talked about synchronization of both processes: And we agree with him.

[Dimbleby] Can you answer one point: What pressure would the Soviet Union be in a position to bring if a united Germany just decides, as a sovereign government, to remain in NATO? What do you do?

[Gerasimov] This is not the pressure: This is the mechanism which we agreed upon—two-plus-four and maybe Poland, in addition—and this is the forum to talk about external aspects of German unification.

[Dimbleby] And do you mean that in....

[Gerasimov interrupts] Now, this is where we're going to put our arguments on the table—if not pressure.

[Dimbleby] But do you mean to say that you see the two-plus-four arrangement as one in which the Soviet Union has a veto, effectively, on a settlement of the German question in terms of German unity?

[Gerasimov] Why veto? We must have a consensus, because as I understand the situation, all partners want the same thing: They want a peaceful Europe.

[Dimbleby] Yes, but....

[Gerasimov interrupts] So it's... the argument's about the way—how to get there.

[Dimbleby] No, but it's perfectly clear from what we've heard that the other three allied powers do envisage Germany remaining in NATO. The Soviet Union doesn't. And my....

[Gerasimov interrupts] It's very difficult to imagine Germany in NATO when Soviet troops are there in German Democratic Republic.

[Dimbleby] Ah, so the negotiating point is the withdrawal of Soviet troops who are stationed in East Germany?

[Gerasimov] This is one of the points to talk about, yes.

[Dimbleby] So that is in fact the strength of the Russian position—that you actually are in place in East Germany?

[Gerasimov] Another strong point is our Vienna talks: At Vienna, the European nations are talking about reducing the level of armaments, and the talks are successful so far. So this is just something in which we can bring this sense of security to Europe without referring to NATO all the time.

[Dimbleby] Senator Lugar, there's clearly a very big gap between the perceptions of the... of a united Germany on the part of the Soviet Union and on the part of Britain,

America, France, and indeed Germany. You've heard what Mr. Gerasimov said about the fact that they have troops in East Germany and that this would be part of the discussions. What approach do you think should be taken to persuading them that the way that you see forward for the united Germany is the right way? And if you can't succeed, what happens then: Does the unity of Germany have to wait until this question of security has been solved?

[Lugar] Well, Mr. Gerasimov offers at least the possibilities for how the change might occur. Surely the CFE talks in Vienna (the conventional forces talks) are going to lead, we believe, this year to an agreement which will level off Soviet troops in the forward zone—that means Germany—to 195,000: That's roughly half of the Soviet troops that are there now. And if we come to consensus and finally signature on that, at least half of those troops under some timetable will depart. Already the Hungarians and the Czechs have arranged for a timetable with the Soviets. I would suspect Mr. Gerasimov and the Soviet side would agree we should proceed to a CFE Conventional Forces 2, which is another set of talks on how we move down further to lower and lower levels of Soviet troops—and for that matter, American troops—in the forward zones: That we contemplate in the United States, and I think most NATO countries do. I think there is a negotiation procedure which is underway, and as I found with Mr. Kohl and Mr. Genscher today: They see the Soviet situation as one in which negotiations for security of the Soviets have to be a part of this.

[Dimbleby] Well, let's put the point to Ottfried Hennig: What happens if—after the elections on Sunday in East Germany—a new East German Government says they want unity; Chancellor Kohl says, "we agree;" and you decide, as the two Germanys, to unite? Will that have any standing at all with the four until there's been agreement with the Soviet Union on the withdrawal of Russian troops, or which way around do you see this happening? Because it looks as if it could be heading for a stalemate if the unity is prepared and ready, and you both want to go ahead, and you've been told by President Gorbachev that you can, but the issues of security haven't been resolved.

[Hennig] Well, I see the union of Germany happen: It has begun, the process is in full program, and I think that a democratic government in East Berlin will decide, the way you put it. But I find that the Soviet aspects concerning their demands for security—it is rather easy to find a solution to that. As Senator Lugar put it, we will have for the time being some Soviet troops in East Germany, and they don't disturb me very much, as long as we have the perspective that after an interval—after an intermediate range period, after, let me say, five or 10 years—everybody goes home, and I think then we will [approximately 10 seconds recording drop due to video tape change] for all the Europeans.

[Dimbleby] Well, let's turn to a second point that Mr. Gerasimov raised, because he is clearly the one most

worried about the various aspects of German unity. But that was borders, and the question of the Polish border, and we know that over the last week it seemed that France, for instance, Mr. Cheysson, is supporting Poland in their claim for a very clear-cut united German guarantee of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland before unity: That is the position, as I understand it, of the French Government.

[Cheysson] Well, it's clear everyone must know that the borders as they are now are final. They are not only inviolable—no negotiation can be entered into that would change them: They will not be changed. This is essential for stability in Europe.

[Dimbleby] How do you want that to be put: I mean, in what form do you want that guarantee to be given?

[Cheysson] Certainly this must be part of some kind of international agreement or agreements: some between the four that have direct responsibility in Germany still; some between Germany and Poland; some between all of those. But may I say—referring to what you were asking before—I think your questions are put as if we were still in a period of confrontation. Well, yes, everyone would use its force, it's possibility of threat, or I would even say of blackmail. But this is not the climate now. The climate is that we try and find agreement between the main partners in Europe and those involved in Europe; therefore, we are not going to ignore what the Soviets think, and neither are the Americans.

[Dimbleby] Michael Heseltine, do you agree that it is as straightforward as that, and that there is now goodwill on all sides, and that everything will go through, and the things we're talking about are being put in the wrong way, as Mr. Cheysson said?

[Heseltine] Monsieur Cheysson is absolutely right about the climate, and that is something which is profoundly to be welcomed, but I think that what we have to remember is that the Soviet defense requirements have to take into account China, they have to take into account their southern Islam frontiers; and I don't believe that the Russian defense capability—either its technological capability or its conventional strength—is going to be run down to a point at which, in the West, we are going to view with equanimity the departure of the Americans out of the NATO alliance. And that seems to me the fundamental point which requires an American presence in Germany for the foreseeable future.

[Dimbleby] Do you, Mr. Gerasimov, foresee the opposite of that—the United States' withdrawing their troops from Germany and therefore from Europe?

[Gerasimov] I think that in time the American troops in Germany will become irrelevant and just an additional burden to the American taxpayer. We are depriving NATO the image of the enemy. Some people are already talking that Warsaw Pact is fading away: It's certainly weakened now with these events in Eastern Europe, with Soviet troops being withdrawn. And we're cutting our

forces by one half a million men and we're cutting our tanks by 8,000 and our aircraft—military aircraft—by 800, and we will continue this process. We're cutting our strength to size, and the Soviet-Chinese border is now not being demilitarized but at least we are... we have less fortifications there, and we are... it's a quiet border. So this is the tendency, which means that NATO will have no opponent.

[Dimbleby] What about this other question of borders: Were you satisfied with what you heard Mr. Cheysson say about the way he thought the problem of the... or not the problem, but the way that the Oder-Neisse line should be guaranteed? Is that the way you want to go?

[Gerasimov] Well, we have this mechanism for negotiations. I think we must have some kind of international guarantee. I agree with him in this sense, yes.

[Dimbleby] Well, Mr. Hennig, what do you make of what you've now heard? Do you think that there are going to be difficulties in the way of the uniting of the two Germanys or particularly over the question of a peace treaty or a final settlement—particularly over the question of satisfying the Soviet Union? Are we going to see this process which has been running at such a pace slow down now, or is it going to go on helter-skelter, as it has been, after next Sunday's elections?

[Hennig] Well, self-determination, first of all, means that the people in the GDR—the Germans in East Germany—have to decide what they want, and they have to say what they want. I am very confident that they will say with the vast majority that they want a reunited Germany. And then I'm very optimistic that we will find the surroundings—the European security surroundings—which fit into that process. And I think that the Polish-German border then will be no obstacle at all, because the untouchability of that border is part of our Constitution: We have said in 1949 that no force ever again will be applied in German policy, and so every Polish citizen and the whole Polish people can be very quiet, because this will be a very peaceful border.

[Dimbleby] Do you, very briefly, recognize that you have a problem in allaying the distrust or the mistrust among your neighbors in Europe about a united Germany?

[Hennig] Of course I do, yes. I see history as it is, and I see this as a process in which we have to build confidence-building measures—as many as possible—towards the East and to all directions. But I am very optimistic that we will fulfill that mission and that at the end of the year we'll be very much further.

[Dimbleby] By the end of the year?

[Hennig] By the end of the year.

[Dimbleby] Thank you very much indeed for joining us, all of you gentlemen from the various capitals of Europe, Mr. Heseltine here in London. That's all from "Panorama" for this week. Good night.

West Europe

TASS Notes Start of 'Two Plus Four' Talks

LD1403132290 Moscow TASS in English 1254 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn March 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Nikolay Kalintsev:

A meeting of experts from East and West Germany, the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France to discuss external aspects of German unity began in Bonn today. It opens a series of talks according to the "two plus four" plan agreed upon in Ottawa.

Representatives of the two German states and of the four victorious powers will discuss complicated foreign policy problems, linked with Germany's reunification, primarily questions of security. This includes the recognition of existing borders, the elimination of any possible danger emanating from Germany, the latter's place in military-political alliances, and the problem of foreign troops on German territory.

The meetings will be held alternatively in the capitals of the states taking part in the "two plus four" negotiations.

The Bonn round, as was the recent meeting of FRG and GDR experts, will be devoted mainly to procedural questions.

TASS Comments on Talks

LD1403151990 Moscow TASS in English 1456 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—By TASS political analyst Yuriy Kornilov:

The negotiations on German reunification according to the Ottawa "two-plus-four" scheme have begun in a rather complicated situation. On the one hand, there is the stand of the Soviet Union and other nations that believe the process should be carried out step by step and should not upset the existing equilibrium in Europe which ensures the continent's stability and security.

Proper account must be taken of the rights and interests of the four victorious powers and of other states, especially neighbours. All revenge-seeking territorial claims must be renounced and the political will of Germans living in East Germany must be honoured. Their hopes and aspirations are borne out, for instance, by the results of the recent public opinion poll in the GDR, published in the British SUNDAY TIMES newspaper. They show that 79 per cent of the republic's population believe that a united Germany should be neutral.

This is one view. It is clear and constructive. But diametrically opposed concepts have been advanced by Bonn and Washington circles, which, as rightly noted by German Social Democratic Party security and disarmament expert Horst Ehmke, are "hostages of the obsolete

positions of strength policy" and favour East Germany's actual annexation by West Germany.

They adhere to an absolutely unacceptable and legally unfounded scheme, according to which Germany's future should be decided not within the CSCE process, not by the population of the two German states, but by a narrow group of Bonn politicians juggling Article 23 of the FRG Constitution, which allegedly allows for a mechanical inclusion of the GDR in the Federal Republic either by parts, by separate lands, or as a whole.

The Soviet Union has unequivocally declared the unacceptability of a future united Germany's membership of NATO, irrespective of what reservations are made. Many sober-minded Western politicians and public circles share this view. They are convinced that a united Germany should not threaten or undermine the national interests of its neighbours or any foreign states.

But certain West German circles care little for all this. They place their imperial ambitions above constructive discussions, clinging as before to their Atlantic formula, which, far from facilitating the "two plus four" talks, is liable to deadlock them.

It is worth noting that the West German political parties are openly interfering with the election campaign in the GDR, financing political groups that suit them and endeavouring to foist their political programmes and views upon the East German population. This holds true, for instance, of Helmut Kohl's recent visit to Rostok. Addressing an election meeting there, he urged East German voters to "overthrow the Communist big-wigs". It would be interesting to see West Germany's reaction if some political leader from a neighbouring country came to Bonn and behaved as though he was in his own backyard, urging to replace the cabinet in such outrageous terms.

Judging by everything, it will not be easy to achieve a consensus at the "two plus four" talks. But there is no alternative. And if the West really wants the legitimate desire of the German people for unity to come true, it must discard once and for all the great power projects of "swallowing up" the GDR, must double and even treble its efforts to "make the unification of the two German states an inalienable part of the all-European process."

PRAVDA Editor Frolov Receives FRG Envoy

PM1303102190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Meeting at Editorial Office"]

[Text] At the PRAVDA editorial office 9 March, I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, met with K. Blech, FRG ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

USSR-Finland Peace Treaty Anniversary Marked
LD1303221790 Moscow TASS in English 2130 GMT
13 Mar 90

[Text] Helsinki March 14 TASS—A celebration meeting held in Finlandia Palace on Tuesday was devoted to the 50th anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland, which set an end to the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.

President Mauno Koivisto of Finland addressed the gathering of members of the cabinet, politicians and businessmen, representatives of public organisations, people who participated in the "winter war."

Regarding the causes of the outbreak of war, he said that there was a lack of trust between Finland and the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939.

The Soviet Union did not believe in Finland's ability and wish to prevent the use of Finnish territory for a possible attack on the USSR.

In Finland there was a lack of understanding where the absence of such trust can lead.

Both sides largely proceeded from the belief that tension would not develop into a war and just a show of strength would be enough. But it happened differently: The war broke out and led to large casualties.

Regarding the post-war development of relations between the two countries, Koivisto said that the Soviet Union was and remains Finland's neighbour and that cooperation with the Soviet Union is growing with every year.

The principles of bilateral relations have been set out in the 1948 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance which retains its importance.

The president spoke highly of Gorbachev's visit to Finland in the autumn of last year. The Soviet Union's unconditional recognition of Finland's neutrality was stated during that visit.

Swedish Media Cited on Soviet Espionage

PM1303135190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent M. Zubko under the "Rejoinder" rubric: "To Whom Is Glasnost a Threat?"]

[Text] Stockholm—I admit that the words I heard during an evening program on Swedish television struck me greatly: They sounded so unusual in our day.

...One sign of the present tumultuous times is the rejection of the stereotypes of the "image of the enemy" bequeathed to us from the time of the "cold war." Without eliminating these cliches there is no complex trust and without trust there will be no genuine progress in the matter of disarmament and hopes of creating an

all-European home will remain a dream. The breaking of the stereotypes of the "image of the enemy" is understandably a two-sided matter if you have in mind East-West relations. We will achieve little if one side actively destroys these cliches while the other constantly returns to old propaganda methods.

Unfortunately, I am obliged to note that in a number of West European states the breaking of such stereotypes is not proceeding as rapidly as in the Soviet Union. For instance, Sweden is a neutral country, not linked by military ties to the leading powers of the West. You would think: What use has it for such cliches? But no.... Here is what was said during the "Aktuellt" news program on Swedish television's first channel: Agents of the Soviet intelligence services have become more active in Sweden and there is an increased risk of sabotage and acts of terrorism. The activation of the agents is caused by the fact that the Soviet Union is seeking to obtain Swedish technology.

The morning newspaper SVENSKA DAGBLADET has continued this dramatic topic. It published a note under the headline "Glasnost Increases Threat to Sweden" which said in particular: "The development of events in the Soviet Union and the East European countries makes the world less secure and increases the threat to Sweden. Soviet espionage organizations have stepped up their activity here and at the same time the risk of acts of terrorism has increased."

The note says that these are the words of Ragnar Smittberg, chief of the security service of FFV, the state arms production firm, who added that his service is increasing its vigilance in connection with the possibility of acts of sabotage, illegal entry into enterprises, and acts of terrorism. Beneath the note is a reference to the Swedish TT news agency. That means that the information has been disseminated throughout the country. Television also cited this security chief.

According to Ragnar Smittberg, the result is that the USSR, with all its glasnost, is so impudent that it is prepared to carry out shootings and explosions on the territory of neutral Sweden for the sake of seeking technological innovations. That is the level of thinking of some ideas about our country here. That is how our policy of glasnost can be turned inside out.

I must, it is true, say that the subject of the Soviet agents did not last long on television—just 15-20 seconds approximately. But with Ragnar Smittberg's help the information was so brilliantly concocted according to former stereotypes that it probably managed to poison the consciousness of many Swedes.

Yeltsin Gives Address at Oslo News Conference

PM0903161190 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
7 Mar 90 p 7

[Morten Fyhn report: "Sharp-Edged Yeltsin Show"]

[Text] In the course of less than an hour yesterday the very candid and stocky political blusterer from the village of Butka in the Talitsk district of the Sverdlovsk region succeeded in distancing himself from most things in the Soviet Union. His message was as clear as it was simple: If the Communist Party does not soon take itself by the scruff of the neck, it will go under, and a new alternative party will be formed. And if Gorbachev does not get his reform policies moving soon so that there is a noticeable improvement in people's living standards, he cannot count on remaining secure in his post.

Yeltsin has never been timid, and with a fresh and formidable election victory in Sverdlovsk behind him he has even less reason to choose his words carefully. For him things are now moving, it would seem, toward the post of president of Russia, even though Yeltsin did not exactly choose Lysaker as the place from which to announce to the world the decision to seek this important post. First the election results must be analyzed, he said.

Yeltsin stopped over in Oslo on his way from Amsterdam and Stockholm to Hamburg and London to promote his autobiography, "Confessions on a Given Theme." His Norwegian publishers, Cappelen, have added the more saleable subtitle, "The Power Game Behind the Kremlin's Walls," but Yeltsin did not like this particularly. Nevertheless, his news conference turned into a show which did not leave any doubts about why he is so enormously popular and so sincerely disliked at home. Here was no quiet spoken bureaucrat, but a lively 59-year-old rebel with an impressive array of facts and facial expressions and with a talent for speaking. All this is combined with an alternately charming and disarming smile, or narrowed eyes and an indignant expression, according to whether or not the questions put to him were to his taste. Yes indeed, Boris Yeltsin is a full-blooded politician who knows how to handle his audience. But will he be Gorbachev's successor?

"I cannot describe my relations with Gorbachev as warm," said Yeltsin, who takes the view that after 5 years of Gorbachev and perestroika it is time to look for results. Gorbachev's big mistake is that as the leader of 280 million people he has not known along what road he should lead his people. He did not have a clear plan, a well thought out base, comprising concrete stages. That is why there has been a series of individual laws and decrees that are unrelated and which have not produced results, Yeltsin said. However, he praised Gorbachev as an exceptional person and said that it was right of him to try to renew society. Also, there have been changes for the better in foreign policy.

As far as conditions in the Soviet Union are concerned, Yeltsin sketched a dark and gloomy picture of a country in deep economic crisis. "At least 48 million people live below the poverty level and there are 32 different conflicts between ethnic groups in the Soviet Union," he

said. According to Yeltsin, perestroika is now beginning to resemble other revolutions imposed from above—it is losing momentum.

At its congress this summer the Soviet Communist Party has its last chance to renew itself and consequently to survive, Yeltsin said. He wants to change the whole party structure, reduce the power of the party apparatus, and permit the formation of factions with different political platforms. Unless the party is changed and renewed radically, it will split and there will be a transition to a multi-party system, he said.

One question put to Yeltsin was: Given the collapse of the East European communist parties—why does he still support communism?

"Where have you gotten the idea that I do?" Yeltsin replied with indignation in his voice. "True, communism is very appealing as an idea, but it is too abstract and does not attract people, and certainly not after the dismal experience of the Soviet Union in the last 70 years."

The important thing is not "isms," but that people should have a better life. And social researchers can decide later what name should be given to the social system, he added.

Boris Yeltsin claims that he has written his book so that people will know the secrets of the mighty Politburo, so that they will find out how those in power work and live, what the rules are, and what intrigues take place.

"My most important aim is to bring out the truth," he said at the news conference. Yeltsin has prepared himself for the possibility that the publication of his book could have consequences for him, even serious consequences, as he put it. For the apparatus of power has many means at its disposal. But he intends to resist in the same way as in the past.

"The last five years have not been the best in my life. I have been hunted and persecuted, but they have not forced me to my knees," Yeltsin said. Publication in the Soviet Union is uncertain. Several interested publishing houses withdrew when Yeltsin demanded that nothing should be omitted or censored. However, he has signed a contract with a publishing house in Riga, and in Sverdlovsk a periodical will print the book.

"There are probably some other revolutionary towns in the Soviet Union," he said.

Norway Balks at Allowing U.S. Naval Arms Dumps
PM1403090790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Mar 90 Moscow Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Deciding to Delay"]

[Text] Oslo, 7 Mar—The Norwegian Government has postponed indefinitely the signing of an agreement with the United States to site arms for the U.S. Navy on its

territory. The question of creating arms and fuel dumps on the Norwegian coast for U.S. vessels arose two years ago when the United States started building up its naval presence in northern waters. At that time Norway agreed in principle to its NATO bloc ally's proposals.

In a message to the Storting (parliament) Norwegian Prime Minister Jan P. Syse noted that the decision to postpone signing the agreement with the United States had been made taking account of the present-day international situation and, above all, the changes taking place in the East European countries. The government believes that a final decision on the need for such an agreement for Norwegian security will be made after an extensive study of the military-political situation in northern Europe.

This new step by the Norwegian leadership has prompted an unambiguous reaction in the country. The adherents of close military cooperation with the United States gave it a hostile reception. They believe that in the current foreign political situation Norway should be arming rather than disarming. However, most Norwegians approve the cabinet decision.

Netherlands, USSR Economic Commission Meets

*PM2802104590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] The 11th session of the Soviet-Netherlands Mixed Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation in the Economic, Industrial, and Technical Spheres was held in Moscow 18-23 February.

Questions of Soviet-Netherlands trade, economic, scientific, and technical ties and cooperation in the currency and financial sphere in development of the Luxembourg meeting between N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Netherlands Prime Minister R. Lubbers were discussed.

A protocol was signed on the results of the session, which reflects the results of Soviet-Netherlands business cooperation and contains recommendations for further broadening and deepening it.

A.D. Chikvaidze, USSR ambassador to the Netherlands, and P. Buwalda, Netherlands ambassador to the USSR, participated in the session's work.

Netherlands To Help Establish 'Smallholdings'

*PM0503163790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA
ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Dutch Experience in Moscow Region"]

[Text] Talks between the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases and the

Dutch Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries ended in Moscow 1 March. It was decided that over 100 family-run smallholdings [fermerskoye khozyaystvo na semeynoy osnove] will be created in the Moscow region using Netherlands experience. N.V. Krasnoshchenov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission, commented on the results of that meeting in conversation with your TASS correspondent.

"The project's general contractor is the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Non-Chernozem Zone's Agro-industrial Committee. The association of peasant farms and cooperatives of Russia will be involved in its implementation. The farmer or peasant family must be the main figure, the center of the agrarian system.

"Dutch specialists will take part in the competition to select the future farmers and the drafting of recommendations to create a managerial structure and equip smallholdings with processing complexes. Three groups of Soviet farmers will undergo training in the Netherlands in 1990-1991."

Yeltsin, Zinovyev Interviewed on Respective Books *LD0903232990*

[Editorial Report] Paris Antenne 2 Television French at 2035 GMT on 9 March carries a one-hour and 28 minute "Apostrophes" literary program interview with Boris Yeltsin and exiled Soviet writer Aleksandr Zinovyev, who speak in Russian with superimposed French translation. They are asked about their latest books—Yeltsin's memoirs, and Zinovyev's "Katastrofka." The program is presented by Bernard Pivot assisted by Alexandre Adler, an expert on Soviet literature.

The two guests are first asked to talk about themselves, their children, their political awareness in their youth, their relationship with the CPSU. Then they are asked to give their opinions about each other.

Alexandre Adler describes the two guests, their social and political origins, their political tendencies, and the background to their current situations.

The two guests are then asked, one after the other, a series of questions mainly related to the subjects of their books and the subjects they relate to most—authority for Zinovyev, radicalization of perestroika for Yeltsin. The discussion then centers on Stalinism—fought by Zinovyev—and nomenklatura privileges—hated by Yeltsin. Zinovyev says he fought all the Soviet regimes, from Stalin to Gorbachev, through his philosophical and sociological essays, novels and caricature. Yeltsin expresses his dislike of party privileges, which he says should be banned. He mentions that he has just given up his last party privilege, his personal car, put at his disposal by the party.

Asked about the future of the party, Yeltsin says that the 28th congress will decide.

Zinovyev says a presidential regime as sought by Gorbachev is the greatest danger facing the USSR. He describes Gorbachev as a mere powermonger. Yeltsin says that the Soviet people, the peoples in the republics, will not tolerate a superpresidential regime. Asked if he wants to replace Gorbachev, he replies no.

A short footage film on Yeltsin's election campaign in March 89 is shown as an introduction to Yeltsin's political style.

Constitutional Compliance Issues Viewed in France

LD0803155990 Moscow TASS in English 1355 GMT
8 Mar 90

[By TASS Correspondent Aleksander Sorokin]

[Text] Paris March 8 TASS—Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Committee for Constitutional Compliance, and Robert Badinter, chairman of the French Constitutional Council, discussed ways of ensuring efficiency of the constitutional compliance systems in the USSR and France, the introduction of the institute of the presidency in the Soviet Union, the development of contacts between the two countries' parliaments and other issues at their meeting here.

Badinter described in detail the operation of the French Constitutional Council and experience accumulated in complying with the demands of the country's Constitution.

He also spelled out his viewpoint on the ways of strengthening the institutes of state authority in the Soviet Union. He praised the plans of introducing the institute of the presidency in the USSR.

In his opinion, this is the only correct road. The French side believes that a parliamentary system without an institute ensuring integration and sufficient force of executive power leads to a deadlock.

France learnt about this from its own post-war experience. The institute of the presidency is of special importance in such a big state as the Soviet Union. Badinter also expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union did not create adequate conditions for the government's normal functioning.

He believes that the mechanism of interaction between the government and parliament, including the act of the non-confidence vote to the government, should contain procedures precluding the unlimited domination and pressure by parliament on the government, which leads to the latter's instability.

The French side also expressed understanding of difficult problems facing the Soviet Union, including ethnic relations. Badinter noted that the desire of nations for independence should be based on strict legality and observance of human rights.

Alekseyev is on a visit in France at the invitation of the chairman of the French Constitutional Council. He also met president of the French National Assembly Laurent Fabius, other prominent politicians and representatives of the France-USSR Society.

Soviet-Spanish Pension Accord on 'War Children'

LD0803235890 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1448 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] Madrid, 8 Mar (TASS)—V.I. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Affairs, and M. Chaves, Spain's minister of labor and social security, have signed an agreement here on the application of the treaty on social security for working people between the USSR and Spain. The treaty, which was concluded on 8 March 1989, lays down the conditions for the provision of pensions to the citizens of the two countries and also their provision with various social benefits.

The new agreement should finally resolve a complex problem connected with fixing pensions for so-called "war children". This concerns the children of Spanish republicans who during the Civil War in Spain were evacuated to the USSR. After completing their studies at Soviet educational establishments they worked honorably and conscientiously in the Soviet Union right up to retirement. When, after the downfall of the Franco dictatorship, the "war children" began to return to their homeland it turned out that under Spanish laws they were not entitled to pension provisions.

The documents that have been signed regulate the entitlement of Spaniards who have worked in the USSR and also Soviet citizens working in Spain to receive old-age and disability pensions, sickness benefit, and other forms of social benefits. In addition, a Spanish citizen who has received a pension in the USSR is henceforth entitled, after working in Spain for a year, to receive an increment up to the level of the established pensions in that country.

Speaking during the signing ceremony, M. Chaves stressed the great importance of the documents that have been drawn up and expressed the hope that the positive changes taking place in the Soviet Union will lead to an expansion of trade and humanitarian cooperation between the two countries. In his turn, V.I. Shcherbakov noted with satisfaction that the problem of the "war children" have been solved on the basis of reciprocity and justice.

Joint Austrian Computer Center Set Up in Moscow

LD1303215290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 13 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Summary] A joint Soviet-Austrian venture under the name 'MVTU [Moscow Higher Technical Academy]-Festo' has been set up at the Moscow Higher Technical Academy. Its official opening took place today, though the enterprise has actually been functioning for over two months now. It offers one-week courses in the use of up to 30 computer programs in the field of automated pneumatics, electropneumatics, and electronics. The center can train 1,360 students per year. The joint venture is opening branches in Leningrad, Kiev, Chelyabinsk, and Novosibirsk.

Debate Demanded on F-15E Aircraft in UK

PM1203154590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Mar 90 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Nuclear Potential Buildup"]

[Excerpt] London, 11 Mar—The United States is planning to station 48 F-15E nuclear-capable fighter-bombers in Britain. This statement was made by Labour Member of Parliament Harry Cohen, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party Defense Committee, who reported that, as may be concluded from U.S. congressional documents in his possession, the construction work necessary for this purpose will begin at the USAF base at Bentwaters (Suffolk) before the end of this year.

According to the parliamentarian, the United States initially planned to station the F-15E's in Bitburg-Rittersdorf (FRG), however, it was considered impossible to implement these plans in the present political atmosphere because it is intended to equip the fighter-bombers with new tactical nuclear SRAM [short-range attack missile] missiles.

"If the British Government had not approved all this, the United States would not have drawn up such far-reaching plans," stressed H. Cohen, who stated that he intends to get the issue debated in parliament. "Either the government deliberately misled the House of Commons or it is unaware of the significance of the upcoming construction work at the base." [passage omitted]

Chernyshev Proposes 'Peace Zone' to Turkey

WA1403143090

For reportage on an interview with Ambassador Albert Chernyshev by Turkey's HURRIYET newspaper in which he proposes a "peace zone" in the Black Sea area along with Turkish economic cooperation, please see the Turkey section of the 14 March West Europe DAILY REPORT.

Latin America & Caribbean

Foreign Ministry Expresses Concern Over Nicaragua

LD1403175190 Moscow TASS in English 1723 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—As the date for the transfer of power in Nicaragua draws close, concern is

growing over lack of progress in dealing with the principal questions relating to the development of the country, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement read at a briefing here today.

First of all, read spokesman Ian Burliai, we are concerned about disbanding and repatriating Contra forces deployed on Honduran territory. Not only Nicaragua's future but also prospects for the peace process in the region depend to a great extent on when and in what way this problem is resolved. Any procrastination is fraught with serious political and military consequences.

Public statements by some contra leaders about their intention to disarm and return to Nicaragua only after the new government guarantees their safety could dramatically destabilize Nicaragua. These intentions should not be supported by those who are interested in a prompt end to armed confrontation, the statement points out.

Both the Sandinista National Liberation Front and the National Opposition Union, currently conducting talks on the transfer of power, are unanimous in the opinion that the solution of present problems should be approached responsibly and that the first, and so far the only, step towards the settlement in Nicaragua must not be made null and void.

The statement stresses the need for the leadership of the contras to display "a sense of civic responsibility for the fate of the country" and get involved with current processes in Nicaragua, for which, the statement points out, "there are now all the necessary conditions."

"We also continue to proceed from the assumption that special responsibility for the solution of the contra problem should be taken by the United States, and it should use its influence to have contra forces demobilised and repatriated before April 25 of this year."

"People in the Soviet Union are hoping for this outcome in Nicaragua and count on Washington to take steps in this direction soon," the document stresses.

"This will be a real contribution by the United States to the normalization of the situation in Nicaragua, which will facilitate the search for a peaceful political settlement in Central America," the Soviet statement said.

Vladimir Orlov Examines Cuban Socialism

PM1403135790 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No. 10, 11 Mar 90 p 12

[Vladimir Orlov article under "The World and Us" rubric: "Being True to Principles or Principles Being True; Slogans and Reality in Today's Cuba"]

[Text] The first thing that strikes you on the drive from Jose Marti International Airport to Havana are the giant political posters put up all along the route: at the side of the road, on central squares, vacant lots and beaches. "We Follow the Right Track", "Further Along the Right Track", "Let's Enter the Year 2000 with Knowledge,

Success and the Rifle". All of them are signed "Fidel". Cubans have come to regard the posters as part of the landscape.

But there is one new aspect. Printed in blood-red on a white background are the words: "Socialism or Death". And this one: "Socialism's Banners Will Not be Surrendered Without a Struggle". And on this banner there is one of Fidel's dictums in its entirety: "If history should assign us the role of the last defenders of socialism in the world, we shall defend this bulwark till the last drop of blood". These words, first heard from Fidel on December 7, 1989, are remembered by every Cuban.

So Fidel Castro, on his own accord, has made it necessary for Cubans to defend not only their small island, not only the ideas of Jose Marti and Che Guevara, but also socialist doctrine as a whole. But which socialist model are we supposed to defend till the last drop of blood?

There is nothing new here. It is based on the total rejection of a market economy, prevalence of moral over material incentives, sacrifices for the idea, militarization of the state which defends itself both against the external and the internal counter-revolution, the inviolability of the party and government elite, the ban on a multiparty system and even on all discussion of it being possible.

Following The "Only Correct Path"

Being True to Principles is the name of the book put out in Havana early in 1989. It is a collection of Fidel Castro's speeches. At that time there was still no answer to the question as to who was betraying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Then it came on July 26. In his annual speech honouring the storming of the Moncadea barracks, the leader made a violent attack on Poland and Hungary for their radical reforms. Having censured these two apostates he exclaimed: "Even if we suddenly hear that civil war is raging in the Soviet Union, even then Cuba would continue the struggle. We'd rather die than turn back!"

Soon the newspaper GRANMA reported a ban on the Soviet NOVOSTI Press Agency publications SPUTNIK and MOSCOW NEWS in Spanish which, even before that, were practically unavailable to local readers. In an editorial entitled "An Urgent Decision in Line with Our Principles", the newspaper said that material appearing in the two publications was "distorted and doubtful allegations and lies which in combination amount to lack of political culture and any culture in general".

The number of articles by Soviet contributors that used to appear in the Cuban press has been reduced to the minimum. Cuban journalists' reports from Moscow are nearly all couched in accusing, negative terms. Stories dealing with the Soviet Union disappear from TV screens.

And to cap it all, there was a ceremony to bury all Cubans who died fighting in Angola and other countries.

A Cuban with whom I watched the live telecast literally gasped seeing the Commandante reading his eulogy from a scrap of paper. An excellent speaker, Castro decided against an unprepared address. The text was written in advance, so much importance was attached to it.

Fidel seemed to have bemoaned not Cubans who died in Africa, but the collapsed regimes in Eastern Europe: "Imperialism and the capitalist powers can't keep back their delight in the face of what is going on. Not without reason, they are convinced that the socialist camp at the present stage is probably no more."

Addressing his nation, the Commandante warned that it was impossible to purify society by "slandering socialism, by destroying its values, demeaning the party, demoralizing the vanguard, disclaiming its leading role, ruining socialist discipline and sowing chaos and anarchy everywhere".

Soon was to be more a specific condemning of "some conceited windbags who brag of pseudo-intellectuality, who at times adroitly team up with counter-revolutionaries" and "dare to belittle the abilities and experience of the party and government authorities". That's devotion to principles. But whether these principles are correct is never questioned.

Without a Shadow of a Doubt

By all appearances, the swift change in Eastern Europe caught Cuban leaders totally unawares. They shocked them from both the economic and ideological points of view. Cuban Radio's comments on the highlights of 1989 was couched in such words: "Taking over power in a number of countries of Eastern Europe were weak governments unable to grapple with the economic mess. In the socialist countries of Asia—China and Vietnam—for the matter, positive change has taken place."

This sort of assessments, I think, are caused by Havana's intention to take over the role of a sage who alone can know the right way. One shouldn't waver moving towards one's goal. The word "doubt" comes from a foreign vocabulary.

Such directness in Cuba takes place alongside rationing of all goods which insures people against poverty, but is no incentive to work. Revolutionary-minded Cuban women are in no danger of becoming mercantile as long as they continue to receive as they do today, either one bra or two panties a year (either a bra or a pair of panties of whatever size they have at the stores) with their ration cards. Neither are Cuban men who buy in the "parallel" market a short-sleeved shirt for a third of a worker's monthly wage threatened by going mercantile. An average Cuban has to work more than three months to buy the usual fan made in China. One can worry about a market economy endangering socialist values, but that does not diminish the size of black-marketing.

Defence of the Revolution

Cuban society is much more stable than most other socialist states. This stability is ensured through a network of committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) encompassing the entire country. All Cubans are members from age 14—more than 6.5 million people.

The Committee have a finger in every pie. They are dubbed as registry offices, propaganda centres and organize regular "days of defence." On such days the populace is drilled in what to do in the event of military attack.

CDR's organize night-watches in their areas. Their activists snoop around for those who listen to broadcast from the USA and for those who voice politically immature ideas. CDR's closely cooperate with the national revolutionary police and other services.

Where are the Sources

As the old stereotypes get demolished, there is a great danger and temptation of creating new ones. This is helped on by any simplification and schematization. Least of all I would like to see the Soviet mass media start calling Cuba an isle of misfortune instead of the usual "Isle of Freedom." Both definitions are far from the truth. There is further danger: to pose as a teacher of Cubans, to tell them where they are right and where they are wrong.

The island republic which was fascinated with revolutionary process, while European socialism was sinking into the morass of stagnation, was copying no administrative and economic structures other than Soviet ones. The rapidly rising Cuban party and government elite was absorbing no other ideological dogmas but Soviet ones formulated by Brezhnev and Suslov.

Today Cubans, especially young intellectuals, are closely and sympathetically following Soviet perestroika. Some of their judgements about change in the USSR are naive, they see perestroika in imagined glowing colours.

When I tried to restrain this naive optimism in a Cuban friend he said: "Do you know about Americans asking people of various nationalities what they thought about their meat supplies? First they put this question to a Russian. He asked 'What is meat?' When they turned to a Cuban he said: 'What is "I think"?' That's the point. But seriously speaking, we are as short of meat supplies as you are in the Soviet Union. But much more than meat we need freedom."

Incubation Period

A new situation is taking shape in the island. According to my observations, there is a shift from social apathy to passive, still rather latent dissatisfaction.

There are now nearly fifteen dissident groups whose demands are as diverse as support of the policy of perestroika in the USSR and freedom of religion in Cuba.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's article "To Live Not According to Lies" is being circulated in Spanish translation in typewritten form. There have been cases of students refusing to sign statements that are usually adopted to support Castro's speeches.

So there are changes? I don't think one should hasten to give a definite answer. A bit more than a year ago, the Western press carried an open letter by a group of West European and Americans, who included writer Juan Goytisolo, philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy, film directors Hector Babenco and Federico Fellini, actors Yves Montand, Jack Nicholson, Gerard Depardieu. The letter, addressed to Castro, urged for a referendum to be held in Cuba on the model of the one held by General Pinochet in Chile. "If it is 'no', then you, Mr. President, should give the way to openness and democracy and hold elections as soon as possible," the letter said. A Cuban official gave this laconic answer: "We held the referendum 30 years ago, and we hold it every day through our struggle and our efforts." So, Havana thinks: Cuba doesn't need any change.

Castro Scores East European Anti-Cuban Vote

PM1203103190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent A. Kamorin: "Cuba's Special Course"]

[Text] Havana—Recent events have made differences of opinion between socialist countries commonplace. But they have perhaps never surfaced in such an acute form as in the case of the conflict between Cuba and a number of East European states.

There have been differences before and confirmation of this can be found in plenty of speeches by Cuban leader F. Castro, who regards, for example, movement in the direction of a market economy as "consigning the most elementary principles of socialism to oblivion." Yet mutual interests have never openly clashed before.

The "watershed" was the vote at the UN Human Rights Commission the other day on a draft resolution envisaging the inclusion of an item on observance of civil rights in Cuba in the agenda of the next session of the commission next year. The document was proposed by the United States and was coauthored by several other states, including Poland and Czechoslovakia, which, clearly, was a total surprise to Havana. The resolution was passed by 14 votes to 12, with 12 abstentions; another two socialist countries—Hungary and Bulgaria—were among those who voted in favor.

Although it has to be said that it is not the first case of conflicting opinions in the UN Commission—you may

recall that last year Cuba voted against Hungary on the question of Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality—the Cuban leadership's reaction in this case was unusually strong.

Addressing the final session of the fifth congress of the Federation of Cuban Women, F. Castro said that "these countries, which only yesterday were allegedly socialist are now behaving in a similar way to the Yankee empire, the enemy of mankind." Pointing out that the position of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria "encourages imperialist aggression," the Cuban leader stressed that in the event of an attack on the island by the United States "these countries will bear responsibility for the blood that is shed here..."

F. Castro also made it crystal clear that Cuba is prepared to review its trade links with the European socialist countries that voted for the U.S. resolution. It was in this part of his speech that the speaker was most cutting, calling the goods these countries are sending to the island "rubbish," "trash," and "junk." At the same time, he stressed, Cuba is supplying them with valuable commodities, such as sugar, nickel, citrus fruits, and pepper.

Wherefore the ferocity? The United States has been trying for some years now to use the UN Commission platform for diplomatic attacks on Cuba. Moreover, Havana, is clearly regarded as a priority target in this respect, in view of the fact that the U.S. ambassador on that body is Armando Valladares, who once did time in Cuba on a terrorism charge. In the past the republic was able to defend itself successfully with the support of the socialist camp. Now the situation has radically changed.

F. Castro's speech clearly marks a new stage in relations within the framework we have grown used to calling a "community." To all appearances, Cuba is very determined. F. Castro said that his country has no intention of fulfilling the resolution adopted in Geneva.

In the speech a very clear distinction is made between the attitude toward the East European states and the attitude toward the USSR.

"One might mention the Soviet Union," the Cuban leader said. "Fortunately, it exists, it is conducting a consistent policy, and it is struggling for the defense of peace. The Soviet Union has not fallen into the hands of counterrevolutionaries and let us hope that does not. The Soviet Union has not disintegrated, and let us hope it does not. No civil war has started in the USSR, and let us hope none does, although the threat exists, a real threat."

Expressing thanks to the USSR for its support in the vote in Geneva (two votes—the Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Castro stressed that the weakening of economic links with the other socialist states would not be a major tragedy for Cuba, although the cessation of deliveries from our country would.

The situation that has arisen in connection with the Geneva vote shows that the Cuban leadership finds the principle of deideologization of international relations unacceptable and is prepared, even in isolation, to keep a firm grip on the banners of the world revolutionary movement.

Castro Hits 'Former Socialist Countries'

PM1303130790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 90 p 3

[Our correspondent dispatch: "Time for Special Measures"]

[Text] Havana—What did Fidel Castro mean when he said this during his speech at one of the latest forums in Cuba?

Thanks to the Cuban mass media, the detached observer might get the impression that Cuba is worried not so much by its internal difficulties as by specific circumstances abroad. Newspapers, radio, and television are reporting on the fact that housing construction is proceeding as fast as possible in the country, the food program is being successfully implemented, and the health protection and education systems are being constantly improved. Party and state leaders, speaking at crowded forums, meetings with workers, and demonstrations, also quite often call attention to unprecedented successes in the Cuban economy. The international situation, which, in its opinion, is evolving in a way that is not at all favorable to Cuba, is causing much greater worry.

The latest testimony to this was, as usual, a long speech made by Fidel Castro at the conclusion of the fifth congress of the Federation of Cuban Women. This speech made by the commander in chief would perhaps not have differed very much from several previous ones, if two very important international events had not preceded it: first, the election defeat of the Sandinist government in Nicaragua, and second, the adoption of an anti-Cuban—as they see it here—resolution by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

A bit of information. In response to the endless U.S. accusations of human rights violations the Cuban Government took a step a while back that was unprecedented in international practice: It invited representatives of the commission in question to its country so that they could investigate this question there and then. The invitation was accepted, and in 1988 a group of international experts really did visit, and they polled over 1,500 Cubans representing different population groups. The result of this was that in March 1989 a resolution highly favorable to Cuba was adopted by an overwhelming majority, in which the UN Human Rights Commission thanked the Cuban authorities for cooperation in their work and for their readiness to provide the international community with the information it needed. In this way, a problem that, by all accounts, was causing the White House so much concern was eliminated: After all, the

United States has tried to drag anti-Cuban documents on human rights into the United Nations every year since 1986 (each time unsuccessfully).

The fact that this question came up again in Geneva at the commission's routine session a year later—in the first few days of this month, was all the more unexpected. As a result, a resolution proposed by the United States and supported by a number of other countries was adopted, calling on Cuba to: first, guarantee that reprisals would not be taken against those citizens who appealed to the international group that visited the island in 1988; and second, provide information at the commission session next year on the questions to which the international inspection group did not receive answers at the time. In addition, the document obliged the commission chairman to provide information at the next session regarding the results of his contacts with the Cuban authorities in the sphere of human rights.

And that would seem to be all. What seems strange is that Cuba is not denounced for or accused of anything in the document. But the document has been received with an extremely hostile attitude here, primarily because it contains a certain element of mistrust in relation to this country's leadership. However, the greatest indignation was caused in Havana by the fact that Poland, Czechoslovakia (they were not members of the commission, but just supported it), Hungary, and Bulgaria were among the supporters of the resolution. It is therefore not surprising that these four countries were subjected to literally scathing criticism in Fidel Castro's speech.

Once again documenting—this time conclusively—the downfall of the socialist camp (because "...with such disgusting behavior... what remains of the socialist community..."), he stated that the vote at the session of the "so-called UN Human Rights Commission" had helped to lay bare these East European countries "from head to toe" and shown the whole world their true essence. These countries, which "only yesterday were socialist," are today "trying to pray forgiveness for that sin."

At present, Fidel Castro said, when imperialism has a more bellicose attitude than ever to Cuba, the four former socialist countries are only stirring up its aggression by their stance.

"A new situation has now arisen which forces us to prepare for a 'period of special measures' in peacetime," F. Castro believes. Cuba is in the same situation as it was during the first years of the revolution, when the United States set up an economic blockade—with the East European countries recently having practically joined it.

Whom can Cuba still rely on? The Soviet Union, which has fulfilled all its economic obligations meticulously up to the present. But what is to be done if one fine day problems appear in the USSR, the Cuban leader asks, and at the same time warns: We must be prepared for this. After all, the majority of the 12 million tonnes of oil that Cuba needs annually come from the USSR! Then we

will have to announce the introduction of a period of "special measures" in peacetime.

However, even if that happens, F. Castro assured his audience, the country's economic development will continue.

Arrest of Cuban 'Human Rights' Activists Noted

PM1403120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Own correspondent A. Novikov dispatch: "Cuba Indignant"]

[Text] Havana—A recent edition of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried a report about a resolution on Cuba adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights. According to this document, at its next session the commission is to consider questions associated with the Cuban authorities' observance of these rights. The vote in Geneva provoked a sharp reproof from Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who voiced vitriolic criticism of the "so-called UN commission" and the resolution it had approved, along with the countries which supported it (let me remind you that they included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria).

This topic continued literally a few days later. The Cuban Communist Party's GRANMA published an official announcement 12 March to the effect that a group of seven "counterrevolutionary elements" had been arrested here and would appear in court for violating Articles 208 and 209 of the country's Criminal Code. The articles mentioned provide for punishment for organizing "illegal associations, meetings, and demonstrations." It is clear from the report that all those arrested are "the ringleaders of a so-called human rights party." Another citizen "directly involved with the aforementioned group" was also arrested. He has been charged with breaching the house-arrest restriction to which he had been subjected "previously."

According to the newspaper, many of those arrested have served time in jail in the past and, what is more, were frequently in contact with the mission representing U.S. interests in Cuba. The reason for their arrest was that, while carrying out "activity conducive to the creation of conditions for U.S. aggression against our country," they sent "warm congratulations" from the U.S. delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights, which put forward the well-known resolution, and also to countries which supported it and voted for its adoption.

Describing this step as a "scandalous, antipatriotic action" GRANMA writes that the arrests once again prove the Cuban people's determination to prevent activity here "aimed at undermining revolutionary gains and opening the door to Yankee aggression against Cuba" from going unpunished.

Castro Address to Students Reported

PM1503101190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Moiseyev dispatch: "Demonstration in Havana"]

[Text] Havana, 14 Mar—Colorful mass demonstrations by young people in support of the Cuban revolution and its leader Fidel Castro have been increasingly rocking the cities of the island of freedom of late. On this occasion tens of thousands of young men and women, mainly Havana students, gathered for a grand rally in Revolution Square. The demonstration was timed to coincide with the 33th anniversary of the armed attack by a group of Cubans from the student revolutionary directorate organization which attempted to overthrow dictator Batista.

The young people, chanting slogans, were addressed by Fidel Castro.

Even in our day, the Cuban leader said, U.S. imperialism continues to threaten us and is doing so with increasing effrontery. Clearly, it believes that socialism is finished. But the imperialists must be made to understand that they will pay an enormous price for aggression against our country. We are defending the banners of the revolution, the banners of socialism.

Here in Cuba the revolution did not take place by accident, the speaker said. No one made it for us, no one gave it to us, no one exported it to us. We accomplished our revolution ourselves, and no one can take it away from us. The people will know how to defend it. We are revolutionaries, we never refuse to fight, to do our duty, to maintain our loyalty to the revolution. As long as our hearts are beating, as long as each one of us is able to think, we will defend the revolution. From each trial to which history subjects us we will emerge stronger, more loyal to the revolution, and even more invincible, the Cuban leader said in conclusion.

Congress of People's Deputies

Gorbachev Sworn In as President 15 March 1990

LD1503092790 Moscow TASS in English 0800 GMT
15 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev, 59, the man who launched the Soviet perestroika reforms, was sworn in as the first Soviet executive president in the Kremlin today.

Gorbachev was elected to the new post in a secret ballot at the Extraordinary Congress of Soviet People's Deputies late on Wednesday.

At the inaugural ceremony, Gorbachev, dressed in a dark-blue suit and laying his hand on a copy of the Soviet Constitution, read out to the deputies:

"I solemnly pledge to faithfully serve the peoples of our country, strictly abide by the USSR Constitution, guarantee citizens' rights and freedoms and diligently fulfil the high duties of president of the Soviet Union placed upon me."

Gorbachev Speech Accepting Presidency

LD1503104490 Moscow Television Service in Russian
0725 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev accepting his election as president of the USSR, from the relay of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies session in the Kremlin in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies, I express deep gratitude for the trust you have placed in me, having elected me to be the first president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I realize that I am taking on these deputies at a difficult time for the state.

I consented to stand for president because I am certain of the future of our fatherland, and also because perestroika has become the meaning of my whole life. I understand that I am especially accountable. I sensed this keenly yet again yesterday as I listened to the remarks by deputies here during discussion of my candidacy. I understand this and, nonetheless, I do not wish to evade carrying out my duty to the people.

The policy of perestroika, as I believe, is the only peaceful way to move toward a new qualitative state, from a totalitarian, bureaucratic system toward a humane, democratic, socialist society that is possible for a country such as ours.

It is natural that evaluations of what has been done and of how I perceive my program of action for the future are expected of me, as president. The main achievements of perestroika are democracy and glasnost, and this has decisive significance for the whole course of further transformations. That is the first thing I would like to say

in evaluating the results of perestroika. Despite today's difficult situation and the mass of difficulties and problems in the socioeconomic sphere, one can state that even here a strategical turn toward the interests of the human being has appeared. We all sense the first results, real results of the political transformations. The creation of a system of genuine sovereignty of the people is underway, and the bases of a law-governed state are being formed. A difficult but vitally important shift has begun from a unitary state to a full-blooded federation.

Having launched perestroika in our own country, on the basis of the new thinking, we have worked out a new foreign policy. This has changed the perception of the role of the Soviet Union in the world today. And most importantly, one can say that this was done at the last moment, when the world stood at the verge of a global catastrophe. The dangerous course of events was halted and the improvement of international relations began. In short, comrades, we are talking of a turn of historic scope. It is important for all of us to understand this, otherwise it is difficult to evaluate correctly many phenomena, at times painful ones, with which perestroika and all our historic work is accompanied.

With such a powerful development of changes, and, let's say bluntly, the unpreparedness for this of cadres and of the public consciousness, we have naturally not managed to do everything as necessary. The coming together of unfavorable circumstances has had its negative effect—Chernobyl, Armenia and other natural disasters, and the sharp deterioration for us of the situation in the world market. No little damage has arisen from the miscalculations made in investment policy and in the waging of the antialcohol campaign, and as a consequence of criminal negligence and even more criminal fanning of interethnic hostility there have been immense losses and human casualties. We have been hampered by inertia, by dogmatic views which have taken root over decades, by a habit of stagnation, by passiveness, by a life of being instructed from above. All this makes itself felt today, as well. I would even say this: Whatever the difficulties of an economic and social kind, and acuteness of other problems, the main obstacle on the road of transformations remains the ossification of thinking. I cannot avoid the question of the retarding effect of anti-perestroika, destructive forces of all shades. Their actions are creating extra difficulties and require cohesion and firmness from all who sincerely desire renewal of our society.

I am aware of the dramatic nature of the situation, of the complexity and extraordinariness of the problems, of the agitation of the public, but I do not see any grounds for panic, and even less any reason to change the policy of restructuring. On the contrary, what is evident is the need to radicalize this policy, and it is precisely to this end that I will first and foremost use the powers of the president.

I will emphasize particularly that the presidential powers will be used by me for a truly decisive advancement of all the processes of perestroika on a democratic basis. I

consider it necessary to speak of this because both before the congress and here at the congress itself, fears have been voiced about whether the presidency threatens some usurpation of power. There are no grounds for such fears. The constitution itself is a guarantee of this, and is now guarded by the powerful supreme representative bodies of state power, with real rights—the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. There is a guarantee of it in the serious, profoundly thought-out counterbalances which exclude development in the direction of autocratic rule. Glasnost and political pluralism, which have become a reality in our country, are its guarantee.

I consider the implementation of a set of measures to reduce tension in the socioeconomic sphere to be a prime task. At the moment, one comes to hear many arguments about indecisiveness, tardiness, belated adoption of necessary measures, and so on. There is probably a good deal of truth in this. But even so, I would like to say this: We have been through the necessary preparatory stage. Without testing out financial autonomy and what are new forms of economic management for us, such as leasing and subcontracting, without a revival of the cooperatives and changes to organizational and management structures and much else that has emerged in economic practice, we would not have been able to arrive at today's level of understanding of the problems which exist, or of the optimum methods of resolving them within the framework of the economic reform. And of course, the drafting of fundamental laws which have been adopted, or which are just about to be adopted by the Supreme Soviet, would not be possible. Society had to go through all this. We were simply not prepared for such major changes... [corrects himself] abrupt changes. Even now we are still not ready. In a word, the preparatory stage was objectively inevitable, whether we like that or not. Of course, the deep restructuring of the economy has proved to be impossible—we are well aware of this and we still sense this now—without dismantling the authoritarian-bureaucratic system as a whole. We have not had the legal preconditions for truly cardinal economic changes. Now, when such preconditions exist, an opportunity has arisen to at last overcome a situation in which the old and new forms of management—command and economic—coexist, and, what's more, in an antagonistic form, mutually weakening one another. As a result of this the effectiveness of both elements is reduced, there is an increased imbalance of the consumer market, money circulation and finances, and the rate and quality of economic growth drops.

The question arises as to how we should act further. I believe that answers should be sought, not by going back, but by moving forward, and at the same time decisively accelerating economic reform. [applause] This is dictated by the logic of the restructuring processes themselves, and this is dictated by the alarming situation which we can feel in the country, and also by the fact that we are not satisfied by the way in which the government program is being implemented.

Decisive steps are needed; a turning point is what is needed. Otherwise, negative trends will increase more quickly than happened before. I believe that we need decisive actions to radicalize economic reform. First and foremost we must expose in a practical way the immense creative potential which is inherent in the laws on ownership, land, lease-holding, and other acts of legislation—this package, the adoption of which is at the final stage. I see the implementation of these laws as the main practical task of the president. Laws won't work by themselves; we have already seen and know this. The initiative and enterprise of people will be stalled if we fail to create the right economic and, I would say, psychological environment in our society.

We must really get down to creating a full-blooded domestic market. This is a most complex economic, political, and psychological problem. It cannot be solved in one stroke. But even today we must act consistently here, shaking off all fears and complexes. In this respect we cannot get by without reforms in the systems of price-fixing, marketing, sales and distribution, changes in the practice of placing state orders and creating commodity and—as a consequence—stock markets. The transition to taxation in kind [naturalnyy nalog] of the main types of agricultural products and raw materials, combined with a free trade and surpluses of these products should be a major step.

Laws and decisions directed at the demonopolization of the economy need to be adopted urgently. [applause] Under a Viable market, the state should have a reliable instrument of influencing the economic processes. This applies, in the first place, to a rational system of taxation of enterprises' profits and population incomes, financial control, regulation by the USSR State Bank of the whole payment turnover, as an integral whole, an active credit policy, with the establishment of interest rates which match the real economic situation. Most of all, it is necessary in the nearest future to considerably reduce state expenditures, with the aim of eliminating the state budget deficit and counteracting inflationary processes. At the same time, reliable social guarantees for the whole population have to be developed—in the first place for the poorly-paid and poorly-provided for sections—various measures of social protection, including a system of compensatory increments to incomes in connection with the rise in prices.

Agrarian deputies, all countryside workers which they represent, should know that for me, as the president of the country, all questions of the life of the Soviet peasantry, the food question, are of the utmost priority. [applause]

The main burden of responsibility for the practical implementation of all these measures lies, naturally, on the government. At the same time, the adoption of presidential decrees on key questions, clearly setting out the tasks, the timeframes, and naming of the responsible individuals will be necessary.

There is need to be frank to the utmost. The implementation of large-scale measures will place society in new conditions, and initially may be accompanied by painful phenomena and may encroach upon the interests of some. Therefore, we, in all fundamental questions, the further progress, the radical progress of reforms, need to achieve in society mutual understanding and accord. Comrades, the fate of perestroika to a huge extent will be determined by—and here this is voiced in all speeches over the days of the work of the congress—by how successfully the transformation of our federation can be implemented.

As president, I once again confirm my adherence to the integrity of the country. At the same time I proceed from the fact that the adoption of measures to strengthen the sovereignty of the union republics, and of their economic and political independence, the enhancing of the status of the autonomous republics and of other national territorial formations ought to be the subject of particular concern of presidential power.

Sharing the remarks which have been made here on these matters, I regard the working out of a new Union treaty that would meet the realities of the present, and the needs for the development of our federation, and of each people, as an urgent task. I hope for understanding and cooperation in tackling all these most important, cardinal, and fateful matters. What is more, differentiation should be envisaged between federal ties, taking into consideration the unique nature of the conditions and potential of each republic. For the purposes of confirming the sovereignty of the republics and their right to self-determination, right up to secession, which is recorded in the Constitution, the Supreme Soviet, in the immediate future, should also examine and determine by a law on mechanism for secession from the union. The president, together with the Federal Council, will be engaged in all these matters, in cooperation with the Supreme Soviet; that is how I perceive it.

Emergency measures are needed to solve painful problems which have arisen on the basis of interethnic quarrels, above all the problem of refugees. On this score, decisions should be made, first and foremost by the governments of the relevant Union republics and, where necessary, also by the Union government. All in all, we have the right today to put the matter thus: The Union republics, in strengthening their sovereignty and acquiring broad independence, should also undertake full responsibility for guaranteeing the civil rights of people of all nationalities on their territory, in accordance with both our Soviet, and international laws...[pauses, changes thought] norms: political, juridical and material responsibility. Recently, the danger of the spread of nationalist, chauvinist, and even racist slogans, has arisen. This must all be fought mercilessly, applying the full force of the Constitution, the country's laws, and public opinion. [applause]

Of the other issues of political reform, as I see it, the president is faced, first and foremost, with the task of

assisting the most rapid completion of the establishment of the entire revitalized structure of the local soviets, as sovereign bodies of people's self-government. The new republican local soviets have now acquired the necessary rights and opportunities, thanks to the laws on land and ownership. Soon the law on local self-government and local economic management should be adopted. At the same time, party organizations' guardianship over local soviets, to direct interference by the former in tackling specific state and economic matters, is being ended. In these circumstances, it is especially important for local soviets to master their new role and to gather full strength as soon as possible. Otherwise a dangerous vacuum of power will arise.

I regard it necessary to stress the following also: Precisely as a result of the creation of the new system of local soviets, a mechanism is arising on which the president can rely when carrying out his functions.

How, in general, do I see the role of president in the system of bodies of state power and administration? Above all, his most important task is to be guarantor of the irreversibility of perestroika, firmly and strictly to lead matters toward the formation of law-governed statehood, of a self-governing socialist society.

The principle of the division of power presupposes a precise demarcation of functions, but by no means excludes the possibility of, and even the need for, their close interaction. In this I see one of the main tasks of the head of the Soviet State and the Presidential Council set up under him. This body thinks like a collective of major political figures, specialists in the main spheres of state and social development who will work out recommendations on the main issues of domestic and foreign policy and, when necessary, propose efficient solutions. I shall also stress that, in my understanding of this, the president should feel and act not as a representative of some kind of separate stratum or political trend, but as a person empowered by the whole people. Naturally, this does not mean that he should reject his own political convictions, but it signifies the willingness to take into account in the most objective and unbiased manner the entire range of the views and lawful interests that exist in society, to act in keeping with the oath, putting the good of the country and the people before all else.

In this respect, an issue must be completely clarified that was also a subject of lively, at times heated, discussion here at the congress. I have in mind the issue of combining the post of president with that of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I share the point of view of those deputies who believe that such a combination is dictated by the interests of perestroika, both today and in the immediate future.

In introducing changes into articles six and seven of the USSR Constitution, the current Congress of People's Deputies is opening up a new stage in the development of democracy in our society. From now, the CPSU is

acting on an equal footing with other political organizations. It will participate, and is participating in the elections, trying to gain the right by democratic methods to form union and republican governments and local bodies of authority. In this respect, one of the most important functions of the president and the bodies set up under him consists, in my view, in the consolidation of the political trends and the social movements. I am convinced that the democratic nature of presidential power provides for dialogue and cooperation with the representatives of different trends in social thinking, their participation in working out various presidential initiatives and programs. Naturally, this applies first and foremost to USSR people's deputies. In my view, the Presidential Council should include special persons who effect contacts with the Congress and the Supreme Soviet, with public organizations and associations, creative unions, scientific and cultural institutions, and the mass media, whose role is enormous and crucial.

Finally, the president must be a guarantor of a stable social order, and of the security of citizens and the state. We all sense at the moment the necessity of overcoming weakness and amorphousness of administrative and executive authority. In fact, this has become one of the motivations for not postponing the introduction of the post of president. Apprehension is building up in society in connection with the threat of a destabilization of the situation. I have in mind the attempts to achieve aims by way of violence, the fanning of intolerance and ethnic dissension, and pressure on state and public institutions by means of all kinds of ultimatum-type demands. Certain groups and figures obviously reckon to impose their views by intensifying fears, by threats of civil war, a coup, national catastrophe, and so on. But the public on the whole does not accept such methods of influencing the country's policy; it rejects these methods, and I think that there is a manifestation here of one of the greatest lessons that we have learned as a result of perestroika and of the interpretation of our past experience. These methods, these attempts to infiltrate these methods into the processes of perestroika, this would have been a kind of return to the past, and this is fundamentally contrary to the aims of perestroika. Such methods, or at any rate the attempts to infiltrate these methods in our lives, are very dangerous for our young and as yet unconsolidated democracy. Such a development of processes must be resolutely halted, comrades, in the interests of democracy and in the interests of perestroika.

It is the task of presidential authority to energetically oppose criminality, both in the sphere of encroachments on lives and property, on the dignity and safety of citizens, and in the sphere of speculation and the shadow economy, which have become intolerable in scale. To this end it will be necessary to establish strict supervision of the implementation of the relevant laws, the necessary decrees will have to be issued and, of course, the law and order bodies will have to be strengthened. They need this, and we must do it. I consider it necessary to speed

up the reform of the courts and of the investigatory apparatus, the procuracy, such that their status, rights, and responsibilities come into line with the job they are supposed to do. While posing the question in this way, I do not discount the responsibility of state and economic bodies and of all our cadres for the elimination of the causes which give rise to law-breaking. Crime in many cases has its roots in mismanagement, squandering, lack of respect for property, and lack of due account for material valuables and for public order. The use of the new opportunities for the soviets to involve the public in the matter and the active participation of the press will be of immense importance for instituting proper order.

No authorities are capable of being substitutes for moral foundations, without which normal human cohabitation is not possible. In the past in our country, they, in essence, neglected the spiritual side, considered it idealism. Now a high price is having to be paid for this. We need a different, conscientious attitude to labor, to science, to education, to the arts, to culture in the widest sense of the word. We must create the conditions for all spiritual values to be perceived in society as a vital necessity for it to exist and develop in full-blooded fashion.

By drawing upon the most rich cultural assets accumulated by our peoples over their long history, including in the Soviet period, by falling in with the values of world civilization, it is necessary to ennoble the whole atmosphere of human relations in society, to unite all those who strive for the good of the fatherland. It seems that we have not yet come to fully realize this.

Group disputes are tearing our public apart. Sometimes they go as far as the scandalous settling of accounts, particularly among the intelligentsia, of which so much is demanded at this crucial and critical stage of the country's history. And with this...[changes thought] and because of this, our society observes this anxiously. Some question the possibility and...[changes thought] or the advisability [pauses] or the advisability of consolidation in society in general. I do not agree with this. In difficult moments, the people always gather their forces in order to stand their ground, to overcome the obstacles. And the duty of those whom people regard as their spiritual mentors is to assist such a process of becoming united with all the means at their disposal. Of course, necessary today is consolidation around the policy and idea of perestroika in order to overcome everything which hinders it.

On foreign policy. Over the past years it has been tested on the whetstone of realism and common sense. It is namely such an approach which has made it possible to put an end to the Cold War and to remove directly the military threat. The Soviet Union has occupied in the world community the place which is worthy of its peace-loving essence. And I resolutely reject the dilettant and sometimes simply irresponsible attacks on our foreign policy. Having adopted the well-known foreign policy decision, the first Congress of People's Deputies,

in the name of the Soviet people, became its guarantor. And all the actions of the future president should be strictly commensurate with the letter and spirit of that decision.

The institution of the president is being introduced in our country at a crucial period of world development, when the structure of the postwar...[pauses] postwar military and political balance is being subjected to fundamental change. An end has been put to the Cold War. However, military confrontation has not yet been overcome. Therefore, with the unconditional priority of political methods of guaranteeing security, the leadership of the defense policy of the country, on the principles of sensible sufficiency, and of the new military doctrine, and concern for the armed forces, should also be an indispensable component of the president's activity. Any other approach is unacceptable. And, as president, I already wish to assure you that this is how it will be.

We now require profound military reform. Here, a large set of difficult questions have to be resolved. That will become one of the important tasks of the president, of the Presidential Council, in cooperation of course with the USSR Supreme Soviet. Availing myself of the opportunity, I want to affirm my adherence to the principle approved by the Congress of People's Deputies that the use of armed forces outside the country without the sanction of the Supreme Soviet or the Congress is ruled out categorically forever, with one exception—in the event of a sudden attack from outside.

What is to be done in the foreign political sphere in the immediate future? One of the main things is the energetic advancement of the negotiation process on all the main types of armaments, for the purpose of attaining substantial results, preferably this year. For the meeting with President Bush in Washington, major decisions are being prepared which will not only signify a new step in the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations, but will become an important contribution by our two powers to consolidating the positive tendencies in world politics.

Changes of historic significance have occurred in Eastern Europe, in all the six countries allied with us. In building relations with them based on the principles of complete equal rights and freedom of choice, in removing from them that which is incompatible with the new thinking, it is important to retain all that is valuable, what is really progressive that has been accumulated over the decades of close relations between our peoples and states.

The German issue holds a special place. It is at present at the center of European politics. In these days I have repeatedly had to set forth our position. It is well known both to our people and to all the interested parties. The essence of it is that the realization by the Germans of their natural right to unity would completely and forever exclude the danger of war starting on the territory of Germany. Hence all the rest—the rights of the four powers and the immutability of the borders, and the link

with the all-European process and the unacceptability of Germany being a member of NATO and the need for a peace treaty on the outcomes of the second world war.

The swift course of international events is imparting a new significance to the all-European summit meeting with the participation of the United States and Canada the fall of this year. It is time to think about replacing the bloc system by collective security bodies, of interaction and cooperation, taking into account the coming into being of a unified Germany in the center of Europe. Even now one needs to gear oneself toward Helsinki-II, which may be the watershed between two epochs in the history of international relations. Joint statements and dozens of agreements in various fields of cooperation have been signed with a number of authoritative countries. Faithfulness to them on terms of reciprocity is one of the most important factors of stability, security, and progress, and in Europe, of real progress to the common European home, with which we have firmly linked ourselves.

Monitoring implementation of the fundamental and practical significance laid at the foundation of these documents also lies in the brief of the future president. The policy of new thinking by no means signifies a cooling of our interest in the developing countries, as some people try to present it, both inside the country and beyond its borders. Our solidarity is immutable with those who are fighting for equal rights, for social progress, democracy and a life that is worthy of man.

In the Asian-Pacific area there lies ahead the consistent implementation of the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives, and their transition to the level of concrete, business-like relations. We are linked by firm ties of many years standing with great India. Cooperation with the People's Republic of China has been well developed. The processes of building peace-loving communities in Europe and Asia should, in my view, finally end with a single system of security throughout the Euroasian area. The situation in the near East is to be seriously analyzed, and our active policy in this region, important for us and for the whole world community, is to be renewed. An ever greater place is being occupied in our foreign policy ties with Latin America. A chance is also emerging here jointly to enhance the positive tendencies in international development.

The problem of involvement in the system of world economic relations and participation in international efforts to protect the environment should constantly be within the field of view of the president. Under conditions of the world's growing interdependence, I would like again to confirm the enormous significance of the UN organization. I am convinced that the revival of the UN's role and the activation of its peace-making function is a most important component in the movement toward a peaceful period in the history of humanity.

Summing up what has been said, I want to say, comrades, that we are all living in one home—the sons and daughters of more than 100 peoples with their national and cultural traditions and unique particular characteristics. I see the role and the purpose of the post of the president of the USSR as being to affirm within the country national accord in the spirit of mutual respect. To assert the principles of civilian peace and accord, to express and defend the interests of the people is the highest goal and sacred duty for me as president of the USSR.

In everything related to the execution of presidential authority, to be without our people's support, its will, its morality, wisdom, intellect, and its common sense, is inconceivable to me. I count on support from the working class, which is making its decisive contribution to advancing perestroika. I believe in the creative power of the Soviet peasant, the true caretaker of the land, of whom—having liberated their labor—we will resolve the food problem.

It is with optimism that I turn my thoughts and gaze toward scientific and cultural figures, toward the whole Soviet intelligentsia, which has been tackled and will tackle most important tasks of perestroika that demand the exertion of intellect and intellectual strength.

I place great hopes in young people, in our young men and women, in their real participation in making responsible political decisions and their implementation, and in the creative energy of youth. I believe I can always rely on the older generation's wisdom and concern for the common cause, tested by years of life, and its interest in strengthening the authority and power of the soviets.

I also address those who are honorably doing their duty in the ranks of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, creating durable guarantees of peaceful transformations within the country.

As president, I want to wish the party of the communists, the most influential political force of the country, success in implementing the platform with which it moves toward its 28th Congress. The Party's proclaimed program goal—humane and democratic socialism—meets the aspirations of the people and its desire to live in an open, democratic, just, and flourishing society.

Our country is living through a difficult time, but if we act in an energetic and friendly way, then we will of course be capable of overcoming these difficulties. We have to cast aside fears and despondency, to acquire faith in our power and capabilities. In our country they are truly enormous.

The Russian people and all the peoples united with it, is a great multinational state and will be capable of regenerating its common fatherland, and will achieve this without fail by way of perestroika and socialist renewal. [applause]

Further on Gorbachev Election Results

LD1503093690 Moscow TASS in English 0853 GMT
15 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev was elected president of the Soviet Union by 1,329 votes to 495, Academician Yuriy Osipyan, chairman of the counting commission, told the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies this morning.

A total of 2,000 deputies received balloting cards, he said.

The total number of deputies is 2,245, but several did not attend because of illness and for other reasons.

Ballot boxes were found to contain 1,878 cards, he said.

Fifty-four ballot cards turned out to be invalid.

Gorbachev won 59.2 per cent of the total number of deputies, Osipyan said. He needed 50 per cent to get the job.

Gorbachev received the support of 70.76 per cent of all the deputies who took part in Wednesday's vote, he said, explaining that this figure was unofficial.

The Congress confirmed the counting commission's protocol.

Ligachev 'Hails' Gorbachev Election

LD1503093190 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT
15 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—Soviet Politburo Member Yegor Ligachev said he "hails" the election of Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev as the first Soviet president.

"This is a major success," Ligachev told reporters here before the congressional session today.

"This is a truly positive development, especially at a time of party and social renewal, when both the party and society are undergoing transformation. This is how it should now be, I believe," Ligachev said, commenting on the importance of combining the top party and state jobs.

Presidency Law Passed After Debate

PM1403193090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by parliamentary correspondents V. Dolganov and A. Stepovoy from the Kremlin: "The Difficult Road to Decisions"]

[Text] When, on 14 March, M.S. Gorbachev, who was in the chair, announced the first break in the latest Congress sitting, many deputies, as they left the auditorium, were saying anxiously: The congress is lagging considerably behind its own planned order of work. Various

opinions are expressed on this point in the corridors of the Kremlin Palace, and in the auditorium, too, the views were far from uniform. On the one hand, very substantial work on the draft Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR and Making Relevant Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution was being done long before the congress (and is being done now by the Editorial Commission). On the other hand, the torrent of amendments, comments, and additions had not subsided by the third day of the congress.

Let us try to unravel the situation.

The 14 March morning session began with a speech by Deputy V.N. Kudryavtsev, chairman of the Editorial Commission. The point was that two substantial amendments had been submitted at the previous sitting. Deputy A. Ivashko expressed doubts over the formulation "the president of the USSR is elected on a contested basis." Yes, he said, the registration of candidates should provide for alternatives. But when it comes to the election, the problem is that a contender, foreseeing, for instance, defeat in the election, could withdraw his candidacy at the last moment. That contender could be intimidated, bribed—anything is possible in life. But the result is the same: The election would be wrecked. It is necessary to make sure this does not happen.

After studying the comments, the Editorial Commission proposed a new formulation, which was adopted by the congress.

The additions submitted by Deputies M.A. Moiseyev, V.S. Podziruk, S.F. Akhromeyev, and a number of other deputies on differentiation between the concepts of martial law and a state of emergency, and the procedure for their declaration by the president of the USSR were also important. Here, too, the new version discussed by the Editorial Commission was adopted by the congress after a vote.

You might have expected the examination of two amendments, which had, moreover, been "perfected" by the Editorial Commission, to take a matter of minutes. In fact, by the first break the congress had in effect not taken a single step forward. There were numerous votes on a great many comments and additions which did not lead to any new decisions or formulations.

Why was the work going so slowly and unproductively? The reason was probably correctly stated by Deputy Yu.V. Golik. We are only marking time, he stressed, because we are trying to turn the Constitution into an instruction manual. He expressed the view that the Supreme Soviet should draw up the new, additional legal documents that are needed today and will be needed even more in future in connection with the adoption of the Law on the Presidency.

It seemed that progress could now be made, especially since by that time only one-fourth of the draft law had been discussed. But then Deputy A.V. Pavlov stands up,

for instance, and objects for the umpteenth time to the voting procedure, although the congress has repeatedly expressed its view on this point. But... once again it was necessary to vote, and another five minutes disappeared. Then Deputy G.F. Novikov virtually issues an ultimatum, demanding that all the results of the voting on 13 March be deemed invalid and the draft law examined as a whole at the next Congress of People's Deputies. Once again a debate, once again a vote. And so on, interminably.

Was not Deputy R.A. Medvedev right about this situation? He put it quite clearly: "People are quite deliberately trying to distract us from a decision on the epoch-making law that is being examined today by confusing us endlessly with procedural questions. This practice is common in various parliaments, it is called obstruction. We are falling victim to deliberate, organized obstruction. I call on you not to waste time on trivia. This is not the last time we will meet; individual points can be clarified and details approved at the next congress or on the adoption of the new Constitution."

Alas, this call did not meet with support, and the stenographic record preserves several dozen more pages after that point full of rejoinders, proposals, comments, and points from the floor that were not essential for the present (extraordinary!) congress. Even some Supreme Soviet members, apparently forgetting the rule adopted in parliament that amendments to draft laws should be submitted exclusively in writing, were charging to the microphones today, forcing the congress to work "from the spoken word." At certain moments there were, according to our observations, as many as 30 people waiting in line for the microphones.

Deputy N.S. Petrushenko, for instance, once again reminded us of the "ANT" state-cooperative association: For whose nuclear bomb was it supplying porous titanium—the Israeli or the Pakistani bomb? And indeed, people say, the country's nuclear scientists are helping the United States to create SDI.... He demanded categorically that "in order to rule out the misunderstandings that are rife in the corridors of the Kremlin Palace," a declaration of income, all property and real estate, and investments in banks and savings banks be submitted not only by the president of the USSR, but by the country's entire body of deputies.

After a vote, the proposal was not passed, but M.S. Gorbachev proposed: "The Supreme Soviet should be instructed to study this problem and, if necessary, adopt an appropriate law on declarations, because there are a great many rumors on this score circulating in the public opinion market, so to speak."

The debates, comments, and amendments on particular points of the draft law continued even after that. In the end the chairman was forced to cut short the debate, asking all those wishing to do so to submit their proposals to the Editorial Commission.

After that, because of the need to examine all the comments and amendments submitted to the commission, a break was announced until 1400 hours.

The draft law contains a number of points that have been widely discussed in society and in the mass media and which caused a great many disputes even at the stage of drafting the Law on the Presidency. Many people express the fear that it could lead to a dictatorship. This question was raised several times the previous day. It arose on 14 March, too. For instance, Deputy I.I. Zaslavskiy objected to the president's right to deprive people of Soviet citizenship. In the past we have seen many cases, he said, when even collective decisions of this kind subsequently made us blush for shame—you only have to remember the cases of Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich, and many other prominent cultural figures. It is undesirable to give this right to just one person, in the deputy's view, a collegial procedure for examining it must be retained.

Deputy S.M. Ryabchenko proposed that the problem of depriving people of citizenship be excluded entirely from all our laws.

After a vote, the amendment was not passed. D.N. Kugultinov, V.L. Ginzburg, and I.A. Andreyeva, speaking against age restrictions in the election of a president, cited their reasons and arguments. All the misgivings that are sometimes prompted by our new laws are associated primarily with a lack of faith in democracy. There is reason to be afraid, if man and society are not free, but are deprived of the right to a real choice. If a voter, for instance, votes in secret and has the possibility of real choice, he is hardly likely to vote for a young lad, a decrepit old man, or simply someone unworthy. The chairman announced that at all the preparatory stages of work on the draft law he too came out against restrictions, which are formulated primarily from fear of a repetition of the past. A vote on the question of the president's age confirmed the former version: The president must be no younger than 35 and no older than 65.

So are we, after all, afraid of the phantoms of the past?

Deputy A.N. Yakovlev spoke very graphically and clearly on this. The shadows of the past should not cloud our future. And the main thing that must be done to prevent a repetition of the tragedies of our history is to extend democratic structures, develop glasnost, and look after the rights of individuals and peoples.

After 1400 hours work proceeded without delays. The congress adopted all the sections of the draft law and ratified the Law on Instituting the Post of President of the USSR and Making Relevant Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution. It was decided that the first president in the country's history will be elected at the present congress for a five-year term. The right to nominate candidates was granted to social organizations through their unionwide organs, the Supreme Soviet, each of its chambers, groups of not less than 100 people's

deputies, and the union republics through their highest organs of state power. A candidate who receives the votes of more than half of the total number of USSR People's deputies is deemed to be elected. If no candidate wins more than half of the votes, there is a runoff between the two candidates who won the largest number of votes.

The law enters into force from the moment of its adoption.

Gorbachev Resigns Supreme Soviet Chairmanship

*LD1503102690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 15 Mar 90*

[Excerpts] Good day comrades. The fourth day of the work of the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies started at 1000 (Moscow time) with the procedure of summarizing the results of yesterday's secret voting on the election of the USSR's first president. It ended at midnight. I will say immediately that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has become president. [passage omitted]

In the interval, I spoke with many deputies. They were congratulating each other and ourselves on the country's first president. They highly appraised his speech as president. But there were critical remarks here, too.

About 15 minutes ago, a large, nearly hour-long interval ended, and the Congress session has now resumed. It is chaired by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He began: "In connection with my election as president, he said, my duties as chairman of the Supreme Soviet are concluded, and he proposed that the election of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet be included on the agenda of this Congress. Well, various proposals were expressed: In general, a discussion on this matter is now under way, and I am ending my report from the Kremlin.

Gorbachev Cites Need for Supreme Soviet Chairman

LD1503151190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1200 GMT on 15 March carries a report by commentator Olga Vasilenko on this morning's session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Following recordings of Deputy Osipyan's report on the presidential election results and Gorbachev's taking the oath, she says: "The complexity of the situation that has arisen was discussed at a meeting of the previous membership of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev actually spoke about." There follows a voice recording of Gorbachev.

Gorbachev says: "During the preparation of the draft law on introduction of the presidency, we envisaged the whole situation: the president, the Supreme Soviet, the government. And all those who participated—and a lot

have participated—and all the commissions were discussing it. At all stages, the view that the Supreme Soviet should not be weakened as a result of these innovations was expressed very sharply. This theme ran through it all. It was present everywhere and we adhered to it. I think this was a correct formulation of the question. Moreover, when the question about having the vice-president there instead of the chairman—so that there should be no such post at all—was raised, all the Supreme Soviet commissions revolted categorically. So there should be a chairman of the Supreme Soviet; any other approach is a blow to the prestige. Generally, so to speak, this is an independent, legislative power. That is why it should be drawn up in such a way. If the vice president were to find himself in a capacity as chairman at the joint session, this would constitute an improper intrusion of the president's power on the Supreme Soviet. So, the question was discussed from this point of view as well. That is why, in the final count, the point of view—I consider this correct and have personally supported it at all stages—that there should be a chairman of the Supreme Soviet has prevailed. That's the first thing.

"Second, I think that, following the same argument, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet—for his own authority, firm tenure and in some way, you know, his respectability among the members of the Supreme Soviet—should derive his powers from the Congress."

There follows a recording of various deputies nominating candidates for chairman of the Supreme Soviet, as listed in referent item although Vasilenko states that 18 nominations were made and that, following withdrawals by some of the nominees, 11 contenders remained.

There follows a recording of Kazannik's address during the discussion of the candidacies. He outlines his reasons for standing with reference to the legislative process and the draft law on the press. He continues: "Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, notwithstanding all his erudition in professional training, does not lead the sessions of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet with sufficient precision. [commotion in the hall] What do I have in mind specifically? I'll prove it, comrades. Yesterday and the day before we have completely ignored the standing orders. According to the standing orders, we are supposed first to discuss the amendments to the draft law, and they are adopted by an absolute majority of votes, that is 50 percent plus one vote." Vasilenko notes that Kazannik's remarks provoked controversy and that the discussion on Kazannik's candidacy continued for quite a long time, but that his name remained on the list for voting.

There follows an interview during the session interval with Deputy Kirillov, from Voronezh, and Vasilenko concludes her report noting that the discussion of candidacies for the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet is continuing.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Nomination Debated

LD1503114690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1000 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Report from the Kremlin by correspondent Marina Novitskaya]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The afternoon session, which resumed after the break, was a very short one. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who was in the chair, reported that the Congress still needed to elect a chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet because, up to now, before the election of a president, as you know it was Mikhail Sergeyevich himself who filled this post. It was decided to include this item in the agenda, although it did not pass without debate. The fact of the matter is that there was a proposal that the Supreme Soviet itself should elect the chairman. But Justice Minister Yakovlev recalled that, according to the changes in the Constitution which had just been adopted, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet not only conducts a session of our parliament and guides its work, but also has the right in certain circumstances to replace the president and to take part in the work of the Presidential Council or the Federal Council. In connection with this, it would be natural that he be given authority directly from the Congress of People's Deputies. This, of course, would give him a certain authority. This argument was supported, but, naturally, in order to propose candidates for election to chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the deputies would need to exchange opinions with one another. As you know, at the Supreme Soviet and the Congress, all kinds of deputies' groups and associations have already been formed, and therefore they decided to again announce a break in order to take counsel.

I have been observing from our commentator's cabin how lively the deputies, who have been split into groups, have been discussing this question right there in the hall.

Well, literally five minutes ago, the Congress session resumed. The deputies have endorsed the authority of the Congress Presidium and have moved on to nominating candidates for the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The floor, on behalf of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, was passed to Deputy Dzasokhov. Deputy Dzasokhov [head of the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs] reported that in a session of the Presidium, which had just been held in the interval, in which heads of committees and commissions of our parliament, and heads of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the union republics participated, they—he, Comrade Dzasokhov—said that all of them together would nominate Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov for the office of chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Well, the session is continuing, candidates continue to be nominated, and we shall tell you in future bulletins how the debate is going. For the moment, I will end my report from the Kremlin.

Lukyanov Proposed as Chairman

LD1503103190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1000 GMT on 15 March reports from the Congress of USSR People's Deputies proceedings in the Kremlin: "Comrades Dzasokhov [head of Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs] reported that in a session of the Presidium which had just been held in the interval, in which heads of committees and commissions of our parliament, and heads of presidiums of the supreme soviets of the union republics participated, they—he, Comrade Dzasokhov—said that all of them together would propose Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov to the office of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet."

Further Candidates Named

LD1503102690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1100 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] The Congress of USSR People's Deputies is continuing its work in the Kremlin. As you know, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was elected first president of the Soviet Union at the morning session which was broadcast on Central Television and All-Union Radio. In keeping with the Constitution, the country's president was sworn in and then made a speech to those assembled.

Now the deputies have to tackle the issue of electing the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This issue acquired unexpected acuteness when it turned out that 19 people had been nominated for that post. Comrades Aleksandr Maksimovich Yakovlev and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, Ryzhov, Primakov, Stankevich, Vol'skiy, Kugultinov, Kolbin, Ryzhkov, and Nazarbayev all withdrew their nominations, but there are still nine people on the list. These are Comrade Lukyanov—his name was mentioned first—Comrades Velikhov, Kazannik, Lubchenko, Nikolay Vasilievich Fedorov, Sobchak, Ryabchenko, Filshin, and Zaslavskiy. The deputies have started to discuss the candidates.

Roundup of 14 March Congress Session Reported

LD1403194890 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT
14 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR began an election of the first president tonight. Mikhail Gorbachev, Communist Party chief and president of the Supreme Soviet, is the only candidate.

The results of the vote will be known on Thursday morning.

The deputies decided to select the nation's first president at the Congress for a period of five years as an exception, because the country is living through a difficult period.

In the future, presidents will be elected by the population by direct, universal, equal and secret ballot.

Gorbachev was nominated by the plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. It was backed by agrarians, representatives of the All-Union Organization of War and Labour Veterans, trade union deputies and others.

The Soyuz (Union) group of deputies, campaigning for preserving the USSR's territorial integrity in a revamped federation, nominated, in addition to Gorbachev, the candidatures of Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin.

Both withdrew their candidatures.

Before starting the nomination of presidential candidates and their discussion, after two days of keen debates, the congress adopted a bill on constitutional amendments today.

The bill endorses the post of president and determines his powers, changes the constitutional articles which enshrined the Communist Party's status as the country's only party.

While granting extensive powers to the president, the bill envisages effective checks and balances to prevent abuse of power.

The congress will continue its work tomorrow morning.

Congress Morning Session 14 March Noted

LD1403122790 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 0930 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] This is Aleksandr Ruvinskiy in the Mayak correspondent's unit in the Kremlin.

The interval at this morning's session is now ending, and I remind you that the law on establishing the post of USSR president and the introduction of amendments and supplements to the Constitution is being discussed article by article. A number of articles have already been adopted, although there are a fair number of people wanting to propose corrections. Before the interval, around 30 people lined up at the microphones situated directly in the hall. The chairman, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, proposed that all these amendments should be submitted in writing so that the commission could consider them during the interval.

Well, it must be said that some fairly unexpected proposals are being received. Listen to a fragment of one of the speeches heard this morning:

[Begin Petrushenko recording] Deputy Petrushenko. Esteemed comrades, the introduction of the institution of presidential power which we adopted yesterday, to applause, really provided good grounds for thought. If we are strengthening executive and administrative power, this demands the strengthening of control

through legislative power, which is needed to prevent the misuse of office, examples of which abound in our history.

In this connection, I propose that the tenet should be supplemented in such a way that on coming to office, the president not only takes an oath, but also presents a declaration on income, property, and real estate, and deposits in banks and savings banks.

In my view, this will remove false interpretations with which even the corridors of the Kremlin Palace are full.

At the same time, I think that the president should demand a declaration on the incomes of the individuals which he recommends, and we, the USSR People's Deputies, should do this, too. [applause]

Secondly, I think that, if we nevertheless go in for an expansion of the list of officials who the president recommends to the congress—and here I object to the Drafting Commission—we will in this way strengthen our parliamentary power, which will be a good counterbalance.

By way of example, yesterday the chairman of the Drafting Commission described the chief of the Main Customs Administration as a secondary individual. In this connection, I would like to remind you that in the United States, this individual is actually subordinate to the president, and that in Tsarist Russia, this department was invariably headed by a relative of the tsar, and the great princes were the chiefs of the 35,000-strong body of the customs service.

If we do this, we shall thus provide good grounds for speaking at the Congress about the ANT cooperative. I understand this reaction in the hall, but let us just remember the movie "White Sun in the Desert" [Beloye Solntsa v Pustyne] where sorrow for the state is actually felt when only 12 tanks are exported. I have [in mind] an article in the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA. For misappropriating three tractors, a worker was condemned and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. For 12 tanks, they received severe reprimands. [applause]

And, after all, the ANT cooperative also had a contract for exporting porous titanium, which is used in the enrichment of uranium. For whose nuclear bomb was it intended? The Pakistanis or the Israelis? I would like to remind you that the publication in the journal MEZH-DUNARODNAYA ZHIZN gives good grounds for considering that our atomic specialists also offered nuclear reactors to power the system of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative—this concerns the issue of the application of, or the powers of, the president for using nuclear weapons.

[Gorbachev interjects] (?Your) proposal?

[Petrushenko] My proposal is this: To put to the vote the declaration of the president's income and to pose the question on the confirmation by the president and,

correspondingly, by the congress, of the chief of the Main Customs Administration. [end recording]

[Ruvinskiy] I have to say that this ill-starred state cooperative, ANT, constantly comes to the attention of the deputies, but the question about it is not being considered either at the session of the Supreme Soviet or presently at the congress.

Well, Deputy Petrushenko's proposal was put to the vote—in fact, only the part about the income of the president. This correction failed to obtain the necessary number of votes. Nevertheless, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev proposed the introduction of a mechanism to monitor the income of the president and to later elaborate an appropriate document.

Deputy Bisher also made a proposal—the deputies had in fact already spoken about it earlier at yesterday's sitting—to unite the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council. This proposal also failed to obtain the necessary number of votes. But I will remind you that in order for a correction to be adopted, two-thirds of the votes of all the people's deputies are needed.

Well, I have to say that now, at this time, the next sitting of the congress should have started, but at present it is delayed by 15 minutes, so I cannot give you any more news about the progress of the work of the congress. But you will learn of this in one of the upcoming link-ups, and in a direct report from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses here on Mayak. That will be at 1430. And now, in fact the Presidium is taking its place. Evidently, the sitting will continue in a minute or two, so I will end the report on that.

Gorbachev Chairs 14 March Congress Session

LD1403074890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0730 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] The extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies continues in Moscow today. Draft laws on instituting the post of president of the country and on introducing amendments and addenda to the Constitution are under discussion. This work was not completed yesterday. At the morning session the floor was given to Deputy Kudryavtsev, chairman of the Drafting Commission. It is thought that the deputies will manage to put forward and discuss candidacies for the new supreme office in the country. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is chairing the sitting.

Moscow TV Carries Congress of People's Deputies

Gorbachev Chairs Session

LD1403173190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 14 March begins carrying a recording of the 14 March Congress of People's Deputies proceedings in Moscow.

Deputies are shown gathered in the hall. Gorbachev asks the deputies to register. Several minutes of general murmuring in the hall are heard as registration proceeds.

At 1604 GMT the board shows 1988 deputies present. Gorbachev says that we can proceed. On the agenda is the adoption of the law on instituting the presidency. The report from Kudryavtsev called for.

At 1606 GMT Kudryavtsev takes the rostrum. He has been instructed by the drafting commission concerning Article 127(1), now reworded. He reads the amended text concerning universal suffrage—an unlimited number of candidates is now permitted for president. Gorbachev says that there is a question about Article 127(3). An unnamed deputy speaks about the amendment. With multiple parties, candidates may represent not just themselves, but also parties or blocks of parties in the future. Then there will be real elections and real leaders.

At 1609 GMT another deputy speaks on Article 127(3), saying that elections should only be valid if there is 50 percent turnout. Deputy Sanulyak from Chernovtsy says that there can be elections even if there is only one candidate. Deputy Kozyrev remarks that very low turnout in individual republics might render an election unrepresentative. Deputy Melnikov notes that the wording should cover the possibility of a single candidate. Deputy (?Kirillov) says that the voting ballot should cover a choice for or against a single candidate. Those are contributions enough, says Gorbachev. The hall agrees.

At 1612 GMT Kudryavtsev says that the wording has to be made more flexible, so that elections can proceed if all but one candidate withdraws at a late stage. He says he cannot agree with remarks on the voting procedures; demands for a two-thirds majority in the republics, as against a 50 percent requirement nationwide, are not acceptable.

At 1615 GMT Gorbachev calls for a vote on the new version. It passes 1694 to 213.

State of Emergency Discussed

LD1403180190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1618 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Kudryavtsev says that further amendments now distinguish between a state of emergency and martial law. The president may call for a general mobilization if the country is attacked. He can declare martial law in individual areas. He may declare a state of emergency in individual areas for the sake of public safety, submitting the decision for later endorsement by a two-thirds majority in the Supreme Soviet. The sovereignty of republics has to be respected.

At 1622 GMT, Deputy Kugultinov says he is unhappy about the age limit for president being set at 65, citing Adenauer and others who were effective leaders at an advanced age. Gorbachev thanks him, but says that we are discussing something else.

At 1624 GMT an unnamed deputy has a question: Yesterday, Khodzhiev spoke about the rights of autonomous as well as union republics. There could be a conflict if an autonomous republic disagrees with the parent union republic about asking for a state of emergency; the wording should cover this.

At 1625 GMT on unnamed deputy asks: Who is to decide about the use of nuclear weapons? Gorbachev says that this is not relevant to the article being discussed, but will be taken into account in further discussions.

At 1626 GMT an unnamed deputy questions how much later the Supreme Soviet is supposed to endorse the amendment on a state of emergency. Kudryavtsev says that it should perhaps indicate immediate submission to the Supreme Soviet.

At 1627 GMT Deputy (?Gorbunov) suggests that a two-thirds majority of a republican supreme soviet should also agree to the state of emergency. Kudryavtsev says that this could prevent any decision from being made.

At 1628 GMT Deputy Kiselev says that the Constitution should say what the state of emergency and martial law mean. Kudryavtsev notes that the present Constitution encompasses nine laws; it becomes very unwieldy if too many laws are incorporated. Concerning the rights of autonomous republics, he says they are not sovereign according to USSR state structure.

At 1630 GMT Deputy (?Shelyshev) suggests that the president should be able to introduce temporary presidential rule if a republic's leading organ is not doing its job. Kudryavtsev says that this sounds sensible.

At 1632 GMT Deputy Obolenskiy states that he wants more precise time limits for submitting the state of emergency for endorsement. Deputy Ivanov says that the reasons for introducing a state of emergency need better definition. There is no distinction between natural and social disasters.

At 1633 GMT an unnamed deputy speaks on his previous suggestion on presidential rule. Kudryavtsev says that the sovereignty of republics must be guaranteed.

At 1635 GMT Gorbachev remarks that the discussion boils down to adding "immediately" to the wording on when the president must submit a decision on a state of emergency to the supreme soviet for endorsement.

At 1639 GMT the vote is registered in favor, by a count of 1,718 to 183. Gorbachev reminds the deputies about the wording on states of emergency and martial law in

individual locations, and calls for a vote on this sub clause. It is adopted 1864 votes to 40.

At 1643 GMT Gorbachev remarks that Deputy Kugultinov spoke about age limits. Another deputy at the rostrum says that there should be no age restrictions. A woman deputy at the rostrum says that there is a contradiction. If the upper age limit is 65, what if a 64-year old gets elected? He goes over the limit while in office. Deputy Pavlov returns to a question raised yesterday concerning a two-thirds majority for passing amendments, along with the ambiguous position that may be held by officials in the current session until a president is elected. Gorbachev says that the voting procedures have already been agreed upon. He asks people not to go chasing after obscure points at the congress. He asks the hall if they want to leave the procedural debate at that, and calls for a vote on it. While the machinery works out the vote, Gorbachev points out that a note to Article 127 implies that only a man can be made president, and should cover "male or female citizen". The vote on procedure was positive.

At 1655 GMT Gorbachev refers to proposals from Kugultinov and Ginsburg concerning age limits, and calls for a vote on whether to debate them according to these suggestions. He asks Kudryavtsev about whether the term "citizen" [*grazhdanin*] used in the draft covers male and female citizens; he appears to receive an affirmative reply.

At 1659 GMT the procedural vote has not been passed, so age limits will be discussed separately.

At 1659 GMT a break in the reportage is announced, until 1715 GMT.

Presidency Amendments Submitted

LD1403181490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1715 GMT on 14 March resumes its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Gorbachev calls for comments on other articles. Deputy Zaslavskiy calls for exclusion of a point in Article 127. An unnamed deputy adds a recommendation that deprivation of citizenship should be excluded from legislation. A vote is called. The amendment is defeated.

At 1720 GMT Deputy Novikov speaks on voting procedures, and on a proposal that yesterday's votes be revoked and that the present changes to the Constitution be referred to the next Congress of People's Deputies.

At 1724 GMT Medvedev says that these are stalling tactics—organized obstructionism. Objections are heard from the chamber. Medvedev says that this isn't the time for niceties; there will be further opportunities in the future to refine the laws adopted.

At 1727 GMT Gorbachev proposes a vote on Novikov's amendment. It is defeated by 1398 to 409, with 163 abstentions.

At 1730 GMT Deputy Petrushenko, a military man, suggests that presidential candidates should make prior declarations of financial standing and interests. Applause. He draws attention to such safeguards existing in the United States. He raises the ANT affair, concerning the illegitimate export of 12 tanks.

At 1735 GMT Gorbachev suggests a vote on Petrushenko's proposal. The vote is taken. The amendment is defeated. Gorbachev proposes that the matter be referred to the Supreme Soviet. This proposal is accepted.

At 1742 GMT Deputy Kruglov raises the question of whether, the president should not be elected by the whole people rather than by the congress. Gorbachev puts the question to a vote. The proposal is defeated by 1,263 to 603, with 90 abstentions.

At 1746 GMT Deputy Bisher speaks for combining the functions of the two councils attached to the presidency. Gorbachev calls for a vote. The amendment is defeated by 930 to 871, with 160 abstentions.

At 1754 GMT Deputy Zakharenko suggests that the president should provide an annual report on the state of the union /world. A vote is called. Defeated by 1,153 to 652, with 117 abstentions.

At 1756 GMT Gorbachev says there are still 26 people waiting to speak. He suggests that amendments be submitted in writing. He declares a 30-minute break for such written submissions.

Afternoon Sitting Opens

LD1403193490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 14 March carries a recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

The afternoon sitting is opened.

At 1807 GMT Kudryavtsev, chairman of the Drafting Commission, is called on to speak. He says that over 200 written submissions have been made, among which a number of proposed amendments require decisions by the congress.

The first concerns the number of deputies who must vote if the election of the president is to be valid—"at least 50 percent." Gorbachev calls for a vote on this amendment. It is passed by 1,862 to 35, with 25 abstentions.

The second amendment refers to Article 127 (3): Dismissing the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court should be excluded from presidential powers. A vote is called for. The results are shown as 1,892 for, 26 against, and 20 abstentions.

The next amendment refers to the declaration of a state of emergency: It should state "to ensure" citizens' security, not "defend." The amendment is passed.

The next amendment refers to Article 127 (4), concerning the Council of the Federation, and suggests giving broader entitlement to representatives of autonomous areas to participate. The amendment is passed by 1,769 votes to 127, with 45 abstentions.

At 1825 GMT the next amendment is presented, referring to the same article: People who do not have an autonomous area should be able to empower representatives to attend the Council of the Federation when issues of concern to them are discussed. It is passed by 1,898 to 37.

The next amendment refers to Article 127 (6), and concerns joint sessions of the two presidential councils for matters of major national importance. Passed by 1,840 to 63, with 42 abstentions.

At 1833 GMT the next amendment is presented and refers to Article 114, concerning extending the right of legislative initiative to cover autonomous areas. Passed by 1,849 to 84, with 22 abstentions.

At 1837 GMT, the next proposal concerns Article 120, on the election and responsibilities of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Passed by 1,894 to 12, with 38 abstentions.

At 1842 GMT, the last proposed amendment concerns the presidential oath: He should pledge to serve "the peoples of our country" and not just "the Soviet people." Passed without vote.

At 1848 GMT Gorbachev asks the congress whether they should resume debates at the microphone. The answer from the floor is no. A vote is called for, which decides that the debates should come to an end.

At 1851 GMT Kudryavtsev apologizes for having omitted one more amendment adopted at the drafting commission, on the composition of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. This is Article 120. Two more representatives are called for from the autonomous republics, and one from the autonomous oblasts and okrugs. This is put to a vote without commentary from Kudryavtsev. The amendment is adopted.

At 1855 GMT Gorbachev quotes a proposal from Deputy Andreyeva to have all written proposals typed up. This is accepted by a show of hands. The second section has now been accepted.

At 1856 GMT the third section is now under discussion. It concerns the length of a president's term in office, and whether the first president is to be adopted by the congress. Once a president has taken the presidential oath, the first term of office will have begun.

At 1858 GMT Gorbachev calls for a vote on the third section.

At 1858 GMT a Leningrad deputy points out that objections to the congress adopting a first president still remain. Surely it should be a matter for a secret ballot by all the people. He calls for a vote on this.

At 1859 GMT Deputy Yeliseyev comes to the rostrum and calls for concentration at this crucial moment. Proposals have been received from the deputies of Estonia expressing support in general terms for Gorbachev and his restructuring, but this can only be moral support: They cannot take part in a vote on the presidency. Yeliseyev calls for a majority of two thirds of those actively taking part to be sufficient in the given instance.

At 1901 GMT Deputy Nikolskiy, Leningrad, supports a presidency, and wishes to vote for a president at this forum, given that genuine multiparty candidacies are as yet impossible. He is concerned at the possibility of combining the posts of head of state and party leader: There could be a vote on this, or it could simply be inserted into the third section that on assuming office, a president would resign all other duties.

Deputies Debate Presidency

LD1403200690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1904 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Sobchak comes to the rostrum, pointing out that many speeches have noted a paralysis of state power. It is this that has necessitated alterations to Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution, essentially dismantling a system whereby party meant state. Time is needed for this to become a reality. Could elections of a president by all the people actually be implemented in a country afflicted by such paralysis, and when an emergency situation exists in many areas while others are declaring a Unilateral Declaration of Independence? He cites Nakhichevan, Lithuania, and the above mentioned note from the Estonian deputies. All actions must be constitutional within the union framework. Perhaps it would be better to vote on Section 4, which looks at the practical introduction of the amendments and changes accepted.

At 1910 GMT A Tajikistan deputy comes to the rostrum, and stresses that only Communist Party and government involvement saved the authorities in Dushanbe during their recent troubles. There should be no combination of two posts, but a transitional phase is ahead as the party cedes authority to democratic institutions.

At 1912 GMT an unnamed deputy cites a mini-referendum in Dzerzhinsk favoring a popular vote. He recalls that an individual capable of using presidential power is needed, as is a controlling body to keep an eye on the president.

At 1914 GMT an unnamed but ardent supporter of presidential power is next in line to speak. He notes that

the law introducing presidential power is not viable in legal or political terms, and he will therefore be voting against its acceptance.

At 1915 GMT Deputy Decyatov from Komsomolsk na Amure says that when individuals speak and complain about the state of the country, they are actually levelling criticism directly at Gorbachev. Gorbachev asks him to talk about the presidency rather than about him, to which Decyatov notes that Gorbachev must be seen as the most likely candidate. He calls for direct elections.

At 1919 GMT an unnamed deputy at the rostrum wonders whether republics would find it easier to talk to a president, to the congress, or to the Supreme Soviet. He calls for a three-year presidential term of office, and for the president to be elected at and by the congress. Few people will be able to vote: The country is bordering on a civil war, and there will be no one left to vote. Hence, vote at the congress.

At 1921 GMT Deputy Zaslavskiy stresses that the congress must, whatever it does, obey the laws of the country. Two thirds of the country must vote for a president. His constituents also want a nationwide vote.

At 1923 GMT Deputy Zalygin worries that the congress is getting bogged down in parliamentary niceties rather than discussing the situation in which the country finds itself today. He points to the force of anarchy in the historical arena. He objects to having an extraordinary congress at all, unless it deals with the real reason for its having been convened in the first place: i.e. the presidency. The congress must not be responsible for leading the country into temporary anarchy. A president must be chosen.

At 1926 GMT Deputy (?Panov) stresses that they are, after all, politicians, and that they must be farsighted. He wants all the people to vote for the first president.

At 1928 GMT Deputy Yakovlev is given the floor.

At 1928 GMT Yakovlev takes up something that Zalygin said—their reason for being there. He is concerned that the deputies do not miss the chance to affect their destiny. More democracy would follow from a multi-party system. However, the matter in hand is to elect a president, and that president is Gorbachev.

At 1933 GMT Deputy Dmitriy Likhachev takes the floor, aware of the emotions that grip the country. A direct vote for a president under such conditions would lead to civil war. It is an urgent matter. Regarding the division of state and party power, he stresses that the president must not be deprived of party support. This again would lead to civil war. He appeals to the deputies to trust him as an old man and one of much experience.

At 1936 GMT Gorbachev points to the lines of waiting deputies, and asks whether the congress should continue its exchange of views. A show of hands indicates that this should now stop.

Sobchak Makes Controversial Remarks

LD1403204190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1936 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

An Estonian deputy comes to the rostrum. Their document should have been received yesterday. They are inspired by the fact that the Estonian delegates represent their own people and obey their instructions. That people now desire independence of state, not nationality, although it does not aim to infringe upon the rights of any other people or state. International law, too, gives them the right to secede, especially when they did not enter the union legally, but as the result of a deal with Hitler. He insists that the presidential vote is a matter for Russia. Given that a president is required, the Estonians would like to see Gorbachev in that position, since he is better than anyone else.

At 1940 GMT Gorbachev says that since a first version of the third section exists, they should now vote on it—on the introduction of a presidency and constitutional changes. A vote on the third section is called for. The third section is adopted by 1,542 votes with 368 against and 76 abstentions.

At 1945 GMT Kudryavtsev returns to the rostrum and recalls the alteration to the presidential oath, amended to refer to "the peoples" of the country rather than to merely the Soviet people. A vote is called for. The third section is adopted by 1,849 votes, with 66 against and 38 abstentions.

At 1950 GMT a vote is called on the fourth section. It is adopted by 1,716 to 114, with 90 abstentions. The law on introducing presidential power and amending the Constitution is now adopted.

At 1953 GMT Sobchak comes to the rostrum to talk about yesterday's speech by Polozkov. He does not intend to enter a personal exchange. An ethics commission can sort out whether he was telling the truth or not. What Polozkov omitted to say, Sobchak will now reveal after examining documents connected with the ANT cooperative. Some of these have been signed by Ryzhkov and Gusev, as well as other government officials.

At 2000 GMT Gorbachev announces a break, but Ryzhkov comes to the rostrum himself and begins to speak. Ryzhkov speech concludes at 2007 GMT.

At 2007 GMT Deputy Prokopyev from Yakutia expresses shock at Sobchak's statement; he is applauded. He calls for an apology.

At 2010 GMT a deputy from Adygey Autonomous Oblast speaks: People in his area know Vorotnikov well, they support him warmly, and what Sobchak said is an insult to Adygey people.

At 2011 GMT an unidentified deputy proposes a vote of confidence in the Ryzhkov-led government. Gorbachev says it is time to wrap up on this topic. A woman deputy at the rostrum says that we all know the difficult situation the country is in. The election of a president is what is needed now. It does not befit deputies to start slandering the government.

At 2015 GMT Gorbachev calls for a break, but the woman deputy at the rostrum continues her attack on Sobchak, and asks Gorbachev what he has to say. Gorbachev says it is time to close on this topic. Deputies want to continue speaking. He says that Sobchak had asked to speak in response to Polozkov, so he was given the opportunity. The government has examined the question raised, as has the Party Control Committee, so they can report their findings to the Supreme Soviet. As far as the tone of Sobchak's statement is concerned, it is unworthy, and we cannot have this kind of thing here. Deputies shout from the floor that Polozkov spoke in a similar fashion as well. Deputies have suggested, says Gorbachev, that perhaps this part of the proceedings should not be broadcast. He puts it to the vote. The proposal is voted down with 637 in favor and 1,250 against. As to the question of whose side he is on, Gorbachev says that it is an impertinent question and does not get an answer. Again he proposes a break of one hour, until 1730 moscow time (1430 gmt).

Deputies Nominate Candidates

LD1403221590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2025 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

The caption reads "Evening Session". The deputies are shown gathered, and then Lukyanov asks them to register. 1,954 deputies are present.

At 2032 GMT the next topic announced is election of a president of the USSR. Lukyanov explains how nominations may arise. He asks who wishes to speak. Deputy Ivashko is given the floor. He reports that the March plenum second session nominated Gorbachev. Ivashko says that in the speeches, Gorbachev's contribution to renewal in the USSR was noted, as was his work in the international arena. He would be expected to work to enhance the USSR's prestige in the world.

At 2036 GMT Deputy Alksnis speaks for the Soyuz group, nominating Bakatin, Gorbachev, and Ryzhkov. Deputy Pokhodnya speaks for agrarian deputies, nominating Gorbachev, but noting that he must do more for rural folk. He goes on to complain that not enough time is given to questions of arming at the Supreme Soviet, and hands a petition to Gorbachev.

At 2040 GMT Kulikov, of the veterans' association, in uniform, nominates Gorbachev. He calls on local soviets

to support the Army, and says that Gorbachev as president will make a good supreme commander.

At 2042 GMT Yakovlev speaks for the trade unions, supporting Gorbachev for president. Deputy Kryzhkov speaks, requesting that Ryzhkov not withdraw his candidacy. Deputy Kugultinov, on behalf of the ancient monuments' commission, nominates Gorbachev, noting the need for attention to be given to culture in the country. He says that Gorbachev knows what a peasant's labor is like. All peoples will be treated equally by Gorbachev, says Kugultinov.

At 2047 GMT Uzbek Deputy Yakubov speaks in Gorbachev's favor. Ryzhkov is a good fellow too. Yakubov attacks Sobchak's insults against the government. Lukyanov asks deputies to stick to the point. Deputy Lisitskiy wants to know why Gorbachev did not put Travkin's amendment to section three to the vote. Deputy Engver, member of the Soyuz group, says that the group has put forward its candidate; he wants to know what is happening to help Afghanistan veterans. As far as can be seen, the decisions on this are not being fulfilled. The President must do something about this in his first 100 days.

At 2052 GMT Masaliyev, from Kirghizia, says that Gorbachev and Ryzhkov were supported, in his republic, as candidates. Gorbachev is their chosen candidate. Chernykh, from Kuzbass, speaks.

At 2055 GMT Deputy (?Martirosyan), in uniform, says that we are living through a nightmarish time. He recalls past dictators. If Gorbachev is to be president, he will have to see to it that the people get a rest from this kind of thing.

At 2058 GMT Deputy Bliznov puts forward three candidates: Bakatin, Ryzhkov, and Gorbachev. Deputy Bunich nominates Gorbachev, noting that the economy must be gotten moving. Deputy Posibeyev nominates Gorbachev. Deputy Zemskova, saying she speaks for herself, nominates Bakatin on behalf of militiamen.

At 2103 GMT a deputy from Turkmenia, Ovezgeldyyev, nominates Gorbachev. An unidentified deputy, on behalf of Karakalpakia, nominates Gorbachev. Deputy Dikul speaks for Ryzhkov's nomination. Disabled people need more help, he says.

At 2110 GMT a uniformed deputy from Sverdlovsk Oblast says that the president should take a military oath as well as a presidential oath, and should go to officers' school for three months. Lukyanov says that 23 people have spoken; if there are other nominations, then let them speak. None are forthcoming. Lukyanov says let us move on to discussing the candidates. Three have been nominated: Gorbachev, Bakatin, and Ryzhkov. He calls for a vote on whether the nominations have been completed.

Bakatin Withdraws Nomination

LD1403223390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2117 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov asks who wishes to speak on Bakatin's nomination. Bakatin comes to the rostrum, and thanks the deputies who nominated him, but wishes his nomination to be withdrawn. Abramovich comes to the rostrum, and says he should not withdraw. Yermilov speaks, and asks Bakatin and Ryzhkov not to withdraw. Militiaman Sorokin does not want him to withdraw. Petrusenko says that there must be a choice of candidates for a president who will have a finger on the nuclear button. Borodulin speaks of Bakatin's virtues as a militiaman and citizen, and asks him not to withdraw. A deputy from Kirov Oblast, a member of the Soyuz group, praises Bakatin and asks him not to withdraw.

At 2126 GMT an unidentified deputy says that if Bakatin is such a good officer, he should not desert the field of battle. Bakatin returns to the rostrum, says that his candidacy has been withdrawn and that is all there is to it. You cannot be forced to be president.

At 2129 GMT more deputies reject Bakatin's withdrawal. Lukyanov asks if a vote is needed to accept his withdrawal. But his own rejection of the nomination cannot be rejected. He moves on to Gorbachev's nomination.

At 2131 GMT an unidentified deputy speaks in favor of letting Gorbachev stand as sole candidate. Deputy Grigoryev speaks in favor of Gorbachev, on behalf of Chuvashia's deputies. Deputy Trofimov says that Gorbachev should have a chance to set forth the program of perestroika. Deputy (?Urazliyev) from Turkmenia speaks in Gorbachev's favor. A deputy from Minsk speaks.

At 2136 GMT Deputy Avaliani says that he is opposed to Gorbachev's candidacy because of the worsening economic situation. The state cannot keep twisting and turning, he says. The Army is not given proper respect, he says. Delay in abolishing Article 6 is shameful, says Avaliani. Don't vote for Gorbachev, whatever you do, even though he is a fine man.

At 2144 GMT Deputy Logunov recalls the first Congress and setting up of the constitutional commission. He says that work on the new Constitution has not exactly been hurried. An agreement needs to be reached in order for Soviet people to be able to live in harmony. He speaks about the press: A free press is needed by society, within the framework of the law. He criticizes the fact that the law on freedom of the press has been in the process of being worked on for a year already, when it is so necessary for the development of democracy.

At 2149 GMT Deputy Sokolov asks candidates for the post of president whether they will be in favor of free trade. He considers this the only possibility.

At 2150 GMT Deputy Kutsenko asks whether such discussion is really necessary, and says that it is all just show. He speaks about Lithuania and the possibility of the different republics electing presidents at their own supreme soviets, stating that Ryzhkov and Gorbachev should withdraw their candidacies.

At 2153 GMT Deputy Shchelkanov says that the President must be a public and political figure, and describes what qualities he would expect the president to have. He refers to the events in Baku, and says that they were the results of undemocratic leadership. A consensus should not be expected, because it will not be attained. He recalls a number of incidents discussed at previous congresses. He says that sometimes the leadership is not totally honest about events, and recalls the lack of coincidence in dates given for Gorbachev's return from Tbilisi after the events there last year.

At 2159 GMT Deputy Sidor says that Gorbachev's platform is known, but those of other candidates are not; they should be if there is to be a real election. He then continues on to say that Gorbachev is the type of president that the country needs—he is not a dictator. New reforms are expected from him.

At 2201 GMT Deputy Sukhov states that he has requested that he be allowed to leave the Supreme Soviet due to the lack of respect shown to the leadership. He criticizes the fact that deputies are not doing enough to protect the poor. He says that the situation in the country can never improve while corruption remains. Therefore he cannot carry out his program.

At 2205 GMT Deputy Romanov asks how Gorbachev will implement the power that he will soon receive, and requests that he explain what he intends.

Economic Issues Debated

LD1403231890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2206 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Deputy Yanenko criticizes the fact that the leadership seems to make rapid decisions that are often not well thought out, and for which the consequences are not foreseen. Scientific investment is not sufficient, though it is important for the country's future. He says that compromises are necessary in relations with the republics—if this had been recognized the republics would not now be trying to leave the union. Economic relations, the price to be paid for oil, and so on, must be established if they are to leave.

At 2212 GMT Deputy Volkov says that Gorbachev has done much for the country, but many events have

occurred during his leadership that now concern people—and he is responsible for them. He recalls how Gorbachev attained his posts. He was not compelled to go through the same struggles that many deputies were.

At 2214 GMT Deputy Suleymenov quotes Bakatain's speech at the previous congress, where he gave the number of militiamen killed and injured during the past year—a higher figure than in Japan. He asks why crime figures in the USSR appear to be higher than in Japan. The new president should not only exercise an iron hand during emergency situations but should also prevent them from occurring, he recalls what has been achieved since Gorbachev came to power: Democracy has been attained, but the economy has not improved. Democracy has been seen in the country only in terms of politics, and not in terms of management and the economy. The state monopoly has remained untouched, so other freedoms do not arise. There is an imperialist form of management. Therefore the president should have as his first task the conclusion of union contracts [soyuznyye dogovory] that will be the engines of the new mechanism. Only that person who started perestroyka can implement democracy fully—therefore Gorbachev should be given the chance to do this.

At 2220 GMT Deputy Kanarovskaya says that there is too much painting of black pictures. Both candidates are praiseworthy. She quotes a Ford manager on the unrealistic expectations, as if a giant country could be changed overnight. We should look at past attempts at reform, and see why they failed, so that we do not fail this time. Women of the country want peace and order to bring their children up in. They do not want things like the Sumgait massacre; they do not want empty shelves; they do not want men to work badly. Perestroyka means work. It is no good complaining about shortages if you spend all your time watching TV. Whoever wins the election, they should remember that there are 150 million women in the country: a force to be reckoned with.

At 2227 GMT Lukyanov says that 17 have spoken. A written suggestion says that they should stop now and vote on candidacies. A vote is taken on the list of candidates. The votes are 1,702 for inclusion of Gorbachev, and 156 against. Lukyanov asks if they want a break, or to postpone the rest for tomorrow. The deputies want to discuss Ryzhkov's candidacy.

At 2233 GMT Ryzhkov comes to the rostrum, and thanks those who nominated him. The country is going through historic times. We must think about how those in the future will look back at the present; we must not make any mistakes. We do not yet know what problems the first president will face; but he must be a person who can think on a broad scale. There can only be one candidate: Gorbachev. Having worked with him since 1985, Ryzhkov says, he knows Gorbachev well: his intellect and his potential. He knows his flaws, too. He is a man who can lead the country. Ryzhkov says that he has responsibility for the government, has had it for four and a half years, and would like to continue in the post if

possible. He will do all he can to put things right, and feels that this is his moral responsibility. Thus, though he is very grateful for the nomination, he cannot agree to run.

At 2239 GMT an unidentified deputy recalls Obolenskiy putting himself forward at the first congress. The hall is full of people elected by the people; is there really nobody in the hall who can provide an alternative to the three people who were nominated? The deputy says he is not attacking Gorbachev's candidacy.

At 2244 GMT another deputy speaks on behalf of Belorussia. The end of the cleanup in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident has been announced, but one third of the Republic is still affected by contamination. People are dying of illnesses that doctors refuse to register as radiation-related. The Supreme Soviet ignored Deputy Sokolov's plea on Belorussia's behalf. The deputy appeals to the future president to give the problem proper attention.

At 2246 GMT Lukyanov proposes the appointment of a tellers' commission, and the end of discussion on candidacies. The show of hands is in favor. He asks for suggestions for the tellers' commission; the deputies have a list of suggestions at hand. An unidentified deputy says that his voters have not mandated him to elect a president. He cannot therefore serve in the tellers' commission, and makes an alternative proposal. Lukyanov asks for a vote on the composition of the tellers' commission with this substitution. The list is approved, 1734 for, 70 against. Lukyanov calls for a 40-minute break.

At 2252 GMT an unidentified deputy says that they should have a break, and then make an alternative nomination. Petrusenko speaks about the inclusion of two "observers" in the tellers' commission, and demands an explanation. This concerns deputies from Lithuania. Lukyanov says that they have the right to be part of the commission. Another deputy proposes a break before gathering again to argue. Lukyanov announces a 40-minute break.

Voting Procedures Announced

LD1403232790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2255 GMT on 14 March continues its recording of the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow.

The caption reads "Continuation of the Evening Session." Lukyanov calls on the deputies to register before the chairman of the Tellers' Commission reports. Present are 1,863 delegates. The floor is given to the chairman of the Tellers' Commission, Academician Osipyan.

At 2259 GMT Osipyan says that the commission has made him chairman. Deputy Rakhimova has been elected secretary. The form and wording of the voting

ballot has been decided: Osipyan holds it up. It is pink, has one name on it—Gorbachev's—and two boxes: "for" and "against." Osipyan explains how voting ballots will be handed out, and how to mark it. To vote "for" cross out "against," and vice-versa. This is because there is only one candidate; otherwise you would just put a mark by the candidate you wanted. If both or neither are crossed out, the ballot will be counted as an abstention. Osipyan explains the arrangements made are to keep any backlog from building up.

At 2307 GMT Lukyanov says that tomorrow's session begins at 1000 Moscow time (0700 GMT) with the announcement of the results of the vote. He asks for questions for Osipyan. A deputy asks if the candidate is going to reply to questions before the vote. Lukyanov says that the candidate expects to answer questions before taking the oath, if he is elected. Lukyanov calls for an adjournment until 1000 Moscow time tomorrow. The caption says good night.

The recording ends at 2310 GMT.

Decision To Elect First Executive President

LD1403133290 Moscow TASS in English 1314 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies today decided that it should itself elect the first Soviet executive president.

There were 1,542 votes for the decision, with 368 against and 76 abstentions.

The succeeding presidents, however, will be elected directly by the voters on the basis of equal suffrage by secret ballot.

While some deputies objected to the first chief executive being elected by the congress rather than by popular vote, most argued they should do this by way of an exception because the situation in the country is too difficult and delaying the election would be a grave political mistake.

As the problem was debated, Mikhail Gorbachev was discussed as the leading candidate for the presidency.

Ryzhkov Withdraws Presidential Candidacy

LD1503004750 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2233 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Speech by Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov on presidential candidacy at the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR peoples Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrades, peoples deputies, allow me to express sincere thanks to those comrades who put forward my candidacy for this eminent post. I also

sincerely thank those comrades who, while proposing my candidacy, had good words to say about me. I thank them because I do not hear such words very often. [laughter and applause]

Comrades, I think that during these hours the country is going through a historic time. I think that subsequently these hours will be studied many years from now and in the near future as the hours in which the new power was born, when a new way of governing was born in our future democratic state. Therefore, I understand that, perhaps, I am not living up to the hopes of those comrades who put forward my candidacy but I would like to say to you sincerely, let us now, at this moment, give thought to the future. Let not just our hearts speak today, let our minds speak, too. Today we must not make a mistake, not in any event. We are electing a president for the first time and we must not commit even the smallest mistake. Therefore, my opinion is that today we must give thought to the future leadership of our country. We are speaking about the president, today, about the first president of our great homeland.

Although we have discussed this question for three days, I think that there are still many problems which we are not even aware of and which the president and his cabinet will come up against because all this is happening for the first time. However, I am convinced of one thing—that the president should be a person who can think on a grand scale who can look far ahead, who can think about the future of our state. If we believe that a president will decide all the current questions we will make the president into someone who is not a president but a completely different person. Therefore, I think that for those future powers—and life will, of course, introduce adjustments—there is one candidacy today and that is Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I would earnestly entreat you to support this candidacy.

As you know, I have been working with Comrade Gorbachev since 1985. I know him. I know him very well. I know his mind. I know his intellect and I know his potential, just as I know his shortcomings which all of us have. However, I believe that he is the man who should run the country today. That is my sincere conviction and I entreat you to believe me.

Second, I bear the moral responsibility for the government, for the work of the government, for the economic problems, for the economic complications—I do not say crises—and so on. I have been chairman of the Council of Ministers for four and a half years and I bear responsibility for this and I would like, and I would ask you to give me the chance, if this future chance is granted, to conduct matters in the economy and in the social development of the country; that is, to be the head of the government, chairman of the council of Ministers who must in practice and in reality implement the decisions of the Congress, the decisions of the Supreme Soviet, which will be coordinated and directed by the future president. I would earnestly entreat you to grant me this chance and, as the saying goes, with whatever strength

and knowledge I have I will do everything to put the situation right, and all the more so since I put my signature to the program for the economic improvement of the country and I am morally obliged to do this. Therefore, I entreat you, I earnestly entreat you to withdraw my candidacy. I am very grateful but this is my firm request. [applause]

Anatoliy Ivanovich clarifies this, that I do not give my consent. Yes. I ask.... I do not give my consent and ask to continue my work in the post which I now occupy and I thank you for putting forward this candidacy and for the kind words.

Gorbachev Nominated First Executive President

*LD1403152790 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee and Supreme Soviet Chairman, was today nominated to become the first Soviet executive president.

The nomination, at the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, was formally suggested on behalf of the Party Central Committee's plenum, which had taken place during a break in the proceedings of the national legislature.

The nomination process is continuing.

Only Candidate on Ballot

*LD1403174590 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent: "Urgent—Gorbachev Only Presidential Candidate"]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The discussion of candidates nominated for the post of elective president of the USSR ended at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin did not agree to run and, according to the regulations, his candidature was no longer considered.

Prime-Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov also refused to run.

As many as 17 people participated in discussing Gorbachev's candidature.

As many as 1,702 deputies voted for leaving Gorbachev's candidature on the ballot. 156 deputies voted against, and there were 36 abstentions.

As a result, only Gorbachev's name will be put on the ballot.

'Acute Debates' on Presidential Election Reported

*LD1403175990 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Video report by correspondent V. Tsygankov on today's proceedings at the congress, including glimpses of Gorbachev, Kudryavtsev and other deputies—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Tsygankov] Again there were acute debates on section three of the document on the conditions of election of the country's first president. Referring to the electorate in their constituencies, some deputies proposed that the elections be postponed, or at any rate not be held at this extraordinary congress. And this was the fundamentally different view expressed by deputies Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and academician Likhachev. [passage omitted]

[Begin Likhachev recording] Dear comrades, I am not a lawyer, but it appears that I am one of the oldest deputies in this hall. I remember perfectly well the February revolution, I know what people's emotions are like, and I have to tell you that at the present time our country is enveloped in emotions. And in these conditions a direct ballot for a president would in fact lead to a civil war. Believe me, trust my experience. Therefore I am opposed to a direct election. An election should be held here and without delay. This election must not be put off. That's the first thing.

The second thing is this: the question of the distribution of party and state power, and whether it needs to be separated at all. By the same token, if we separate party power and state power and we deprive the president of party power, then at the same time we will create an opposition to the state, and we will just as clearly lead the country into a state of civil war. This is not possible. When we are now all anxious that there should be strong authority, there must not be any separation of power. [end recording]

[Tsygankov] The afternoon session ended with the adoption of a single law on the institution of the office of president of the USSR, and the introduction of changes to the country's constitution.

Further on Debates

*LD1403174190 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[By TASS parliamentary secretary]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—A multi-party system has not yet taken shape in the Soviet Union, and Mikhail Gorbachev, if elected president, should retain the post of the Soviet Communist Party general secretary. Deputy Svyatoslav Feodorov, the famous eye specialist, told journalists here today.

"I believe," he told correspondents before the morning session of the third extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, "that under present conditions Gorbachev

should continue leading the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. He may only leave the post when other parties are established and a new alignment of forces is formed".

Feodorov believes that Gorbachev's first steps as president should be aimed at "using his powers to settle disputes, sharply aggravated recently, between the centre and union republics".

The president, he said, should also prepare state structures to enforce the law on ownership and the fundamentals of legislation on land, recently promulgated by the country's parliament.

Speaking about the procedure for electing president, Feodorov stressed that it should be a nationwide election. However at this point, taking into account the specific situation in the country, the president should be elected immediately by this extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, he said.

Feodorov also said that he expected 70 to 75 percent of Soviet People's deputies to vote for Gorbachev during the forthcoming ballot.

Deputy Anatoliy Ananiev, a writer, views the situation in a similar way. Expressing the hope that Gorbachev will be elected president, he noted that "there is no other leader at this point who can propose a better programme than Gorbachev's".

Ananiev believes that apprehensions relating to Gorbachev filling two posts simultaneously—president and party general secretary—"are groundless". As the monopoly on power is coming to an end in this country, he said, there is no reason for fearing the combination of powers. He also noted that "in the Soviet Union, as in other civilised countries, the president does not only represent himself, and, emblematically, the nation. He must stand for the idea his party, one party among other parties, puts forth and supports, and he must head this party."

Deputy Pavel Bunich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, formulated the idea in his own manner. He told correspondents that "holding the two posts—president and party general secretary—is only justifiable until the party's 28th congress".

Bunich voiced hope that the situation in the party will change so considerably at the 28th congress "that Gorbachev will no longer need the post and it will be filled by another man".

Presidential Election To Take Place 'Tonight'

*LD1403190690 Moscow TASS in English 1855 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—During the nomination of candidates to the post of national president at the

current extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin withdrew his own candidature.

In keeping with congressional rules, his candidature was not discussed after that.

Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov also refused to run for president.

After thanking deputies for the nomination, he stated that a president "should be able to think in broad categories, should look far ahead and think about the state's future".

"Today, there is only one candidate fit to fill this post—Mikhail Gorbachev," he said.

Ryzhkov expressed the wish to remain in his current position, handling issues of the country's economic and social development.

Seventeen deputies discussed Gorbachev's candidature. For the first time in Soviet history, the nation's supreme body of authority heard strong criticism with regard to the No. 1 executive.

Teimuraz Avaliani from Kemerovo called on deputies to vote against Gorbachev, whom he blamed for leading the country to the brink of collapse and for the failure to advance in the economic and social sphere during the past five years.

Aleksandr Shchelkanov, a deputy from Leningrad, said that Gorbachev's activity was marked by manifestations of voluntarism and a lack of substantiation when adopting major decisions.

Nikolay Kutsenko, a deputy from the Ukraine, proposed that Gorbachev withdraw his candidature.

The majority of speakers, however, backed Gorbachev's candidature, describing him as the initiator of perestroika and its guarantor.

A total of 1,702 deputies voted in favour of keeping Gorbachev on the ballot paper. 156 were against, and 36 abstained.

The election is expected to take place later tonight. Its results are expected to be announced on Thursday morning.

Yakovlev Favors Presidential Election by Congress

*LD1403175290 Moscow TASS in English 1625 GMT
14 Mar 90*

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies today decided to elect the first president of the USSR by secret voting by participants in the congress. As many as 1,542 people voted in favour, 368 voted against, and there were 76 abstentions.

In the future the Soviet president will be elected by the country's population by direct, equal and secret voting.

The proposal to elect the first president at the congress caused objections of a number of deputies. But the majority believed that this should be done as an exception: the country is in a difficult situation, and a delay would be a serious political mistake.

The main presidential candidate, Mikhail Gorbachev, has been named during the discussion of this problem.

People's deputy, Politburo member and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Aleksandr Yakovlev said that the introduction of presidency in the USSR is a transition from vague collective responsibility to personal accountability.

He emphasized that the main purpose of the current extraordinary congress is not to make some amendments to the constitution, but to elect president because of the situation that formed in the country.

"Each of us has a historic opportunity to show personal responsibility and wisdom," he said.

The idea of voting of the whole people sounds attractive and is essentially right, Yakovlev said. But at present "we are obliged to give primary consideration to the actual situation and not to abstract notions, for a delay can roll us back," he said.

He is of the opinion that the election of president by the whole people at present will render the Congress of People's Deputies ineffective and unnecessary. He said that the president will have no counterbalance which is needed in conditions of still brittle and euphoric democracy.

Writer Sergei Zalygin urged the congress to give thought to what is more important at the present moment, and not to what is better theoretically. "If we put off presidential elections, we shall plunge the country into anarchy for several months," he said.

The oldest among people's deputies, 84-year-old literary scholar academician Dmitry Likhachev was the last to take the floor before the voting on the form of presidential election. Likhachev, who has been upholding the ideals of good and justice all his life, who worked towards preserving Russian culture and experienced Stalinist camps in his young years is regarded as moral arbiter by Soviet people.

"I remember the 1917 February revolution in Russia very well," Likhachev said. "Now that the whole country is swept with emotions, direct elections of president would lead to a civil war. The elections must be held here, and they should not be put off, Likhachev said.

Zaykov Supports Presidential Power Base

LD1403233190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2205 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Comments by Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, during foyer interview with unidentified correspondents at USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow on 14 March—recorded]

[Text] Once again, about the congress. There are many who said today that the president should not at the same time head the party. But here is the opinion of Comrade Zaykov. [video switches to interview with Zaykov surrounded by journalists holding microphones and tape recorders in a hall]

[Begin Zaykov recording] [words indistinct] that the time has come to give back, I would say, the inviolability of power which the CPSU had. It should be handed over to presidential direction. That will indeed be the separation of the functions of running the state. [end recording]

Lawmakers 'Struggle' To Amend Proposed Bills

LD1403130690 Moscow TASS in English 1251 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The debate on constitutional amendments at the Third Congress of Soviet People's Deputies went into high gear, as lawmakers struggled to amend proposed bills today.

Meanwhile, reporters covering the congress lost count on the number of changes suggested by the deputies.

More than 20 changes were introduced during the first two hours of congressional debate today, as supporters of the new, powerful presidency battled with those who wanted to put the president under strict parliamentary control.

In a frantic effort to block the new bill, supporters of restricted presidential rule moved a motion that annulled all previously adopted decisions and postponed the passage of the bill until the next congress.

Tensions reached their peak as the electronic system counted the vote on the motion. A sigh of relief could be heard in the hall, as the electronic screen displayed the result of the ballot—409 for, 1,398 against and 163 abstained. The motion was rejected.

The congress then took a one and a half-hour "time out".

During the break, the drafting commission will try to forge a compromise on several articles.

Deputies Comment on Presidency, Lithuania

LD1303194390 Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT
13 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The institution of a new executive presidency in the Soviet Union will create additional favourable conditions for the solution of the country's foreign political tasks, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs, said here today.

Addressing a news conference between sittings of the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which considered this issue, Dzasokhov said that the introduction of presidency "will impart a more stable, steady character to the concept of new political thinking and the entire concept of perestroika."

Once the president becomes responsible for the country's foreign policy, said Valentin Falin, a committee member, the Soviet Union's foreign policy "will have a purer state form."

In his view, this will simplify the solution of several difficult problems, including those connected with processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe.

Speaking of prospects of the USSR's relations with these countries, Falin observed that they "will continue on a deideologised basis."

Asked about the Lithuanian and parliament's decision on state independence, Falin said that one cannot adopt decisions outside the legal framework, which violate overall interests of the Soviet Federation.

At the same time he warned against "a hasty assessment of the developments."

'Dramatic' Congress Session 14 March

*LD1403215990 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2000 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] Today is the Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. We go over to the all-union radio correspondents in the Kremlin. Aleksandr Ruvinskiy is at the microphone:

[Ruvinskiy] The daytime session of the Congress of People's Deputies was extremely dramatic. Under debate was the question of whether to have the president elected at the congress or by way of universal suffrage. Let me tell you about the results right away. The president will be elected at this congress. There were very many people who wanted to speak on this issue. There were quite a few speeches from the rostrum. Let me acquaint you with one of them. Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev has the floor:

[Begin Yakovlev recording] Why have we gathered here? Let us not disassemble or be underhand about it. We have gathered here not to introduce certain emergency amendments to our constitution, but to elect the first president of the country in view of the situation that has emerged in our country. We have also gathered here with longer-term prospects in mind, so as to enable our democracy, our democratic process, our perestroika to

move forward. In essence we are deciding the country's destiny now, this very hour, this very minute, or, to be more correct, we are defining the direction along which it can and should proceed further. The doubts that have been voiced here and the discussion on the topic of what form the presidential election should take create the impression, as far as I personally am concerned, that the wheels of our fate may crack. I am very concerned lest our calculations turn into miscalculations that may yet cost the state and the country very dearly. After all, comrades, it seems that we have convinced ourselves that we did embark on the correct path of transformations; that we are tackling tasks of strategic nature for our country; that the country and its people got down to breaking up the thousand-year old paradigm of Russian non-freedom; and that we have decided in favor of turning toward unconstrained development. And at the same time we can see the difficult situation of society and we do not spare the harshest denunciations when we talk about it, about the sickness of the organism that requires to be cured in the economic, social, and moral sense, and I mean cured today, not later.

The idea of universal suffrage sounds very attractive. It is a correct idea, into the bargain. But we are politicians, lawmakers, and that is why we are duty bound to give preference to specific conditions and not to abstract reflections, since any delay may throw us back.

Indeed, why is this delay needed? Do ask yourselves this simple question: What content is vested in this very democratic form of universal suffrage? The search for a new leader? Or something else? The universal suffrage will at present—and I stress at present—make the Congress of People's Deputies unnecessary and ineffective. The president will be deprived of this counterbalance, and, for the time being, it is needed, in the conditions of what is still a fragile and, I would say, still euphoric democracy in our country. Do we have a need for this?

Let us, again, grow up, and let us refrain from crying out for the past that we so easily tend to forget. The fact that universal suffrage will be much more democratic under a multiparty system must also, comrades, be taken into account. And, for the time being, it is my deep conviction that the logic of perestroika urges us to make haste. Essentially the struggle between the forces that firmly take the stand of perestroika and the forces that oppose them has entered the decisive stage, and it is far from over. This factor, then, should be considered by us in a responsible manner.

Some people speak of the undesirability of combining offices. The issue does exist here. But is it worthwhile now to embark upon a path of conflict and some kind of suspicions, especially given the conditions that make it imperative to unite the healthy social forces for the purpose of attaining a qualitatively new aspect of society? Apart from this, dear comrades, the general secretary must report back on his work during the coming congress.

Further, let us not play hide and seek. The point now is to elect a specific leader the president of the country, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

It seems that almost everyone agrees with this. So according to what yardstick of justice and morality do we today go through the motions of trying on this most arduous crown of Monomakh [Kievan prince who fought against anarchy and was eager to have Russia united], subsequently wishing to cast it aside into a dusty shed? You cannot die twice and you cannot be born twice. Let us together think of this, too. But if some people are engaged in a search for a new leader, then here, too, we need to think seriously both about the motives and all the consequences of taking a step such as this. Dear comrades, we have no way back, or, if we do have one, it leads to destruction. The introduction of the presidency is a fundamental transition from collective wishy-washiness to personal responsibility. For each one of us it also represents an historic opportunity to demonstrate one's own personal responsibility and personal wisdom. Thank you for your attention. [applause]. [end recording]

[Ruvnitskiy] The Congress of People's Deputies also approved the presidential oath and decided to make the law effective the moment it passed. Thus, let me repeat again, the president should be elected during the present congress. Following the end of the discussion on this question, the floor was given to deputy Sobchak to give the following piece of information.

[Begin Sobchak recording] Esteemed comrade deputies, I asked to be given a chance to speak in order to make some comments in connection with the speech yesterday of deputy Polozkov, not to engage in polemics with him or to answer some personal accusations. I think that the high tribune of this congress is not the place for this and that the Commission of Deputies' Ethics and the judicial organs will give a correct answer to whether Comrade Polozkov was speaking the truth or a non-truth here. I would like to say a few words about what Comrade Polozkov has not mentioned. And he was keeping quiet about the following circumstances connected with the activities of the state cooperative concern ANT.

I have acquainted myself with the documents relating to this organization and can state with all responsibility that our government has had a hand both in creating it and in its activities. These documents are signed by Comrades Ryzhkov, Gusev, and other senior members of our government. This organization carried out and intended to carry out not only those operations which were mentioned but also a whole series of other operations, in particular, sales of uncut diamonds from the state depository, and a whole range of other very important strategic raw materials and things, for sums amounting to tens of thousands of millions [form of currency unmentioned]. Comrade Polozkov has also kept quiet about the former—well, I do not yet know whether he is already the former or not—head of this organization, a certain Comrade (Ryashintsev), a former

KGB official. And in one of the government's documents about the activities of this organization with which I have been acquainting myself, there is the following phrase: "To provide the economic security for the organization's activities and to entrust the organs of the Committee for State Security with the provision of such." I do not even say that it is precisely this organization that was given the right to export certain goods and without license, in breach of the law. And none other than myself and a large number of Supreme Soviet members have asked a question on forming a parliamentary commission for investigating ANT activities as soon as these details were disclosed in the press. But, regrettably, our voice was not heard. I address the congress with a suggestion to form such a parliamentary commission, bearing in mind that from its conclusions a question of confidence in the government could be raised. The matter is too serious. And I am prepared to take part in this commission. And now two concrete observations regarding Comrade Polozkov's address.

Why is it that deputies Tikhonov and Sobchak were so eager to fight for passing the law of cooperatives? I am informing you that at the ninth session of the Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation, where neither I nor Tikhonov were deputies, Comrade Ryzhkov delivered a speech on this law and on the necessity of passing it, and the following comrades spoke during the debates: Orlov, Fedirko, Rugin, Primakov, Tarazevich, Voskonyan, Luchinskiy, and other comrades Polozkovs, meaning that all these are not exactly the representatives of the scientific intelligentsia, but names well known to all of you. But the paradox is that in this instance, these comrades absolved themselves from such a law which the Supreme Soviet should be proud of. And the trouble lies in the fact that, in practice, within such a beautiful law, it is precisely these comrades who have done their best to ensure that instead of real cooperation a pseudo cooperation has appeared.

And the second observation: Comrade Polozkov spoke a great deal about the Russians. I am also a Russian and I fully share his position on this issue, but with some additions. I understand Comrade Polozkov's concern about the Russians' plight, because in the new Russian parliament Comrade Vlasov, a Yakut, and comrade Vorotnikov, an Adygey, will be sitting [applause]. And so, from the point of view of our Russian Federation of the union, I am not at all against a Yakut or an Adygey at the head of the Russian or the union government, but I am against the Russians representing Yakut and Adygey peoples in our parliament [applause]. [end recording]

[Ruvnitskiy] Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov asked to speak.

[Begin Ryzhkov recording] You know, esteemed congress, I get sadder and sadder. What are we engaged in? I don't understand you either, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Why is it that you always give the floor to Comrade Sobchak? Why don't you provide information? [applause] Why do we give him the opportunity of spitting at every person

here? Why does he [voice falters], I'm sorry, after [words indistinct] I'm actually surprised, you know, I'm getting excited as I am speaking now. I did not expect such an attack, although 80 days after the adoption of the program, quite honestly, I have had nothing but attacks every day in the country. I cannot open a newspaper, I cannot watch television. How long will the defamation of the government go on? I do not understand this matter. If in December we adopted a decision, gave a vote of confidence in the party, er, the government, if we adopted a program, then let us get on with it at last. Nothing of the sort is going on in the country. Utter discrimination is going on, smearing is going on, abuse of everything that the government does. Can the government really work in such conditions?

And today they are letting Comrade Sobchak out here. Can...[changes thought] you know, I would never have sunk to settling some accounts today, or to mentioning surnames. But there has to be a limit to this. He has smeared Vorotnikov, he has smeared Vlasov, he has smeared Ryzhkov. What right do you have here, to declare to the whole world, that I am the guilty one in this affair? Get to the bottom of it, for God's sake. I think that the creation of ANT, and cooperatives like it and other organizations, was necessary. I would like to give you some information: From the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, we indeed provided the possibility, opened up the possibility, for all to trade abroad. We have 14,000 enterprises, cooperatives, and so on, registered, 14,000! I recall when, in the summer, last summer, we were confirming the composition of the government, and we got to foreign economic links, that is, we were determining the ministry and so on; these people, including Comrade Sobchak, they were shouting that we had suppressed foreign economic links, that we were not giving any freedom, that we had introduced licensing, that we had introduced the imposition of quotas. But we saw what was happening in the country at the time. Yes, we did indeed introduce tough measures. To date we have given the possibility, but at the same time we have become convinced that a very many negative phenomena have indeed occurred, and so we are now establishing order here.

Regarding ANT: I signed an order from the Council of Ministers on the creation of this state cooperative organization in order to provide the possibility of concluding barter deals, and, in its concept, this was a correct proposal, a correct proposal. We actually wanted to sell what could be found in the country, production waste, to find above-plan output, to sell it abroad and with this money to supply consumer goods for our country. What is bad in that? I will tell you that, after this, and before this, I had signed dozens of applications, dozens of orders on the conclusion of barter deals. I can give you the official information on how many people's deputies appeal for barter deals to be permitted.

In this case the same thing was done. Subsequently, Comrade Gusav indeed signed a document, and he did this without malicious intent; I am convinced that he

acted honestly in this, where it was written: Permit the above-plan output of sectors of the national economy, including defense sectors, to be sold, and so on. Today, of course, we ought to write the word civilian, but who at that time thought that under this phrase, this general phrase, they would start such machinations, including with these tanks, and so on? And so, there has to be liability for this, criminal liability, but I categorically reject the notion that the government was involved in this matter. Categorically—you can set up as many names, I mean, commissions, as you like—this is not true! The government can make mistakes, but the government is not corrupt, I state this here, and I reject it categorically!

And one last thing. I entreat you, I entreat you as a man and as chairman of the Council of Ministers: Either give us the chance to work or otherwise we shall resign. [Applause] We can no longer work in this way. We cannot work in such a situation. Look at what is happening in the country. We do not all see what is going on. How can the government work in such a situation? And, therefore, I earnestly entreat you: It is necessary to change attitudes toward the government, and to give it the chance to work. We are doing everything to ensure that, so to speak, our fruitful work should take place, but in such a situation as today it is not possible to work.

And one last thing. We are speaking about presidential power today. I am in favor of there being a strong president. I am in favor of there being strong presidential power. We really need this to survive. But I am certain that no strong president and no strong presidential cabinet will work if two components are not working, as well. These are executive power—the government must be strong—it must implement in practice everything that is proposed; and, of course, judicial power. Therefore, if we need a government, if we need a strong government, then it must be supported. Thank you. [applause lasting 45 seconds]

Ryzhkov Denies Link With ANT Affair

LD1403172290 Moscow World Service in English
1500 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Shortly before the break, the congress had a dramatic experience. People's Deputy Anatoliy Sobchak spoke on the case of the joint state and cooperative concern ANT. It was founded in order to help fill the domestic market with bottleneck imported commodities. [sentence as heard]. A number of ANT's operations, in violation of customs rules, caused a row in the press. Deputy Sobchak said that the government must bear its share of responsibility for that and demanded a parliamentary inquiry into the affair. Prime Minister Ryzhkov, in his reply, said that there was no corruption in his cabinet and that it could not be linked to the ANT affair. The prime minister accused the mass media of systematic attacks on the government, which hampered its activities. The country needed a strong

government as much as it needed a strong president, the prime minister concluded to applause.

Warns Government he Might Resign

LD1403180290 Moscow TASS in English 1716 GMT
14 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—At the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies today Deputy Anatoliy Sobchak, a lawyer from Leningrad, made a statement alleging that Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and some other government officials were party to a ploy by the ANT cooperative, which attempted to sell foreign customers Soviet military machinery (TASS reported on the affair at the end of February).

Nikolay Ryzhkov responded to the charges by categorically rejecting any personal interest of government members in the deal. He added that opponents of the government have stepped up pressure on the government during the 80 days that have passed since the previous Congress of People's Deputies expressed confidence in the government programme to raise the economy.

"It is outright discrimination, everything the government does is run down," Nikolay Ryzhkov said. "It is impossible to work under such conditions. If the atmosphere around the government does not change, we shall tender our resignations," he stressed.

"I want to state emphatically that the attitude towards the government should change. Let the government work, we will do all we can to make this work productive," Ryzhkov pledged.

Stormy applause lasted several minutes after Ryzhkov concluded his address, a vivid confirmation of confidence in the government and its head on the part of the overwhelming majority of Soviet people's deputies.

More on Ryzhkov Resignation Offer

LD1403142490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1356 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 14 Mar (TANJUG)—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov today offered his resignation and the resignation of the entire Soviet Government to the Congress of People's Deputies after having been accused of involvement in a scandal surrounding an attempt to illegally sell 12 tanks abroad.

Deputies greeted Ryzhkov's statement with applause in an obvious sign of support for his announcement that he and his government were "clean."

Accusations against Prime Minister Ryzhkov and his government were made at the congress by Aleksander Sobchak, a prominent deputy and intellectual. Following Ryzhkov's statement, which categorically rejected the claim that he and his government had been implicated in

the affair, an interval will probably ensue to give deputies an opportunity to allay passions. [passage omitted]

Gorbachev Comments on Ryzhkov, Sobchak Exchanges

LD1503000290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2015 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Remarks by M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] I think that we should end this section of the Congress session and end it in the following manner. [shouting from the hall] One moment, please. First...[more shouting from hall] Well, are we to continue speaking? [shouts of "Yes"] That's enough, that's enough. I ask all the deputies to take their seats. [shouting in the hall continues] I ask the deputies to calm down—we are at the congress—and to take their seats. I think that we should end this section of the congress session in the following way. First, comrade Sobchak, as a deputy, yesterday insisted that he should be given the chance to respond to that part of comrade Polozkov's speech which concerned and offended him yesterday. We promised him that we would give him the opportunity after the adoption of the law. There is no such possibility now. [shouting from hall] One moment, one moment comrades. He was given eight minutes, within the procedure, as it were, as we still had the opportunity. In this regard I do not understand Nikolay Ivanovich's [Ryzhkov's] reproach to me. [Reproach that Gorbachev gave Sobchak the opportunity to slander people and attack the government] That is the first thing. [shouting in the hall continues]

Second, as far as comrade Sobchak's speech is concerned, I would divide this question into two parts. First, in connection with the fact that at Party Control Committee level and at government level itself, an investigation has been carried out or is in its final stages [investigation into government involvement in ANT tank sales scandal]. The Council of Ministers held a meeting and adopted a decision on this and assessed these events. The Party Control Commission, within the party control procedures, is studying all the aspects connected with the conduct of various officials who are Communists and will examine these questions. I think that the congress is entitled to give an instruction today that the government—it has already completed this and has everything clear as we heard today from Nikolay Ivanovich—should give a specific report on what the investigation showed. Although, the essence of the issue is already clear from Nikolay Ivanovich's explanation. It should report to the Supreme Soviet. [indistinct comments from floor] In that case, I think that if Nikolay Ivanovich could give a report now or tomorrow.... But I do not think that we should act hastily in this matter. He will report to the Supreme Soviet. This can be published and detailed information can be conveyed to the deputies. All of this can be done. So, that is that part.

As far as the tone, the reproaches the underlying meanings that were scattered throughout Deputy Sobchak's speech, I agree with all the deputies: that this was unworthy, unworthy, and we cannot conduct our work and arrange our relations in such a way, neither in the USSR Supreme Soviet let alone at the Congress, nor in the relations that the Congress and Supreme Soviet have with the government or, in general, with the other organs of our political and social structure. Here, I agree with the angry words spoken from the rostrum and with what I felt in the hall. I think that Comrade Sobchak should ponder on this and explain his attitude to the congress. [shouts from the hall] I do not understand. [more shouts] The deputies here are saying that Deputy Polozkov deserves similar criticism since in the deputies opinion, he also committed improprieties and attacks.

I think, comrades, that this does not embellish and does not enrich, but and most importantly, this introduces an abnormal atmosphere into work and violates the comradely relations which should imbue the work of the Supreme Congress [as heard] and the congress of Peoples Deputies. This should not occur.

Third, I think that deputies have suggested that this part of the congress should not be transmitted, not broadcast. [shouting from hall] I do not know if this is the correct thing to do. Therefore, I would like the congress to decide. I will put the question to the congress to be voted on since a proposal has been put forward that this part of the sitting should not be broadcast. I put this proposal to the vote. [the proposal is voted down with 637 votes in favor and 1,250 against]

Thus, the proposal fails. All of this will be broadcast.

Finally, with regard to what concerned me personally in the speech by Deputy Umalatova. Her question was put like this—I cannot repeat it word for word: Whose side am I on? I consider this question totally improper [bestaknyy] and inappropriate and I refuse to answer it. [applause]

Further on Gorbachev Comments

LD1503000290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2015 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Remarks by M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

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Brazauskas on Letter to Ryzhkov on Economy

LD1403234390 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2205 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Foyer interview with Algirdas Brazauskas by unidentified correspondent at USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow on 14 March—recorded]

[Text] After Lithuania had announced the restoration of state independence, a question arose about the economy, and the regulation of Lithuania's economic ties with other republics of the union. [Video switches over to interview in a foyer with Brazauskas]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Excuse me, please. Ryzhkov said yesterday that he did not yet have any documents from Lithuania. Are there already any documents now?

[Brazauskas] A letter; a letter was presented yesterday to Ryzhkov with the proposal that economic ties be left such as they are now. They were good-natured proposals, to the effect that nothing be changed by anyone. Ryzhkov has such a letter. [end recording]

Extension of Congress Reported

LD1403081690 Moscow TASS in English 0740 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 14 TASS—The extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, which entered its third day this morning, is continuing to discuss changes to the Soviet Constitution.

The article-by-article discussion was to end on Tuesday, but a mass of proposed amendments stretched out the discussion for another day.

Obviously, the congress, which was scheduled to end today, will have to be extended. It is yet to deal with the

business of nominating presidential candidates and electing the country's first chief executive.

The morning session is being chaired by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Makhkamov Speaks at Congress 13 March

LD1403191190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1731 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Speech by Deputy Makhkamov from Tajikistan at the Third Extraordinary USSR congress of People's Deputies, held in the Kremlin on 13 March—recorded]

[Text] Comrade People's Deputies: It seems to me that the issue that we are discussing today is not only and not so much the issue of whether we need presidential power or not. The problem is deeper and more acute. At issue is actually the future of our country, the very fact of the existence of our community. I do not wish to over dramatize the situation, and I do not think that I can do that, having lived through the February tragedy in Dushanbe along with my people. I would like people to take an understanding attitude toward my speech. But I wish to ask the question, and not only for myself—has the sad list of tragedies come to an end, or will it continue? Personally, I am convinced that in order to finally draw a line under this list we need strong, authoritative, mobile, and civilized power. In our view, the establishment of presidential power does not at all contradict the democratic spirit of the principles of a law-governed state, a spirit which is asserting itself in the country. It is natural that political hopes and forecasts depend on the position from which each of us views this, on what goals and designs we have, and on how sincere we are. In this connection I cannot fail to express my surprise at the public utterances in the press, on television, and even here at the congress by some comrades who are popular in the country and who object to the introduction of the institution of a presidency. If we recall and read their latest speeches the inconsistency of their notions will become apparent and some of their arguments simply give rise to indignation. At a critical moment for the country, displaying egotistical political ambitions is immoral.

It is no secret that the adversaries of the idea of presidential power, both in the center and locally, present as one of their main arguments the view that presidential power could restrict a republic's sovereignty. Once we have correctly analyzed and weighed all the factors for and against, we come to the conclusion that it would be possible to remove certain doubts by more clearly formulating some of the articles, which would underline guarantees that the president would protect the sovereign interests of the union republics.

We are also reassured by the fact that the measures of limitation seem to us to provide sufficient guarantees that the institution of presidential power will not turn into a factor which holds back democracy or the sovereignty of union republics.

I and the majority of my Tajik deputy colleagues unambiguously support the idea of electing the country's first president at the Congress of People's Deputies. This is dictated by real life, by the urgent requirements of the day, and by the need to involve the top echelons of power in the process of consolidation of all of society's forces without delay. The fact that such a consolidation is vitally necessary and that it will not bear being postponed is obvious. There is nowhere else to go. Our country, our federation is on the verge of collapse. It wouldn't just be an unforgivable political error to fail to notice this.

Nor is there any doubt that destructive forces have taken shape and are functioning energetically in the country. By skillfully exploiting the slogans of perestroika, and by manipulating our mistakes and errors and all of our slowness in overcoming objective difficulties in certain situations, they are decisively influencing particular groups in society and provoking disorders which lead to human casualties. The scenarios are identical everywhere. One gains an impression that the guiding hand is also identical. Even the wave of meetings that has been rolling just over the past two or three days, with an identical and categorical rejection of presidential power, attests to a great deal. Familiar faces are to be seen everywhere behind the inexperienced and emotional youths—for the most part they are nationalist, corrupt elements, the kingpins of the shadow economy, careerists, and political adventurers who are straining for power. And in some place the reactionary section of the clergy is playing an anomalous role. And the fact that the tendencies can be observed of radically and extremistically inclined groups from various regions uniting on one platform gives rise to a great deal of concern. They are coordinating their actions and planning joint activities.

The facts provide evidence of this. The dramatic events in Dushanbe and their grave consequences are an example of this: 23 dead, dozens wounded, irreplaceable loss for many families and for the whole fatherland. That is the main thing, the most important thing. Considerable damage has been inflicted upon the city; more than 100 trading establishments and state institutions were damaged, burnt, destroyed and looted, as well as 20 units of state and personal transport. The damage comes to more than 51 million rubles [R]. The material damage can, of course, be replaced, but the mothers cannot be consoled of young compatriots who have been killed and who, through their inexperience and trustfulness, became both the instrument and the victim of those for whom the satisfaction of their own ambitions, their own political and economic greed, is far more important than the suffering and grief of their fellow citizens. While grieving deeply for the deaths of people I do not absolve the republic's party and state leadership, or myself, of political responsibility for the shortcomings in the socioeconomic sphere which gave rise to tension. I wish to stress once again that the Dushanbe events demonstrate that the opposition element of an extremist persuasion, which has come to believe in its impunity, is deliberately ignoring the attempts of the authorities to settle by

political methods alone the problems which have arisen in such a delicate sphere as that of national interests. They take the long-suffering and correctness of the authorities—not without reason—as a manifestation of weakness, inability to apply the law in a sovereign manner, and as readiness to make the next concessions to elemental forces. And how many times have we experienced in our country the card of the interethnic issue being played deliberately, actively, and criminally, and how many times have the difficulties in life of one people been explained as the machinations of the representatives of other nationalities? I would like to take this opportunity to carry out an instruction from the working people of our Republic to express here at the congress, for all to hear, sincere apologies to our Armenian brothers for the contrived Armenian issue in Tajikistan. I assure all that the Tajik people—I stress, the people—have never felt and do not feel any sentiments of enmity toward the Armenian people or the representatives of other nationalities residing in our republic. The whole country should know this truth. And those citizens of Tajikistan should be certain of this, in whom the events in Dushanbe evoked sentiments of defenselessness, of uncertainty about their future, and even a wish to leave the Republic. We understand the alarm of people who made up their minds to leave the Republic in haste. I would like to sincerely call upon them to change their minds, and not to submit to rumors, panic, and individual provocations. For many of them, Tajikistan is their homeland, and I assure all of them that this homeland is not indifferent to the fate of its children. We shall do everything within our powers to eliminate the problem of refugees from Tajikistan. This will be assisted by specific guarantees which are being worked out by the Republic's government at the initiative of Communists and the public, and which will be approved at the very first session of the new Supreme Soviet. We hope that they will reduce the acuteness of this issue which—let us be blunt—is being artificially whipped up.

While giving their due to the interests and problems of all the nations and ethnic groups residing in Tajikistan [bell rings]—I am finishing—it should also be said that the reasons for the social tension among the indigenous population are deep-rooted; they are not straightforward. It should be admitted that in the past, serious errors and mistakes were committed in tackling certain issues of national development. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to rid oneself of this unpleasant and sometimes shameful inheritance of the past decades. It is not only changes in approaches and priorities that will be decisive in emerging from the crisis situation. We need large amounts of funds, we need time, and we need understanding and patience. It is difficult, very difficult, once again to call upon the people for patience, but the realities of life and our possibilities are such that through our impatience and striving to be at the forefront, without the necessary material backing, we are destroying that fragile edifice that we have managed to build over the few years of perestroika. Tajikistan will not cope with the highest child mortality in the country,

the lowest standard of living, unemployment among labor resources, and its ecological crisis without assistance from the Federation, with its own resources and strength only—even with independence and the possession of full political and economic sovereignty. Of course, what I have said does not mean at all that we are oriented toward parasitism or unilateral assistance, but in order to implement perestroika in reality, and to ensure that all of the country's citizens achieve a worthy standard of living, mutual assistance by republics that are sovereign and powerful on the economic level is essential. But the task of building a viable federation brings to the forefront the issue of an effective, unifying force, the issue of the institution of presidential power. [Applause] In Tajikistan our people said the last word on this question during the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, which took place soon after the well-known events, and it decisively expressed trust in the party and the Communists, who bear the main burden of responsibility for the fate of perestroika in the Republic.

We will use this vote of confidence to vote for the introduction of the institution of a presidency, and we call upon the deputies from the fraternal union republics to support our proposal. By so doing we are voting for our unity and for the future of our Federation. Thank you.

Lukyanov Answers Questions at Congress 13 March

*LD1403145290 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1855 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Speech by Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 13 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Moscow Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Comrade deputies, there have been relatively few questions. Many of them coincide. I would like to give brief answers to these questions but I certainly would not like to sum up the debates we have had on the draft law. This is because this summing up has been entrusted to the drafting commission and the drafting commission will let us have its views.

So, very briefly: Deputy Kuznetsov asks whether the system of universal suffrage is suitable for a federative state. This is what he writes: Have the works of expert political scientists dealing with the form of electing the president been studied in any serious manner during the course of preparing the law on the presidency? After all, many of them are of the view that a federative state is ill-suited to such a form of elections as universal suffrage and that a system of electors who would counterbalance the role of the republics would be more correct for the USSR.

Let me answer this briefly: At this stage we are offered a system of electors in the form of the Congress of People's Deputies. Further, a great deal will be resolved, not just in the Constitution. I think that, in my view, we should make a note of universal suffrage as something for the

future, but we must not rule out the eventuality that the process of working through the questions connected with the federation may also yield other solutions. What is needed is, simply, to study attentively both our practice and our possibilities. As for the political scientists, their view, the view of scientists was very carefully taken into account when these documents were being worked through. It must be stated that legal and political experts alike were brought into this work.

Deputies Zakharov, Kosarchuk, Pavlov, and others ask who should the president propose the composition of the Committee for the Supervision of the Constitution. After all, the president's actions will be supervised by this committee.

The committee may question any presidential decree. Hence, should it be the case that the president should propose the composition of the Committee for the Supervision of the Constitution? I agree with this remark and it is my view that it must be implemented and that this norm [as heard] is handed over to someone else, this right, I mean.

Deputies Konovalov, Kashnikov, Yevtushkov, and others are worried about the structure of the ties between the president and the local soviets. Won't the local soviets turn out to be appendages of the presidential appointees, appendages without any rights? Won't the system of the soviets thus collapse?

No it will not collapse. The system of a republic of the soviets—there is the soviet, with its chairman, or its presidium or executive committee—remains unchanged locally. As for the president, he, at the highest level, coordinates and represents the meeting point of both the legislative power, the power of the representative bodies, and the executive power. Thus he will not have any appointees locally when dealing with these bodies.

Moreover, it will, evidently, be necessary to have it enshrined that the highest officials of state from each republic are members of the Soviet of the Federation. This is in accordance with what the deputies proposed and, as far as I know, the Drafting Commission supports this and the aim here is to refrain from tying the republic down to what bodies it shall have.

Deputy Andrey Konstantinovich Izmodenov from Sverdlovsk oblast asks why is it that the first president must be elected at the congress? Yes, the future constitution will evidently adopt precisely such a norm that the president will be elected by the people, the whole people. At the same time and in order not to lag behind—something very many deputies spoke about here—it is proposed to have the first president elected at our congress. Why? No such institution has existed as far as our society's traditions are concerned. We still do not know, nor do we know all the details of how and in what manner such elections will be held. So, in the first place, what is needed is time to prepare a legislative act on the procedure of presidential elections. Time is needed for this. The second aspect is this: The elections to the

republican and local soviets have not yet been completed in the country. If the presidential election campaign were to be superimposed or overlaid on this campaign into the bargain, then honestly speaking, I do not know what would come out of that. Everything must be attentively sorted out here.

And, finally, the third thing is that, in my view, we underestimate the potential of the Congress of People's Deputies as a broad representative forum which reflects, as though in a mirror, both the views of our society and its composition, a forum that expresses most widely differing points of views, including diametrically opposed viewpoints. If the congress is within its powers to adopt the constitution—the basic law of the USSR—then why should one refuse it this right, the right to elect a president?

I think that the remaining issues—the circumstances which make it imperative to have a president elected without delay—have been set out in the report and there is no sense in repeating them. At the same time, deputies are surely interested in whether the prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet chairman should not be simultaneously broadened at the congress.

Comrades, this matter has been thoroughly examined both at the Supreme Soviet and during the sessions of the Presidium and in the standing commissions. No, apparently it is inexpedient to do so, since presidential prerogatives differ sharply from the prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet chairman. In fact, these are the prerogatives, to a considerable extent, of the entire Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the whole question in itself—that is to say if one were simply to broaden the prerogatives of the Supreme Soviet chairman—would not be helpful to what is the main plan: to delimit the functions, to separate the legislative, executive, and judicial functions. I think that in view of this it is a serious argument.

Deputy Karimov and some other deputies—Deputy Karimov is from Tajikistan—ask whether the office of president can be combined with the office of the Central Committee's general secretary, and shouldn't the president suspend his party membership? Not a single constitution in the world contains a demand of this kind. Presidents who have been elected retain membership of their party, as a rule, although there are countries where they renounced this and give up their prerogatives. But, as a rule, they do retain their party membership. Apart from this a demand of this kind would be, in a sense, a formal demand. You cannot prohibit one by law from adhering to specific convictions or views which lay at the basis of one's choice of one's party. As for the president—and this, comrades, is enshrined in the draft oath—in our country he pledges strictly to follow the Constitution and faithfully to serve the interests of the entire people.

Deputy Neyland and some others ask for comment on the provision which states that a state of emergency and

martial law require that the matter is obligatorily examined with the involvement of the republican Supreme Soviet. It seems to me that one could proceed from the republic's consent and this can be proven legally and given a legal form. However, in certain cases, when the situation requires urgent action, a state of emergency can be declared, in case of a natural disaster, some sort of big explosion, and so on. In these cases the president could take on the prerogatives to introduce such a state, even if the republic in question failed to give consent, but it would be obligatory to ask the Supreme Soviet for its views.

Deputy Nazarenko is in favor of introducing the presidency and wishes to know my view on what the president's first decisions should be. I think that this program and these decisions will be presented by the person who, if the Congress approves the changes to the Constitution, is elected as head of our state.

Let me just say that I have tried to reply to all the remaining questions—a further batch of questions has been received but there are relatively few of them—in my main report.

Congress Editorial Commission Members Listed

PM1403160590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

["Editorial Commission of the Extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Aytmatov, Chingiz—chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, and Protection of the Historical Heritage. Amaglobeli, Nodar Sardionovich—rector of Tbilisi State University.

Ambartsumyan, Sergey Aleksandrovich—rector of Yerevan State University.

Andreyeva, Iren Aleksandrovna—secretary of the USSR Union of Designers Board, Moscow city.

Bisher, Ilmar Olgertovich—deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities.

Bosenko, Nikolay Vasilyevich—chairman of the Committee for Veterans and Invalids Affairs.

Burlatskiy, Fedor Mikhaylovich—political observer for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Moscow city.

Vorotnikov, Vitaliy Ivanovich—chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Gryazin, Igor Nikolayevich—member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Construction and Architecture Questions.

Dementey, Nikolay Ivanovich—chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Dzasokhov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee.

Yeremey, Grigoriy Isidorovich—chairman of the Moldavian Republic Trade Union Council.

Ibrayeva, Kulzhariya—team leader on the "Sarykumskiy" sovkhoz [state farm], Alakulskiy Rayon, Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, Kazakh SSR.

Ivashko, Vladimir Antonovich—first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

Kalmykov, Yuriy Khamzatovich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order.

Kanoatov, Muminsho—writer, first secretary of the Tajik SSR Union of Writers Board.

Kerimov, Dzhangir Ali Abbas ogly—head of department at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, Moscow city.

Korotkin, Vladimir Ivanovich—machine operator on the "Chyrvony Kastrychnik" kolkhoz [collective farm] in Shklovskiy Rayon, Mogilev Oblast, Belorussian SSR. Krayko, Aleksandr Nikolayevich—department chief at a branch of the Central Institute of Aircraft Engine Building named for P.I. Baranov, Moscow city.

Kudryavtsev, Vladimir Nikolayevich—vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow city.

Lizichev, Aleksey Dmitriyevich—chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, Moscow city.

Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich—first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Minnullin, Tufan Abdullovich—member of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, and Protection of the Historical Heritage.

Mironenko, Viktor Ivanovich—first secretary of the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee.

Mutalibov, Ayaz Niyazi ogly—first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee.

Mukhammad-Yusuf Mukhammad-Sodik—chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan Presidium, Tashkent city.

Mukhtarov, Akhmedzhan Gulyamovich—chairman of the Uzbekistan Union of Journalists board and editor of the republic newspaper KISHLOK KHAKIKATI, Tashkent city.

Negmatulloyev, Sabit Khabibuloyevich—president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences.

Nishanov, Rafik Nishanovich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities.

Orazberdiyev, Abdyrakhman—first secretary of the Karakumskiy Turkmen Communist Party Raykom [rayon party committee], Mary Oblast.

Ochirov, Valeriy Nikolayevich—deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions.

Pavlov, Aleksandr Sergeyevich—chief of the CPSU Central Committee State-Law Department.

Pivovarov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and of the Development of Management and Self-Management.

Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich—chief editor of the journal VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, Moscow city.

Primakov, Yevgeniy Maksimovich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union.

Prunskene, Kazimira Danute Prano—deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Pukhova, Zoya Pavlovna—chairman of the Soviet Women's Committee.

Razumovskiy, Georgiy Petrovich—secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Revenko, Grigoriy Ivanovich—first secretary of the Kiev Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom [oblast party committee].

Rugin, Roman Prokopyevich—member of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Questions of the Development of Culture, Language, National and International Traditions, and Protection of the Historical Heritage.

Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich—member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order.

Tikhonenkov, Ernst Petrovich—member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources.

Khachirov, Ismail Azretovich—chairman of the "Rodina" kolkhoz in Prikubanskiy Rayon, Karachayevo-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast.

Khokhlov, Aleksandr Fedorovich—rector of the Gorkiy State University named for N.I. Lobachevskiy.

Tsyu, Nikolay Antonovich—first secretary of the Kishinev Moldavian Communist Party Gorkom [city party committee].

Shalaye, Stepan Alekseyevich—chairman of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions].

Shamba, Taras Mironovich—secretary of the Academy of Social Sciences party committee under the CPSU Central Committee, Moscow city.

Shakhnazarov, Georgiy Khosroyevich—corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and assistant to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Engver, Nikolay Nikolayevich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Youth Affairs Committee subcommittee on young people's socioeconomic problems.

Deputy Appeals for Help in Agriculture

LD1403234690 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 2036 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Remarks by Deputy Pokhodnya at the 14 March session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies. Farming deputies met the day before yesterday and discussed candidatures for the post of president of the USSR. After lengthy discussion the candidature of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was proposed. This candidature had also earlier been supported by the Committee for Agrarian Questions and Food. However, in putting forward this candidature we should like to give Mikhail Sergeyevich the following mandate, since we have not up to now been fully in agreement with the attitude to farming questions

espoused by him or by the government. We have a number of serious reproofs and sources of dissatisfaction.

First and foremost, talk of giving priority to agriculture is just that—words. But look at the reality. The appeals which farming deputies made at the first congress and the subsequent government decisions on these matters are simply not being acted on today. This is very regrettable. Just look at how things stand today. Even that 10 percent which we managed to obtain at the Supreme Soviet session, that miserable 3,200 million [roubles] allocated for the countryside, for rural construction, is being put into effect so painfully slowly. In practical terms it is hardly being used at all. The committee recently called officials before it on this matter. So what is all this about giving priority today?

Mikhail Sergeyevich, I have several times sought to speak both here on this rostrum and at the Supreme Soviet session, and we have not been allowed to speak. [applause] Just a minute, comrades, literally. [bell rings to indicate his time is up] The whole farming question was decided in five minutes, the adoption of the budget and plan. Five minutes we were given. Just look, five minutes and we were given 10 percent. Mikhail Sergeyevich, we once again invite you to visit Belgorod Oblast and take a close look at our experience and see the reality of the debt that industry owes to agriculture today. There are things worth seeing there. Delegations come to visit us. [passage omitted]

We need businesslike relations, economy-minded relations between country and town. The countryside needs to be saved. It needs help. This is a priority for feeding us all. And everyone, those in industry and those in farming, need to remember this. Such is our mandate today. And here I have over 300 signatures which I am handing to the presidium. [applause] [hands petition to Gorbachev]

Political & Social

Results of Opinion Poll on Post of President

LD1403034190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2115 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] Well, and now, as we promised, a conversation in our program on the subject of a recently-completed opinion poll, carried out by a service named Mneniya [opinion]. We have as our guest the coordinator of this service, Grigoriy Anatoliyevich (Pashkov). The poll in question was carried out under the sponsorship of the Soviet-British enterprise (?Gala Komeron)—these are the sponsors. So what are the results, what is the attitude in the country towards the post of president?

[Pashkov] Well, during the course of this poll, a direct and specific question was asked: Is a president needed in our country? The majority, more than sixty percent declared that he was. There are far fewer opponents or

people who have not yet formulated their attitude towards the necessity for this post. Approximately every fifth person says no and about one out of ten of those asked had not yet determined their position.

[Announcer] There were big discussions at the congress just now about how to elect the president.

[Pashkov] I should say that the citizens we questioned in many cities of the Soviet Union demonstrate a rare unanimity. Only three percent are coming out in favor of the USSR Supreme Soviet electing the country's president. Eight percent of those asked favor entrusting the election of the president to the Union's Congress of People's Deputies. But the majority, more than 84 percent, consider that such an important and responsible matter as the election of the president should be done by they themselves.

[Announcer] As I understand it, the question asked was about the principle of electing a president in general—now we have a rather special situation.

[Pashkov] Naturally, the questions were formulated and the poll began before the beginning of the work of the current extraordinary congress. However, an analysis of these figures by our experts shows that direct elections of the president would significantly add to the prestige of both the president and the institution of presidential power in our country.

[Announcer] What are the other results of the poll?

[Pashkov] Well, we know who will come forward as alternative candidates at the elections for president at the Congress of People's Deputies and here are the opinions of people asked during this poll: Seventy-two percent of those people who had formulated their attitude towards this issue named Gorbachev as the president wished for, 11 percent named Yeltsin, 8 percent Sobchak, and 3 percent Ryzhkov. These are the preferences for the post of president and wish you success in your very useful work.

[Pashkov] Thank you. [video shows announcer and Pashkov conversing in the studio]

Military Chief Welcomes New Presidency

LD1503102890 Moscow TASS in English 1016 GMT
15 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—"The establishment of the presidency will help improve the structure of state authority, make it more harmonious and efficient in solving urgent state and social tasks and increase the responsibility of specific persons for their decisions," Chief of the Soviet General Staff Army General Mikhail Moiseyev told the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper today.

Moiseyev called for the expansion of the Soviet president's rights to direct the construction, training and use of the Soviet Armed Forces.

He believes that the president must make an individual decision on the introduction of martial law, which should be made in case of enemy aggression or a direct threat.

In the areas where martial laws [are] in effect, all functions of state authority and management bodies concerning defence, state and public order must be passed over to the military command.

In case of a state of emergency, which is declared in peacetime in order to protect the USSR and ensure the security of its citizens, power will remain in the hands of the local authorities and administrative bodies. In this case presidential governing can be introduced, Moiseyev said.

He believes that the Soviet president should be granted the right to approve the Soviet military doctrine and especially important programmes for the development of armaments and military hardware, as well as the Soviet military budget for a five-year period and a fiscal year.

He must consider and approve the strategic line and the principle stand on disarmament and security of the country, and, in case of a nuclear attack, make an individual decision on the use of nuclear weapons in response.

"The establishment of the presidency will help make the system of governing the defence construction and the Armed Forces more harmonious, which will create favourable conditions to carry out military reform and qualitative transformations of the defence-industrial complex and the Armed Forces within its framework," Moiseyev noted.

Primakov on Presidential Power, Elections

90U10417A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No. 10, 10-16 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Ye.M. Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by correspondent N. Zhelnorova: "Power and Privileges"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Zhelnorova] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, why precisely now has it been decided to introduce presidential authority? Are we not in too great a hurry?

[Primakov] So many voices are being heard against it precisely from the ranks which are vigorously opposed to Article 6, I am simply astonished. Where's the logic? Currently the defense and foreign ministers and the chairman of the Council of Ministers deal practically with the Politburo. But when the situation changes? What then, will they be left in a vacuum or will we need, for all that, to create some other system of real political power? With regard for the departure from a one-party

system, power should be concentrated in the state structures. The Council of Ministers, however, is called upon to deal more with socioeconomic problems than questions of official policy.

I could consider legitimate the formulation of the following questions: How effective will a president be, will this institution be assuredly democratic, how will the president come into contact with parliament, with the federation.... I am prepared to give some thought and find an answer to any problem within the framework of the presidency, but I cannot understand those who say that Article 6 is unnecessary and that we should give up a system where one party is the guide and oppose a presidency here. I cannot for the life of me understand it.

[Zhelnorova] It is fear of strong authority, a dictatorship.

[Primakov] This is an actual problem. But let us stipulate at once that strong authority and dictatorship are different things. Of course, our country underwent a time of tyranny and simply has to fear a return to it. Consequently, it is necessary under these conditions to do everything to ensure that the strong authority be democratic.

[Zhelnorova] Of course, but as yet nothing has been done for this....

[Primakov] I cannot agree. First, the democratic election of a president is being introduced here for the first time. Second, the possibility of impeachment—the recall of the president on the part of parliament—is provided for. Third, the presidency is confined to two terms. Fourth, the president cannot by delaying veto revoke a law if parliament, having voted twice, confirms its decision. Finally, the powers of the president are strictly defined, and he would be obliged to coordinate a whole number of his decisions with parliament.

But at the same time the president must be effective.

[Zhelnorova] Very well, but why not, then, heed his own appeals and conduct nationwide, direct, secret presidential elections on a multiple-choice basis?

[Primakov] If this question is viewed in the abstract, it is perfectly correct. But it needs to be viewed in the actual situation. When universal lack of responsibility is rocking the country, postponing the election of a president and organizing a nationwide ballot would mean delaying a solution of the question. And then, if we turn to world practice, why can it not be considered that the congress elected by the whole people—for the first time!—may not represent the president's electors? [sentence as published] Subsequently this will necessarily be done by direct nationwide ballot.

[Zhelnorova] Are there candidates for the office of president other than the main one?

[Primakov] I would not myself nominate another candidate. However, inasmuch as this will be on a multiple-choice basis, all who have the right of legislative initiative may put forward their candidates.

[Zhelnorova] Do you believe that Gorbachev is an enigma?

[Primakov] I have not been acquainted with him that long personally. But this is what impresses me about him. He is a person who takes in information and masters new fields incredibly quickly. He has a vast memory and an exceptional sense of responsibility. He is capable of adjusting his views in connection with a change in the situation. A man who, of this there is no doubt, has tied his life wholly to perestroika because he is convinced that it will be good for the people.

[Zhelnorova] What shortcomings do you yourself see in Gorbachev?

[Primakov] In my view, he should be a little stricter and more exacting in questions of the economy, particularly when these questions were being decided along the lines of the Central Committee and when he could have influenced them to a greater extent. I believe that M.S. Gorbachev now recognizes this, and this is a reason why he supports a presidential form of government.

[Zhelnorova] But does Gorbachev feel beyond question that he will be the president?

[Primakov] He himself categorically insists on multiple-choice elections. He even said recently that he sometimes has a desire, were it to be suggested, to stand down—let someone else be found. But he added here that such a decision might be seen as desertion.

[Zhelnorova] Are there any circumstances which might force him to resign?

[Primakov] If we fail to handle the situation, many people will have to think of resignation.

[Zhelnorova] And how soon if changes do not occur? Excuse my boldness.

[Primakov] We do not have much time. I believe that very considerable renewal should come with presidential authority. We cannot just simply rearrange figures. A new policy means new people also. The presidency would afford an opportunity to regroup forces.

If this question applies to me, I will say with all sincerity: resignation from political work would be no tragedy for me. I would happily return to my beloved institute. But failure of the cause in which I believed and which I now serve would be a tragedy.

[Zhelnorova] It is known that there have been disagreements between the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers has been unhappy that the Central Committee adopts impracticable decisions, and the Central Committee has been unhappy that

the Council of Ministers has failed to fully carry out its political instructions. What is the situation now?

[Primakov] This was fair criticism to some extent given the omnipotence of the Central Committee and the impotence of the Council of Ministers. The situation now is fundamentally different. Earlier it was impossible to release from the Supreme Soviet, for example, a document before it had been approved in the Central Committee. But now this is daily practice.

[Zhelnorova] There is much talk about the construction of a luxury dacha for the Gorbachevs. Is this true?

[Primakov] It is not. M.S. Gorbachev is building no luxury dachas. But it is being said that he is building himself dachas in Switzerland or Finland even. Surely he does not need to go on television and say that I, comrades, am not building dachas by Lake Geneva?!

[Zhelnorova] Even if others are saying so. It needs to be understood that a reverse wave is coming. All the negative things which we have learned in the period of glasnost about our former leaders are returning as complaints about the current leaders. Courage is needed to endure this.

[Primakov] Here I agree with you. The president should have an office which controls and refutes various rumors and provides explanations. For example, why not talk about the fact that M.S. Gorbachev has taken nothing for himself from the royalties from the publication of his books—and this is an immense amount of money, foreign currency included.

At the same time the head of state must have the necessary conditions to perform his functions: an official residence, communications, transport and protection. I hope you agree with this.

[Zhelnorova] Have you addressed critical remarks to Gorbachev?

[Primakov] Why does everyone have the clichéd impression that in the Politburo the general secretary says something, and the rest merely assent. This is far from the case. The discussions frequently go on for hours precisely because opinions do not coincide.

[Zhelnorova] We are constantly being told about lofty aims and a bright future. And we are being led toward them by methods which are more often than not brutal. We now know how the revolution was accomplished and what methods Stalin employed. Are we not taking this path? After all, it is clear to many people now that we will not live to see the fine goals but the methods we can see and perceive each day, and they have become more important to us than the goals.

[Primakov] You are proceeding from the fact that Stalin pursued shining aims and at the same time, however, operated with methods which had nothing in common with such aims. This is wrong. He proclaimed them, but did not pursue them. We, on the other hand, are both

setting shining goals and providing for clean methods. Were some people today to propose a repetition of 1937 to ensure stability in our society, I would say: Play without me. More, I would fight this.

But if I am asked: Do we need to bring order to bear? Do we need to compel compliance with the law and seek to ensure, for example, that weapons not make the rounds of the country, I would answer: Yes, undoubtedly. There is in many areas currently an orgy of crime. People can for some time put up with the fact that the stores are pretty bare. But they absolutely will not put up with the fact that it is dangerous to go outside. Order needs to be brought to bear. In what way? Not, of course, by general execution. But by stricter measures than those which have been practiced hitherto....

[Zhelnorova] While calling on the people to suffer in the expectation of change, our party appointees are themselves unwilling to put up with the same conditions as the people. I believe that if we have to suffer, it would be better to do so together—of more benefit. I am, as you can see, approaching questions about privileges.

[Primakov] The people are rightly impatient of privileges. But it would be unfair, I believe, not to mention that much has already changed. Take the situation in Moscow. The special rations and special refreshment area system has been eliminated. The former special shops are today supplying products to children's medical establishments. A whole number of sanatoria, hospitals, and clinics of the former Fourth Main Directorate has been transferred to general health care and the Children's Fund. The system of free official dachas has been abolished. Order is being brought to bear in respect of the use of official cars. Of course, not everything has been done as yet. Some people are both dawdling and idling. Nonetheless, the system is changing qualitatively, and there is no trickery and game-playing here. That there is still a particular stereotype in public opinion and that breaking with it and getting over it will take more than just a day or two is another matter.

[Zhelnorova] Does not the isolation of those who determine policy in this sphere also begin with privileges?

[Primakov] I understand what you are driving at. It has been written in the newspaper that I—chairman of the Privileges Commission—have myself flown on personal business by special aircraft. This was, incidentally, the one and only time in my life when I have flown this way. At the end of December I was given eight days leave for the whole of last year. I wanted to fly by general aircraft, but there were strict rules. Since we are talking about this, I can inform you that these rules have now been revised.

I have to mention that the mere fact of a speaker of a chamber flying by individual aircraft is perfectly customary in many countries. But it has to be considered that public opinion in our country reacts sensitively to such things.

[Zhelnorova] Public opinion says to this: Fly on whatever you like, accompanied by 10 aircraft if you wish, but give the people some results. Since you have taken up important business, help extricate us all from poverty! But the result is that we compare, when profitable, the life of the presidents of the two powers, forgetting to compare also the life of the peoples. Let there be both a fourth and a ninth directorate, only let them be justified by the high quality of administration of the country!

[Primakov] I am sure that "managerial results" are directly connected with the conditions of work also. Egalitarianism is contra-indicated here. But two rules need to be observed: the first is obligatory regulation of what an executive should have specifically "by office". We have long been requesting this from the Council of Ministers. A minister should have such-and-such a salary, say, such-and-such transport, such-and-such conditions for recreation. The second rule is absolute glasnost.

Many people say that the Council of Ministers, for example, should not have a sanatorium-medical administration. But others have departmental clinics and hospitals—the Likhachev Plant, the Academy of Sciences, the artistic unions. Why should the Council of Ministers not have one? The main thing is that this not be at the expense of the overall health care budget. And that this be under public supervision.

Of course, we need to forgo all illegal privileges, and the most illegal is abuse of office.

[Zhelnorova] But could you personally manage without any privileges?

[Primakov] I will tell you what I have and what I have not. I have not spent a single day of my life in an official dacha (now, incidentally, all members of the Politburo, except for the first two persons, have been struck off the official dacha list). I have my own dacha, which was built when I worked in the Academy of Sciences. I live there together with my daughter and granddaughter. Never in my life have I had a gardener or cook. I have a private car, and, believe me, this is not a privilege but a necessity.

[Zhelnorova] We know how the presidents and political leaders of any country live, but as far as ours are concerned, there is total secrecy here, which, naturally, gives rise to rumors. And there is nothing to refute them with.

[Primakov] I agree. There should necessarily be glasnost on this issue also. I can tell you with absolute certainty that the country's leadership has no reason today to avert its gaze from the people. But can the same be said about many of the "truth-lovers" who, while actively speculating for their own political ends on the subject of privileges, are themselves far, very far from being beyond reproach?

[Zhelnorova] People are asking why many privileges are enjoyed by "former" people such as Romanov, Grishin....

[Primakov] I am not sure that they enjoy such at the present time. In any event, I know that they have been evicted from the official dachas. Nor, generally, do I believe that all "former" people should be reduced to the same level. There are those who are guilty before the people. But there are also those who have not deserved any slights.

[Zhelnorova] And now a few lightning questions on various topics. Do you allow of the possibility of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] seceding from the USSR?

[Primakov] This would be a catastrophe since the Soviet Union would cease to exist. But at the same time I understand that the RSFSR population is dissatisfied with its position. And this dissatisfaction is justified. From where does it derive? When all barbs are being loosed against the center, Russia has come to be associated with the center. This could arouse indignation.

On the other hand, it is sometimes heard that the USSR is an empire, in which Russia is the metropolis, and the national republics, the colonies. But here is the paradox: The "metropolis" of the RSFSR, possessing immense resources and potential, lives worse than the other republics.

[Zhelnorova] Might some republic quit the union within a year?

[Primakov] Were it to come to this, deciding such a question within a year would be impossible.

A mechanism for such secession is needed. It needs to be determined at the time of the referendum how it should proceed and how account should be taken of the opinion of the nonindigenous population. And the economic aspect—the whole union was, after all, built in the republics.

[Zhelnorova] When will we emerge from the crisis? In policy, in the economy?

[Primakov] This is not a thousand miles away, particularly if there is real presidential authority.

[Zhelnorova] Is a military coup possible here?

[Primakov] I believe not.

[Zhelnorova] Your attitude toward religion?

[Primakov] It is an inalienable part of culture and civilization. And the personal right of each to determine his own attitude toward it.

[Zhelnorova] Leaflets were distributed in Moscow recently which reported that you, Abalkin, Yakovlev, and Yeltsin were preparing a coup d'état. Please tell us how you would accomplish this.

[Primakov] A complete absurdity. The leaflet cannot be seen as anything but humor, albeit black humor. And I see no logic in the combination of names.

[Zhelnorova] Who will, after all, be the occupant of the house on Sintsevaya Vrazhka? Is it intended to make it over to Afghan veterans?

[Primakov] We have now given the house, which was erected for the "needs of deputies," to the Moscow City Soviet. It will determine its fate. There have been the most varied suggestions here. A group of deputies appealed by letter, for example, for this house (it contains 56 apartments) to be handed over for offices of foreign companies and for medicines to be purchased abroad for invalids and Afghan veterans with the foreign currency which it earned. Quite a substantial amount could be obtained.

[Zhelnorova] What is the budget of the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Primakov] Some R78 million. For comparison, the budget of the U.S. Congress is over \$2 billion.

Abalkin Discusses Presidency Form of Law

PM1503111590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

["Lightning Interview" with L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by parliamentary correspondent Yu. Ursov; date, place not given: "L. Abalkin: 'For Success of Reform'"]

[Text] The debate on the presidency at the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies revolves chiefly around its political aspects. However, it is clear that the new institution of power will have a substantial influence on economic processes. PRAVDA parliamentary correspondent Yu. Ursov talks about this with L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Ursov] Leonid Ivanovich! How, in your opinion, will the presidency be able to accelerate an improvement in the economy's health?

[Abalkin] Strong and—I will particularly emphasize—authoritative power is needed to implement a cardinal reform of the economy. This can be ensured with the help of the Presidential Council. This power would unite all movements which command authority and mass support in order to make the president's decree an expression of the nationwide will of the people's sentiments. Only on this condition will presidential acts be executed. In short, the president must, in my view, rely on public movements which people now trust. Otherwise the fate of all the already adopted documents of executive power could befall his decisions.

I mean, in particular, the government program for improving the health of the economy adopted at the last congress. People instantly began subjecting it to massive attacks and discrediting it. But I would like all who are

concerned about the destinies of the country and the people to rally their forces to realize it. If we have adopted some decision in arguments and debates at the congress, we must unite and fulfill it.

[Ursov] In my view, one of the major shortcomings of the laws adopted in connection with the economic reform is the fact that they proceed from what is desired and not from what actually exists. Can we expect the situation to change under the presidency?

[Abalkin] It is naive to think that, having adopted a particular law, we will instantly obtain miraculous results. On paper the country would long since have been leading a life of plenty.... The authoritative functions of the presidency will undoubtedly be able to accelerate the reform and promote the adoption of energetic decisions. But not only this. I will emphasize once again that both the efficacy and the substantiveness of laws and the effectiveness of presidential decrees will depend to a huge degree on the extent to which they are backed up by real changes in economic relations and economic motivation, and simply by enhanced responsibility.

These views of mine are connected with an understanding of the fact that the presidency is a part of a rule-of-law state. But, for all its importance, it in turn is only a part of a civil society. And the presidential form of rule can promote progressive changes in the economy on condition that social concord or, if you like, civil peace is achieved. Finally, it can do so given the existence of strong executive power and a professional apparatus.

Legal Expert Questioned on Presidency

PM1203164190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
10 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with Professor B.M. Lazarev, sector chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, by O. Losoto and A. Chernyak: "Presidential Authority"—date and place not specified—first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] On Monday 12 March the extraordinary third session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which is going to examine the draft Law to Institute the Post of President of the USSR and the Relevant Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution, will begin work in Moscow.

PRAVDA's correspondents have discussed this institution of authority, which is new to our country, with Professor and Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Boris Mikhaylovich Lazarev, chief of a sector of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law.

[Correspondent] Boris Mikhaylovich, the editorial mailbag contains letters from people who ask: Why is there a need to introduce a presidential system of rule?

[Lazarev] The perestroika that is being carried out in the country is considerably bound up with the adoption of new legislative acts. A whole package of new laws has

already been adopted and another is in preparation. Thus, perestroika is taking place on the basis of a renewal of legislation. In that context the problem of implementing these laws is becoming increasingly urgent. At the same time we are now seeing that many laws are not working....

[Correspondent] There needs to be a bridge....

[Lazarev] Yes, a bridge, figuratively speaking, from legislative power to executive power. That is a strategic goal. But it is also connected with the characteristics of the present moment. The government is now in a difficult position. It has been inundated with a host of new, perestroika-related problems. The prop formerly provided by the CPSU Central Committee is no longer there, its sectorial departments have been abolished. The rights of the union republics are being expanded and economic pluralism is being established. The creation of a multiparty system in the future is not ruled out, as the CPSU Central Committee draft platform says. In the state sphere we need an additional coordinating element which, to some extent, would be a counterweight to these decentralization processes. Until now that coordinating element was provided by the CPSU Central Committee, to a considerable extent, and the party Central Committee General Secretary. Now the main coordinating link must be located not deep within the party structure, but within the state mechanism. This is directly connected with the fulfillment of the 19th All-Union party conference guideline that the supplanting of soviet organs by party organs must be resolutely stopped.

[Correspondent] For a long time we declared the slogan of the separation of party and soviet functions....

[Lazarev] It was merely a declaration, but the Soviets really must hold sway over the entire state apparatus. We do not have the post of head of state here. Many people often call Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev the president now, but legally speaking, in fact, he is not. Several types of power are concentrated in his hands. And they are not completely compatible. In the first place, as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet he leads the preparation of soviet congresses and Supreme Soviet sessions, in the second place, he often chairs the congress and correspondingly Supreme Soviet sessions. And third, he has certain presidential powers, to be precise: The right to hold diplomatic talks and to sign international documents and to nominate the main officials of the union state apparatus for election or confirmation.

No president in the world exercises such a range of functions. He is either a president or a chairman of a parliament, or a speaker, or, as in Poland, marshal of the Sejm.

[Correspondent] All these are strategic factors. But there are urgent daily questions, whose solution requires strong authority....

[Lazarev] We know that things are uneasy in a number of places, that the situation is being destabilized to the

point of mass disorders, that there are interethnic clashes going on. A rapid response is needed here, but it is difficult to get such a response from the Supreme Soviet because it is not always in session. You cannot convene the Supreme Soviet Presidium at a moment's notice but in a number of cases you have to act immediately.

Because we do not have the kind of organ which could take prompt decisions, what happens is that a group of senior officials is brought together and they make decisions—whether to send troops to Tbilisi or not, whether to impose a curfew in Baku or not. And then deputies begin trying to find out who took those decisions. Who is responsible for them? It is unclear. Henceforth it will be absolutely clear. Such decisions are taken by the president.

[Correspondent] Will he take such decisions single-handed?

[Lazarev] No. He will have a Presidential Council and a Council of the Federation. The president himself may issue a decree to convene the Council of the Federation there and then and together with the heads of the union republics discuss the situation and take additional measures to resolve a conflict which has occurred.

[Correspondent] Some opponents of presidential rule say that presidential power will limit the sovereignty of the republics to some extent, don't they?

[Lazarev] Well, let us look at whether the principles of the federative nature of our state will be violated. Some comrades put the question in these terms: First let us adopt a law on the federation and then institute the office of president.

What can I say on that point? First, when the draft Law on the Presidency was being prepared consideration was given to whether it would be contrary to the act on federation. There will be no divergences. Of course, the law on the federation that is being prepared is still not ready, it is further from being prepared than the law on the president. But I think that there will be no fundamental divergences here. After all, the functions we are giving the president are deliberately of a unionwide nature and cannot be transferred to the republics at all. For example, the president will play the role of supreme commander in chief. That is a job of unionwide importance. It will not be transferred to the republics. Second. The president will nominate leading workers of union organs. He has the right to appoint USSR ambassadors to foreign countries. They are ambassadors of the USSR, the union republics themselves cannot send their own diplomatic representatives abroad. He awards USSR orders and medals. But who else is there to present awards? This does not preclude the possibility that republics may, if they want, institute their own orders and medals. The president will, furthermore, confer the highest military ranks on people. The republics do not have their own armies. I do not think that they should be created either.

[Correspondent] What about the actions of the president as regards the federation?

[Lazarev] The president will be charged with monitoring the implementation of the principles of the Soviet federation. If those principles are violated then either he will react himself within the limits of his power or he will submit the corresponding question to the Supreme Soviet or the congress. Point two. If he resolves questions which have a federative aspect he will be able to rely on the Council of the Federation. Thus if you bear in mind that the principles of Soviet federalism are not being undermined in any way, the republics are not being encroached upon.

[Correspondent] Conversely, it even turns out that presidential power will to some degree strengthen sovereignty....

[Lazarev] I agree, there will be a new guarantee of the observance of the principles of Soviet federalism.

[Correspondent] Boris Mikhaylovich, you have mentioned the Council of the Federation many times now. What is it exactly? What will it consist of?

[Lazarev] The draft states that the Council of the Federation will be headed by the president, and the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of all the union republics will be ex officio members.

[Correspondent] What will happen if there are presidents in the republics?

[Lazarev] Then it will include the presidents, too. But many deputies are proposing an arrangement that there should be no presidents in the republics. After all, a federative state usually has just one president.

[Correspondent] What questions will the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council study?

[Lazarev] The Council of the Federation will examine questions of the observance of the principles of our federalism, which will be enshrined in the union treaty and the Constitution. For example, the question of how to regulate this or that interethnic conflict and what must be done to strengthen our USSR. That depends on the character of the question. Either it will be submitted to the Soviet of Nationalities or the president, depending on the extent of his powers, will issue a decree. A close organizational exchange is envisaged between the Council of the Federation and the Supreme Soviet of Nationalities.

As for the Presidential Council, this organ will examine questions of the implementation of the basic guidelines of domestic and foreign policy. As is well known, according to the Constitution this is ratified by the congress of USSR People's Deputies. Therefore, it will serve to transmit the congress' decisions but where necessary will take the relevant measures for the defense of the country and strengthen legality and law and order. I think that the Presidential Council will be somewhat

like U.S. President's National Security Council. But that is not all. It will also handle other questions.

[Correspondent] And who will belong to it?

[Lazarev] The president himself will decide that. The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers will belong to it ex officio. Perhaps the heads of certain ministries and departments will, too. Some eminent politicians and scientists may belong to it. The creation of expert groups under the president's office is possible.

[Correspondent] Will the Presidential Council be a permanent body?

[Lazarev] It will be convened when necessary. It will not adopt any resolutions itself.

[Correspondent] Will it submit recommendations to the president?

[Lazarev] Only for the discussion of a problem and the elaboration of measures. It is a consultative organ attached to the president's office.

[Correspondent] Are there any opponents of the idea of presidential rule? What are their arguments?

[Lazarev] The opponents say this: We favor having a president but why hurry? We'll draw up a new Constitution and "insert" the post of president there. But the question is: If there is such unanimity on the need for a president, why delay? And if emergency situations occur requiring a rapid response, why delay with the institution of this post? Especially since you cannot create a Constitution quickly. Does that mean that we should wait? But time does not stand still. Here is their second argument. They say: Will that not be a blow against federalism? Is that not putting the cart before the horse? Let us begin by regulating the federation and then introduce the post of president. I see no cart or horse, this will not be contrary to the future reform of the Soviet federation. Indeed, it will serve to strengthen federal relations.

[Correspondent] The following viewpoint is being expressed: Yes, a president is needed, but no sooner do we introduce an article on the presidency into the Constitution than we violate it....

[Lazarev] Why are we violating it?

[Correspondent] Because it envisages a nationwide vote but the congress is going to elect the president.

[Lazarev] Of course. The Constitution never sets temporary norms: That is why it is being proposed that the Constitution include a permanent norm: The president will be elected by the entire population. And another law will be adopted to elect the first president at the congress. The congress has the power to do that. Yes, it would probably be better to elect the president by direct vote but we still haven't completed the elections to the

republic and local organs of power. One election campaign would have to be superimposed on the other. Second, we do not know yet how those elections should be conducted. It is also necessary to prepare a law on the presidential election procedure. A new legislative act is needed. Which means losing time again. Third: The Congress of People's Deputies is empowered to accept the Constitution or amend it. Why deny it the opportunity to institute the post of president, this is entirely within the congress' competence. That is the formal, legal aspect. Our congress is a broad, representative organ with more than 2,000 people from different regions of the country and different social strata. Therefore it is more sensible to elect the first president at the congress and meanwhile prepare a law on elections by the population.

[Correspondent] Will we have a vice president?

[Lazarev] That question is being discussed, some deputies say that the president has so many things to do that we should institute the office of vice president, but others believe that this will mean two poles of power again. You need one man who could be held accountable. And so these two trends are competing with one another. In my view, it is possible to manage without a vice president but if practice shows that the president's work load is too great the post of vice president may be instituted in the future.

[Correspondent] Some readers are saying: Will that not lead to the usurpation of power, a cult, and so forth?

[Lazarev] No. In the first place, to prevent one man from occupying the same post for too long it is proposed that no one may hold this office for more than two terms. Five years per term. Second, there is an age limit—65. Furthermore, the president may be removed from office early by decision of the Congress of People's Deputies.

[Correspondent] The draft law has a stipulation that the president must poll over one-half of the votes in the union republics, too. But what happens if he fails to do that in one or two republics? Will he not be defeated?

[Lazarev] He will be elected if he doesn't poll sufficient votes in two or three republics. But if he fails to poll sufficient votes in eight republics he will be defeated. Why has that norm been proposed? It is the demand of some deputies. They say: If there is a universal vote, the most populous republics—Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia—will be able to elect the president and the rest with fewer people will be effectively ignored. It is proposed to combine the general vote of all the people with the opinion of the republics' population.

There is another point I want to make. The president will not have absolute power. He has no legislative powers. What does he have in this sphere? The right of legislative initiative? But that poses no threat to parliament.

The president will have a right of veto. If he sees that a law has been adopted under the influence of emotions or

that it just scraped through by a majority of one or two votes he will use his suspensive veto, that is, he will not sign the Decree but will return it to the Supreme Soviet and say: Comrades, take another look. And he will explain his objections and doubts to the Supreme Soviet. If the Supreme Soviet takes a second vote and confirms its previous decision the president will be obliged to sign the law. So, he has a right of suspensive veto but not of absolute veto. Thus, there is no threat to parliament.

One more thing. Government powers will not be transferred to the president either. The government is obliged to inform the president of what it is doing so as to keep him abreast of matters but not so that he supplants the government. After all, there is still the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, we are not copying the United States where the president is both head of state and head of government. In our country he will only be head of state. The head of the government is someone else with his own powers.

In conclusion I want to say that by the proposed reform we are combining our Soviet traditions with the experience of foreign states where the presidential system has worked well.

Lawyer on Presidency, Constitutional Issues

PM0503165290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Doctor of Legal Sciences A. Mishin by Valeriy Vyshutovich: "The Power of Authority or the Authority of Power? Doctor of Legal Sciences A. Mishin on the Idea of Presidential Government"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Excerpts] [Vyshutovich] The idea of instituting presidential power in the USSR is not unexpected. Once before it was mentioned in parliamentary debates, but did not meet with support. So why has presidential government now become such an acute and urgent political requirement?

[Mishin] It is true that Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov proposed that we look at the idea of a presidency, but he was not listened to or understood. Now life itself and the logic of perestroika have brought us to the point where presidential government is necessary. Emergencies, unlawful actions, flareups of extremism.... Are the old institutions of power capable of controlling the situation in the country and preventing the development of conflicts? Alas, not always, as many events show. The tragedy in Tbilisi, Sumgait, Fergana, Baku, the miners' strikes, the present situation in Transcaucasia... Was the reaction of the organs of power appropriate and timely in every such case? No. The Supreme Soviet, having so many voices, is simply incapable of adopting speedy decisions. The discussion of an emergency situation often turns into a rally, a struggle between different interests, a show of political ambition, and meanwhile time passes, sometimes irreparably.... [passage omitted]

[Vyshutovich] But surely M.S. Gorbachev already has sufficient powers? General secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Defense Council....

[Mishin] The whole point is that the combination of various posts does not by any means give our leader real plenitude of power. As chairman of the Supreme Soviet he could be recalled by the Congress, although that is unlikely today. But he could also be recalled by the CPSU Central Committee, from which he was elected deputy. Given the present composition of the Central Committee, I do not think this possibility should be underestimated. In that case Gorbachev would automatically lose the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. As a party leader surrounded by the narrow group of the Politburo, he currently has a highly ambivalent status as head of state. Gorbachev personally could certainly act as a guarantor of democratic transformations in the country, but his official position is fragile in the present situation. The controlled revolution from above which began five years ago threatens to turn into an uncontrolled revolution from below. The replacement, at the people's demand, of the top leaders in Tyumen, Chernigov, Volgograd, Sverdlovsk, and Donetsk inspires anxiety and concern not only among those whom we describe as the conservative section of the party apparatus. Destabilization and the growth of social tension are no use to anyone. The country is experiencing a crisis of power. The extremists feel they can act with impunity. The people demand the safeguarding of order and security. In these conditions one-man power is preferable to collegial power. [passage omitted]

[Vyshutovich] How serious and well-founded, in your view, are the fears that a presidential government in a country without democratic experience will lead to a new personal dictatorship?

[Mishin] I see no logical connection between the two things. A personal dictatorship can be established even without a presidential government. Stalin was dictator for 30 years, and what posts did he hold? Either general secretary or Council of Ministers chairman. He was never a president, but he was certainly a bloody dictator! So it is not a question of the form of government. The Americans have had very powerful presidential power for 200 years. They say that in the Civil War period Lincoln was a dictator. But what kind of dictator is that, when there was freedom of the press, the Congress was in operation....

We do not need authoritarian power. We need authoritative power.

[Vyshutovich] What constitutional guarantees should there be, in your view, against authoritarianism?

[Mishin] First, the new Constitution should make provision for the institution of impeachment and the parliamentary accountability of the head of state. But it is necessary to indicate precisely in what circumstances.

For instance, if he sends troops in somewhere or other, and parliament deems this unlawful—let him be tried! But the main control must be financial. The budget must be adopted not as a whole, but article by article—so much, for instance, for the army, the KGB, and so forth. After all, we do not even know what our military budget is. Yet in the States the Congress approves appropriations for the building of, say, a nuclear submarine, and sometimes it says: It is not needed.... Furthermore, parliamentary monitoring of the activity of the executive power is needed.

[Vyzhutovich] In what forms?

[Mishin] In the most diverse forms. Both parliamentary and presidential. For instance, the British form is questions which it is obligatory for the prime minister and ministers to answer. The American form is the investigative activity of parliamentary committees. These committees may summon anyone to account to them, even the President. Furthermore there is criminal liability for disrespect for Congress. When Nixon refused to hand over a tape to the court, the Supreme Court forced him to. That is to say, monitoring of the executive power by the legislative and judicial powers. We must make the judiciary a real power. Why is it that people in our country who have been injured or whose rights have been infringed still write to the CPSU Central Committee, PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and so on...? They should go to court, but everyone knows how low the prestige of that state institution is in our country....

[Vyzhutovich] All the same, until such time as constitutional guarantees have been created against authoritarianism and personal dictatorship, should we be in any hurry to elect a president?

[Mishin] Without a strong executive power, the laws being adopted today will not operate. A strong executive power is necessary to ensure that local executive services finally start operating in accordance with the law. The Supreme Soviet cannot force them to do this. It only adopts the laws.

It is time to give our state a civilized form of government. To set up institutions that are more in accordance with our people's spirit. The president should exercise this form of government without having to keep one eye on the Politburo. He should be responsible, under control, but powerful.

There is no need to be afraid of presidential power, nothing could be worse than the system we have now.

Furthermore we need a procedure for ensuring continuity of power. If something happens to the president, the vice president takes over; if something happens to him, the chairman of one of the chambers takes on the administration of the state. In Russia, if the czar died, everyone knew who was the heir to the throne. But now remember a more recent era of great funerals. Brezhnev dies—we do not know who will replace him. Andropov dies—once again it is not known who the replacement

will be. When Chernenko died, could anyone guarantee that Gorbachev would be elected, and not Grishin or Romanov? We need a strong president. And we need continuity of power.

A procedure for the presidential oath should also be formulated. It should be a festival, a solemn act—national and international. It is time to shrug off our disdainful attitude to much that is the practice abroad. After all, only recently we were talking about the falsity and hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy and calling it deception, a trap for the people.... The sooner we rid ourselves of these political prejudices, the more intelligent, literate, and civilized we will be in conducting affairs in our society and state.

Justice Minister on Presidency Draft Law

PM0903115790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[S. Karkhanin record of comments by Doctor of Juridical Sciences V.F. Yakovlev, USSR minister of justice, under the rubric "Lawyer's Opinion": "Soviet Presidency"]

[Text] As is known, the question of presidential power in our country will be the main point on the agenda of the forthcoming extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies. And certainly the draft law published a few days ago in the newspapers will generate huge public interest. At the request of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's political observer, this document is commented upon by Doctor of Juridical Sciences V.F. Yakovlev, USSR justice minister.

Let us begin with the point that the presidency question has strategic significance and is meant for the long term, since it is directly connected with building the rule-of-law state. Strong executive power ensures that the operation of laws is more effective. Life is the best teacher, and now it is suggesting that the structure of executive power which has existed so far is incomplete.

Previously, according to the Constitution, the Supreme Soviet Presidium was the collegial head of state. Its present role is different. The party in its turn has firmly stated its intention not to implement state power: The party may be the ruling party, but not the administering one—this is not the same thing. So, it has turned out that we do not have a head of state now. And real life has made us feel that something is amiss. Frequently a prompt response to crucial situations is needed, but there is no one to provide that response....

Should we return to the "collegial head?" But Soviet experience testifies that we always had an individual head of state although, unfortunately, this was unconstitutional. Consequently, practical need has been taken into account here. It is another matter that in the rule-of-law state being built this need must be implemented in constitutional, legal forms.

Many foreign countries recognize that executive power and the state must have a head—a person invested with the appropriate powers to promptly, efficiently, and responsibly make state decisions.

As is known, proposals to introduce presidential power in our country were put forward long ago. Our public affairs experts have also been carefully studying this problem for a long time, studying foreign experience. And we didn't need to invent the wheel—it already exists. Which specific wheel would best suit our "cart"—that is another matter. In our country the form of presidency must be our own one which takes into account all the country's specific characteristics. Incidentally, a number of scholars, measuring up the possibilities of presidential power for our system, already had ideas in this respect, especially as there are many different types of presidency. And when we received an official instruction to prepare the document, there was no shortage of materials. And the work was done very quickly.

But it should be added that the draft law itself underwent major changes in a short time. There were debates among specialists, state figures, and particularly among deputies. For instance, misgivings were expressed regarding the fact that the president may become too powerful a figure with respect to the legislative organ. After all, in some of the world's countries in the event of a deadlock the president has the right simply to dissolve parliament, calling for new elections. At first it was proposed to include something similar in the rights of the head of state in our country as well. But after the debates a significantly milder option appeared.

How far does presidential power combine with democracy? The main point, of course, is whether we will be able to build presidential power in such a way that there are guarantees that it will not develop ultimately into personal power or dictatorship. We have been through this before; this is a very painful issue for us.

The question was and is being scrutinized and, probably, will still be scrutinized very carefully. Our reference point should be not that person or those people whom the people "are measuring up" for presidential power, but any major state figure capable of occupying this post.

In general, constitutional guarantees and mechanisms are needed. I think that they have been produced in the document published, although it is not ruled out that it would be worth thinking about them again. I perceive elements of the mechanism in question first of all in the elections. We have made provision for elections by the people or by Congress, secret and contested elections.

It is further recorded that no person can be elected to the post of head of state more than twice. A limited term of office is also a condition which rules out dictatorial power. And the most important point is that the powers of the head of state in the draft law are very clearly regulated, and furthermore the functions of the other state organs are clearly defined. And one more thing—

provision is made for the possibility of the early removal of the president from office, if he suddenly tries to seize all power in breach of the Constitution.

One argument already heard at the session was this: Can presidential power be introduced before we define what our society represents from the viewpoint of its national-state system? But this is a general question and it cannot be addressed only to one component of state power and administration. At the head of state we have organs which exercise the powers of the Union and the federation as a whole. In developing the new principles of a federal system, the correlation of the powers of the Union and the union republics remains to be established in the Constitution or the Union treaty.

Let me add that the federal system of the state and the presidency as a form of rule are by no means mutually exclusive. The FRG and the United States are examples. As for our own distinctive features, it is useful in any case to study international experience, but one cannot fail to take into account our country's specific characteristics. There are distinctive national, historic, and psychological characteristics. I do not see anything bad in studying the experience of our foreign colleagues—rather the reverse, I think that this is supremely useful as it makes it possible to live and act in accordance with the achievements of world legal standards shaped over thousands of years. If we study and somehow use this experience then, I think, there is nothing shameful or servile in this which contradicts our national dignity. On the contrary: We would probably be behaving in not an entirely dignified way if we tried to ignore world experience. But, I shall stress, in the legal sphere we also have our own Soviet achievements—family law, for instance; many recognized authorities speak highly of it.

How should a president be elected? There are three models. In Greece, Italy, and the FRG, the president is elected by the parliament. In the United States and India—by electors. In France, Austria, and Mexico—by a nationwide direct secret ballot. We chose the third way—the most democratic, in my view. The present "intermediate" version—elections by the Congress—is explained by the fact that the structures of power have only just been formed on the basis of general elections. Incidentally, it not only has its negative sides, but also its positive ones: The people express their wish via the deputies to whom they have entrusted the country's fate. The president must rely on the deputies and have their trust as well.

Tougher, More Powerful Gorbachev Predicted

PM1303101690

[Editorial Report] London BBC Television Network in English carries at 2230 GMT on 9 March on its "News-night" program an interview with OGONEK Editor Vitaliy Korotich at his home in Moscow, by Peter Snow as part of a video report on the challenges ahead for President Gorbachev. No date is given for the interview.

Korotich tells Snow: "I think that we are living in a big country which is coming back to humanity. Now we start the decisive moment in the history of this change. If we will do this, practically we have no time: It counted in months, if then maybe two-three months. If it will be done, Gorbachev will be one of the main leaders in the history of Europe this century."

Snow asks: "The alternative, if he fails?" Korotich answers: "No alternative: Alternative is ruin. And if it will be catastrophe in the Soviet Union, it will be catastrophe in Europe. It will be catastrophe for everybody, because I afraid to imagine what it will be when in this big—full of missiles and nuclear warheads—country, if it will be something wrong, and cruel people will come into power."

Speaking of increased presidential powers for Gorbachev, Snow asks Korotich: "How does he explain to people that he wants to be president for five years without a popular mandate?" Korotich answers: "He is still telling the same, believe me: People, people, believe me. When he became the leader of perestroika, he started—believe me—to do all." He shrugs: "He's still an alternative, and I still believe in him: I have no choice. I still believe in him: I still believe that it will be possible to do something because he started this, and if it will be something wrong with this perestroika, Gorbachev will be one of the first who will be destroyed by our conservatives, by our right wing people."

On the party's future, Korotich says: "Gorbachev must recognize the reality: We must have a multiparty society. Before we will have it, we will never have real democracy. And he needs this: Without the position, he will never be a strong president. Strong presidents always must have opposition."

Snow talks about the economy—which he calls the "greatest immediate threat to Gorbachev's immediate survival." Korotich tells him: "Simply to feed people, but at the same time we haven't the mechanism to do this. We have big mouths, but we have not stomach; we can swallow billions, but we cannot use them for this body—which is quite unhealthy. I think that now Gorbachev wants to do this, but he is looking for the way in which it's possible to do it. The country is still not working: We are in crisis, and Gorbachev wants to have more, more possibilities in his hands." Snow asks: "That's why he needs the powers?" Korotich agrees: "Yes, now he will be more responsible; now he will have more power than anybody before him." Snow asks: "Will he be more ruthless? Will he be tougher in making perestroika work?" Korotich nods his head: "I think he will be tougher."

Workers Comment on Need for Presidency

90UN1042A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Interview with Viktor Petrovich Gerasimov, milling machinist sixth class at the auxiliary instrumentation

shop of the machine-tool plant, "Yelabuga Motor Vehicle Plant" production association, and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Smirnov, molder at the foundry of the scientific research projects administration, "Yelabuga Motor Vehicle Plant" production association; by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent U. Bogdalov; date and place of interview not specified; under the rubric "Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee—View of the Labor Collective": "Do We Need a President?";]

[Text]V. Gerasimov: Let us read together one more time the appropriate paragraph from the CPSU Central Committee platform: "The question is being raised more and more insistently in society concerning creation of a position of head of state, in the person of a president responsible to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and possessing the necessary powers of authority."

I confess that I have long related with mistrust to references of the powers that be to an alleged national necessity to decide some kind of extremely important—in their view—question. I remember when they called the Yelabuga Tractor Plant the very first and foremost people's need. We had come to need a new tractor-cultivator most urgently.

And so we believed. I, for example, was one of the first to come rushing in here in 1985 from Sverdlovsk, where I was working as a lathe operator at an electromechanics plant. The construction died out in front of my very eyes—and got tied up in a paperwork jungle of large and small resolutions owing to good-for-nothing material-technical supply. This lasted until they conclusively rejected the idea of the tractor plant and decided to build a motor vehicle plant.

Note in this regard that the people, quoted so freely, didn't bat an eyelid. We were the ones in trouble—the thousands of workers and engineers that had assembled in Yelabuga. And buried in the foundation was not just 1 million of the people's money. This is where distrust arises of any innovations from above.

But here I am in agreement with the conclusions contained in the party platform, although I myself am not a party member. For a long time now there have been conversations among workers to the effect that the country does not have a single head, does not have a leader who could make one decision or another at the will of the majority and upon consultation with the people, someone responsible to us all.

We don't need a "great," "most wise," "father of the peoples" that we once had, unfortunately, and from whom our fathers and grandfathers had to endure so much. We need a chief of state elected at our will.

V. Smirnov: True. Let me add that the highest authority we have currently—the Politburo—is a collegial authority, a general one. You cannot identify a specific party as being to blame for one mistake or another. Afghanistan is an example. Some four or perhaps five of

our leaders, now dead, made the decision. There is no way to find out now. It is as if no one is guilty of sending troops without justification—so who do you hold responsible?

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: But the position of general secretary is no small entity either. Does everything here just amount to a change in title?

V. Gerasimov: Well, I am not a party member. Did party people elect the general secretary for me? Let me stress once again that we need a president, elected from among several candidates, working on the same team as the people's deputies elected by all the people. Here it must be admitted, we have already accomplished half the job.

V. Smirnov: A title is also a matter of substantial significance. It is no accident that the leaders of many states are not awaiting your and my decision and call Mikhail Sergeyevich president from time to time.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: Should the president be required to be a communist?

V. Smirnov: I do not think so, although the predominance of party members among USSR people's deputies and in the Supreme Soviet is evident. And it is most likely that they will elect from among this milieu. But at the initial stages of our parliamentary development and presidential rule, the chief of state should be a CPSU member all the same. This is an acknowledgement of the true place and role of the party in society. Especially during the course of perestroika. A great deal of what constitutes our tomorrow will depend on this.

V. Gerasimov: I would also like to add the necessity of providing guarantees to protect a communist-president from party apparatus pressure, especially from the conservative side. Only the people should be able to elect, replace, or remove the chief of state. This will indeed strengthen guarantees of irreversibility with respect to perestroika.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: How and in what manner, in your opinion, can a president exercise his powers of authority? Let us say that following his election he visited Yelabuga, and you were presented the opportunity of telling him personally the most....

V. Gerasimov: If Mikhail Sergeyevich came to see us—and it is not by chance that I refer specifically to him—I and my comrades have enough problems stacked up—on the presidential level, so to speak. Most of all we need fewer words and more actions, especially if it is the people who grant the authority. Provocations, sabotage, and the kindling of ethnic dissension must be met not only with a negative assessment, but with the opposition of all the force of state authority as well. Of course haste in making decisions, weighty ones in particular, is not to be tolerated. But weakness is also inexcusable. We are waiting for a democratic, but powerful authority.

A high degree of accountability and increased responsibility for decisions undertaken at the level of government organs is also necessary. Especially intolerable, in my view, are attempts to paint a rosy picture of the true situation and send false information higher up. We see such a situation today at the Yelabuga Motor Vehicle Plant. Construction of the motor vehicle plant is backed by authoritative documentation of the most prestigious organizations of the country. And things at the construction site are going so-so. Impressive plans for the erection of housing, social and cultural facilities have little backing, practically speaking.

The USSR Council of Ministers resolution states unambiguously: the first stage of the motor vehicle plant is to be put into commission in 1991. This time consideration is already far removed from reality. We've got a vicious circle—the minister lies to the director, he lies to us, and we lie to our children....

V. Smirnov: Strong presidential authority of a democratically elected leader is necessary as never before. We workers observe the vacillation of present representatives of authority and their desire to avoid hard decisions. Lawful and effective measures are taken at times with intolerable sluggishness, and the situation becomes aggravated as a result. Irresponsibility breeds indecisiveness, and indecisiveness, in turn, weakens the political will of the leadership.

Metropolitan Aleksiy on Presidency as Institution

LD1103081490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0500 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Our special correspondent Igor Zorin was in the Kremlin yesterday [for the registration of deputies] and he interviewed Aleksiy, metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, on the subject of the institution of the post of president in the USSR. [passage omitted: Aleksiy says as things stand the Supreme Soviet chairman is already overworked]

[Begin recording] [Zorin] Tell me, please: has the Russian Orthodox Church discussed this matter—the question of a USSR president?

[Aleksiy] This has not been discussed by the Russian Orthodox Church, and therefore each of us representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious associations will, I believe, express his own opinion. At the same time, however, we know the mood of our believers, and so when I speak I will be speaking on behalf of my flock, which I represent at the congress and on behalf of my electors, whom I also represent.

[Zorin] I imagine the vote on the presidency at the congress will be by name. Could I ask you whether you are going to be in favor of the introduction of the institution of the presidency?

[Aleksiy] I will vote in favor of the introduction of the institution of the presidency, because this is a specific

and very significant step toward passing power over to the soviets. It is not a matter of indifference to us religious people, believers, whether power is transferred to the soviets, because—as we have often said—our state is not atheistic. [as heard] Party ideology, however, actually presupposes a struggle against the religious view of the world. Therefore, the establishment of presidential power is, I believe, a significant step on the road to the creation of a secular state, which will not be an atheist state. [end recording]

PRAVDA Reviews Readers' Letters on Presidency

PM2702150090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Review of letters by "Social Policy Department," under the rubric "Topical Theme" and the general heading: "With Broad Powers"]

[Text] Nearly a month has passed since the publication of the discussion in PRAVDA on "Perestroika and Power," but the reactions to it are still flooding into the editorial office. We receive letters from scientists and workers, communists and nonparty people, students and pensioners, engineers and physicians. This confirms that the subject of the powers of the central authority in the conditions of perestroika is of concern to the broad masses.

Indeed, we have recently all been experiencing a kind of power vacuum. The difficult situation in the economy and the social sphere, the wave of strikes that swept through the country, the events in Transcaucasia and Central Asia which required the troops to be sent in, the endless and often futile disputes at Supreme Soviet sessions—all this did not escape people's notice. They are asking increasingly frequently: Where are the authorities, why do they lag behind the emergency situations that arise, and why is their intervention not always effective?

The simplest explanation is that the situation that has arisen is the result of the transitional period of perestroika: The former institutions of power have lost their influence, and the new ones have not yet gained strength. And that is true. We have all seen the difficulties and heated debates surrounding the adoption of the Law on Ownership in the USSR and the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Grain in what is now the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, we have all seen our parliamentarians' agonizing quest for a way out of the difficult situation in Transcaucasia that is acceptable to everyone.

You would think that thoroughness in the parliament's work could only be welcomed—the best decisions are not taken in haste and frenzy, under pressure of emotion rather than reason. But the trouble is that the legislators are taking a long-term view, while the situation in the country needs to be changed radically now, today. Who will do this?

The government? But it seems that it does not have the powers to adopt emergency, radical solutions. The chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet? Even he does not have the power—for instance, to impose a state of emergency in a given region or adopt radical measures on some economic or social problem. Furthermore it transpires that, because we were thinking primarily about the humanization and democratization of society and the widening of human rights and freedoms, we did not make provision for, did not formulate an institution of head of state, a mechanism to prevent democracy from turning into permissiveness and anarchy.

And this, like any loophole in legislation, was promptly exploited by those who would like to retard society's progress toward a rule-of-law state.

True, sensible people have already realized that the self-styled leaders on the "left" and on the "right" are trying to plunge them into an abyss of social and economic upheaval. They are less and less inclined to believe the demagogues who call for destruction, but do not lift a finger by way of constructive work. More and more people are turning their hopes to the party, which began and is continuing the cause of the renewal of society, and rallying around the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress. They see this as a constructive principle that will lead the country out of today's crisis situation, and that is why they support the idea of a presidency. A head of state with great powers is certainly necessary in today's complex situation—the majority of those who write letters to the editorial office stress this.

But I think the question of the presidency arises not so much in connection with the present realities as with the future. The creation of the post of head of state, in the shape of president, will make it possible to resolve many of the problems of the rule-of-law state which we have begun to build. First and foremost it will help us to achieve a real separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers and to increase the autonomy and accountability of each of them.

A number of letters ask: Will the president become a dictator? No idle question. Therefore readers are already quite rightly proposing that, in the event of the establishment of a post of one-man head of state, a monitoring mechanism be created to enable the people, or parliament, or some other institution to terminate the presidential powers early if this proves necessary.

The question of presidential rule—to be or not to be—is on the agenda for the session today. Summing up our readers' opinions, the answer is unequivocal: A rule-of-law state needs a head with great powers. This is dictated by the need to maintain the country's stable development, give greater dynamism to perestroika, consolidate the guarantees of its irreversibility, and extend citizens' rights and freedoms.

TASS Reports on CPSU Plenum

*LD1403185290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1820 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow, 14 Mar (TASS)—We are transmitting the full text of the information report about the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

The plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU continued its work on 14 March, 1990. The plenum examined the question of putting forward a candidate from the CPSU for the post of president of the USSR.

USSR peoples deputies from the CPSU took part in the work of the plenum.

The speakers at the plenum were: V.A. Maslov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]; G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia; N.I. Malkov, first secretary of the Chita Oblast committee of the CPSU; YU.V. Dubinin, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR in the United States; P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia; Ya.Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia; N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The plenum adopted the decision to nominate M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as candidate from the CPSU for the post of president of the USSR.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the central committee of the CPSU, spoke at the plenum.

The plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU will continue its work.

CPSU Democratic Platform Formed 13 March

*LD1403000390 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2115 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Text] A Coordinating Council of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU has been set up. It is planned to call a meeting of the Democratic Platform to put forward candidates for the Communist Party congress.

CPSU Platform Shows Leftward Drift

*PM1403143190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3*

[Letter from reader Ye. Roshal: "Highlighting Priorities"]

[Text] I do not consider it expedient to discuss individual phrases in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform, because the question arises of the very essence of that document. In my view, it pays tribute to old tradition, preventing us from discerning the priorities which should be particularly highlighted in the text.

The platform really defends itself against the right wing, which is quite definitely stated in the first section, but it does not prevent the CPSU's actual enemies at the moment—radical left-wingers—from appearing in party ranks. Thus there has been an obvious movement, a drift from centrism toward center-leftism. Along this path of conformity and concession—a path well trodden by East Europe—the party may find understanding from some of the Moscow intelligentsia and separatists in the Baltic republics and the Transcaucasus, but I am sure that it will alienate the Russian heartland.

Adapting to center-left pressure may also perhaps give the CPSU a certain time to find its feet, but it will have to move in the direction of the Hungarian and Polish option. Will not the party have to endure the same sad metamorphosis as happened to the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] and PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]?

It is not enough to recognize the multiparty system, shun careerists, abandon undeserved privileges, and so forth. The party should find within itself the courage to espouse centrist positions (on the whole), formulating its platform in quite narrow and binding terms so as to cut off both political flanks. In this connection priorities such as the defense of the state's political integrity (while granting union republics sovereignty within a federal framework) and reliance on the working class and the peasantry should be unambiguously reaffirmed (and perhaps developed in detail).

For this reason the platform should analyze the current political situation in the country—the breakdown of political forces, the aspirations of the CPSU's enemies, and the economic motives behind the political struggle—so as to clearly specify on this basis the CPSU's place and role in an emergent multiparty system.

[Signed] Ye. Roshal, scientific worker, nonparty member, Moscow.

CPSU Factions Urged To Form Own Parties

*PM1203160990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4*

[A. Prigarin, A. Kryuchkov, and G. Morozov article as part of "Debating Leaflet No. 13. Party and Perestroika. Approaching the 28th CPSU Congress" two-page feature and under the rubric "Readers' Responses": "Alternative to... Democracy"]

[Text] Debating Leaflet No. 11 carried the text of the "Democratic Platform." We have a positive attitude toward the publication of this alternative document in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress. There is no doubt that it raises important questions of party perestroika.

It all began with the founding of the Moscow party club. It was given the name "Communists for Perestroika." Toward the end of last year the majority of the club's members decided to change its name. Its new name was

"Communist Reformers for a Democratic Platform in the CPSU." An all-union conference of party clubs and party organizations was held at its initiative in Moscow last January. It was also attended by some USSR people's deputies belonging to the interregional group of deputies. The conference founded an association of communists named "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" and adopted documents.

Our differences emerged back at the stage when the Moscow party club, in which we held the positions of a "communist section," had its name changed. Soon afterward, and "in connection with irreconcilable ideological and theoretical differences," we were expelled from the party club. At that time, and on the section's basis, we founded our own club using the old name and, in this capacity, attended the conference. Analyzing in depth the essence of the questions under discussion, we openly declared at the conference's final sitting that we could not join the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" Association. We were backed by a number of delegates from Moscow Oblast, Ufa, Yakutsk, Mirnyy, and others.

Why did this parting of the ways occur? Not simply because there were several arguable propositions. For example, how was it possible to accept the draft first paragraph of the new CPSU Statute, which contains the following words: "Every citizen of the USSR can be a member of the CPSU regardless of vocation, philosophical beliefs, religion...." Yes, some of the DP [Democratic Platform] slogans are popular and progressive. Many of them, however (transfer of power to the soviets, repeal of Article 6, direct election of congress delegates by electoral okrug), were suggested earlier at a conference of secretaries of Moscow primary party organizations and the Moscow CPSU Gorkom [city committee] itself.

The main point which forced us to dissociate ourselves was the goals set by DP leaders.

Keynote speakers at the conference bluntly declared their commitment to social democratic ideals, the creation of a new party totally different from the CPSU, and a total break with Marxist-Leninist teaching. True enough, a somewhat different position prevailed at the end. A whole series of speakers, including USSR people's deputies, proclaimed that it is still too early to withdraw from the CPSU and that it is necessary to first do some work with communists, attract the most active ones to their side, struggle a bit to acquire a material base, and only then found their own party.

This is how the renewalists democrats behaved. Even the most resolute delegates got confused. It was no accident that the conference's final documents failed to reflect either the "radical" (outright break with the CPSU) or the "partisan" (capture of power from within) tactics. The foreground was taken by general democratic elements calculated to gain support from the majority of communists.

This, we repeat, is the central point of difference: The divergence between word and deed, between spoken and

printed words. Indeed, whereas V. Shostakovskiy declared that the DP's goal is to renew the Communist Party, Yu. Afanasyev adheres to another tenet: A dialogue with the CPSU is impossible in principle. As for I. Chubays, he said these actual words at a rally in Moscow: "There are so many of us here that we can storm not only the Winter Palace, but even Lubyanka." How can anyone fail to doubt the genuine goals of these newly hatched leaders after all this? Especially since the "Democratic Platform" contains no stipulation of socioeconomic tasks and says nothing at all about the economy. All the emphasis is placed on division of power between the CPSU and other parties, in essence on the struggle for power. But for whose sake?

Here is another aspect. It is strange to hear some DP leaders saying that this is not a faction within the CPSU "since it has not been in any way organizationally constituted." And yet that same conference elected a leadership center—the Coordinating Council—and announced the creation of its own press organ. Its internal structure has also started taking shape.

Frankly speaking, we are not afraid of the formation of factions within the CPSU. We would actually deem it useful if those so inclined would form a social democratic party and maybe even some other parties. Only then would it become possible to conduct an honest and frank dialogue with them, to define the sphere of agreement and joint actions, to openly discuss the issues dividing us. And the positions of those who openly call for the CPSU's liquidation while continuing to call themselves communists would be that much more clearly defined.

It seems to us that the time has come for our party to begin an open and frank conversation about the danger looming not only before the CPSU, but also before the country as a whole. In our opinion, today it is necessary to rally all those who stand firm on the positions of socialist choice, who reject exploitation of man by man in any form, and who are against socialism without democracy as much as they are against democracy without socialism. The danger is so great that all who value the party that is undergoing renewal must stand up and defend it.

Party Central Committee Chairmanship Urged

PM1203141990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Alekseyev, as part of "Discussion Leaflet No 13. Party and Perestroika. Approaching the 28th CPSU Congress"; two-page feature and under the rubric "Topic of Conversation": "Does the Party Need a Chairman"]

[Text] Moscow—I was probably not the only one, on reading the draft CPSU platform, to ask myself in bewilderment: "What, are we also proposing to institute the post of party chairman?"

Indeed, this would be an unprecedented decision. Such a post has never existed in the CPSU's history. Maybe V.I. Lenin was the closest anyone got to this position within the party, especially in the post-October period when his right to exercise leadership was no longer questioned by anyone—so great was Vladimir Ilich's prestige.

But this status that he enjoyed was in no way organizationally instituted at that time. This question was not even raised, since V.I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that it was necessary to develop by all possible means the collegial organs of party leadership—the RKP(B) [Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] Central Committee and its Politburo, Organizational Bureau, and Secretariat—and to expand and democratize their composition, including by means of recruiting more workers.

True enough, it was not without V.I. Lenin's involvement that the post of general secretary was instituted in the RKP(B) Central Committee in 1922 and, as it is well known, this post was taken by I.V. Stalin. Lenin, however, intended this office not to dominate the party structure but rather to coordinate and guide the activity of the Central Committee apparatus and its auxiliary services, relieving the workload of the Politburo and other elected party organs.

In "skilled hands," however, this office could be transformed into a means for concentrating unbounded power within the party and the state (given the one-party system) into just one man's hands. It is well known that V.I. Lenin, having seen the first steps in Stalin's work as general secretary, swiftly perceived this impending danger and promoted the idea of restructuring the structures of top party leadership. But even at that time there was no question (especially in the conditions of acute rivalry for leadership of the RKP(B) between some members of the Politburo) of instituting the post of party chairman. This could only have resulted in a split within the RKP(B). Nor was this question raised in the party later on.

True enough, the history of communist parties does offer examples when some of them instituted the post of chairman, including in countries where communists were in power. For example, Mao Zedong was chairman of the Communist Party in China. It is well known, however, that this led to a substantial curbing of the role of elected party organs, hypertrophied growth of one man's powers and authority, and the shaping of a personality cult.

All these universally known aspects of the problem flashed across my mind when I studied the Central Committee platform and saw the proposal to institute the post of party chairman. It seemed to me that all this ought to have brought to mind the idea of the undesirability of instituting such a post in the CPSU.

I think, however, that an initially adverse role is played here by "his majesty" the stereotype. It conveniently offers the mind a trip into the past and reliably blocks the path toward a dialectical examination of the problem.

Let us look at the problem from another angle—not from the positions of past experience but from the viewpoint of today's realities and the immediate future prospects. Obviously, nobody would deny that the country is fast moving toward a multiparty system. Including even... a "communist multiparty system."

I personally am in favor of creating a Russian Communist Party [RCP]. I am convinced that, being organizationally shaped on new democratic principles, it would introduce a tremendous positive factor in the process of the entire CPSU's recovery. A renewed, united, and strong RCP could actually become the dominant factor around which the communist parties of sovereign union republics would wish to rally (in line with the principles of strictly partnership-like and comradely relations, on the basis of ideological community of views and of development prospects). I am convinced that without an autonomous party (which would belong to a renewed CPSU) there can be no genuine autonomy of republics and, without all this, there can be no union of sovereign socialist states.

It is thus possible that a perfectly new situation could develop in the CPSU in the very near future.

Past forms and structures of leadership would be useless. You have to agree that the office of general secretary, assuming the existence of rigid vertical structures, strong powers and authority, and so on, would appear anachronistic. It would probably be deemed expedient to retain the office of first and maybe even general secretaries in union republic communist parties (in the RCP, for example, the Ukrainian Communist Party, and others). So then, should there be a party "marshal" above them in the CPSU?

Of course not. In my view, this is a past stage of party building. The elaboration of consensus in the CPSU would require new leading or rather coordinating structures or institutions. This is where the office of party chairman (or chairman of the Central Committee or the CPSU Central Committee Presidium) should come into its own. A Central Committee Presidium would be appropriate instead of the Politburo, and it would be expedient for all leaders of union republic communist parties to sit on it. Their election as delegates to it should be effected not by congresses [syezdy] in the conventional sense but by all-party all-Union congresses [kon-gressy].

There are also other opinions. Some people deem it necessary to preserve the present principles of party building and the CPSU's structure, with the party chairman elected by all communists in the country in direct and secret ballot.

What could be said in this context? I am afraid that the principle of multicandidate elections (without which it is no longer possible to imagine any further democratization of party life) would rather lead to a split within the CPSU. Nor will this be successful in producing a genuine leader. Communists in different republics would have

far too different criteria and approaches. I assume that the first option—whereby the union republic communist parties, having acquired the necessary autonomy, jointly advocating the building of socialist society, and having pooled their efforts, elect a chairman of the CPSU Central Committee at a congress [kongress]—could be the most promising.

Yeltsin Said 'Resting' After Heart Problem

*LD1503094890 Paris Domestic Service in French
0700 GMT 15 Mar 90*

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, a key figure and progressive deputy in the Soviet Union, suffered a cardiac malaise last Sunday. On Monday he made a very short appearance in the corridors of the Congress of Deputies. Since then he has been resting at home. He has already had incidents of heart failure in the past.

Scientific

Cosmos-2060 Scientific Satellite Launched

*LD1503084990 Moscow TASS in English 0847 GMT
15 Mar 90*

[Text] Moscow March 15 TASS—An artificial Earth satellite, "Cosmos-2060", was launched by the Soviet Union on Wednesday.

The satellite carries scientific equipment to continue space research.

It was put into an orbit with the following parameters:
—the initial period of rotation - 92.7 minutes,
—the maximum distance from the Earth surface (in the apogee) - 430 kilometers,
—the minimum distance from the Earth surface (in the perigee) - 412 kilometers,
—the orbit's inclination - 65 degrees.

In addition to scientific equipment, the satellite carries a radio system to measure the orbit's elements and radio-telemetric system to transmit data on the functioning of devices and scientific equipment to the earth.

The on-board equipment is functioning normally.

The coordination computer centre is processing incoming data.

Cosmonauts Continue Experiments Aboard Mir

*LD1203142290 Moscow World Service in Russian
1020 GMT 12 Mar 90*

[Text] The second month of the flight of Soviet cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin on the "Mir" orbiting complex has started. They have fully adapted to the conditions of weightlessness and are feeling fine.

During the latest communication session the cosmonauts reported that in the past few days they have been

mainly engaged in unloading the "Progress" automatic craft and in staging biological and technological experiments. In particular, smelting of the latest batch of semiconductors has started in the (Galar) semi-industrial device.

The expedition's main task is to ensure the forthcoming docking with "Mir" of the 20-tonne "Kristall" technological module, whose launch is scheduled for the end of the month. This module is a miniature plant for the production in orbit of ultra-pure crystals and medical preparations which are beyond the reach of technology on earth.

Cost of Flight Recouped

*LD1203103890 Moscow TASS in English 2206 GMT
11 Mar 90*

[By TASS Correspondent Andrey Filippov]

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—According to preliminary estimates, the expenditures for the 166-day flight of the fifth expedition to the orbital station Mir, amounting to some 90 million rubles, have been recouped. This has become possible mainly due to scientific and technological experiments carried out during a prolonged space flight.

Cosmonauts Aleksandr Vikorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov who returned to the ground on February 19 reported to the state commission on Sunday. It was noted at the state commission's meeting that for the first time in the practice of space flights, the smelting of semiconductor crystals for the electronic industry was conducted on board the spacecraft for several weeks. It should be noted that the smelting was made at the record temperature of 1,200 degrees centigrade.

Biological crystals for the needs of the medical science were grown on board the orbital station Mir for several months. This project was also implemented for the first time. First reports about the ecological situation on the Earth were received from board the station.

An experiment commissioned by the American Payload Systems was successfully fulfilled on a commercial basis.

Samples of space equipment were successfully flight tested in open space during the expedition.

The new orbital module "Kvant-2" was linked up to the basic station Mir.

At the same time the cosmonauts described a number of problems without whose solution the efficiency of space flights cannot be enhanced.

Because of ergonomic drawbacks of the station, the crew at times had to spend up to 80 percent of their working time to prepare their work place and fix their position. There are no adjustments for fixating the cosmonauts in the zones of work while fulfilling some or other experiments.

Despite complaints of numerous crews the equipment is not being refined.

Some of the problems posed by cosmonauts will shortly be resolved. Others will await their solutions for "objective reasons," according to representatives of the scientific-production amalgamation "Energiya".

TASS Signs Extensive Communications Deal

*LD1303194290 Moscow TASS in English 1902 GMT
13 Mar 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Kikilo]

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS—The Soviet News Agency TASS will be able to use a privately owned global communications network to exchange dispatches with its bureaus inside the country and abroad, following the signing of an agreement with the U.S. companies Contel and Vertex here today.

Under the agreement, Vertex will provide the TASS headquarters in Moscow with two ground stations, comprising two 11-meter antennas and high-frequency amplification equipment.

The project will give TASS access to two Intelsat satellites, above the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, which cover practically two-thirds of the globe.

Contel will provide TASS with special equipment to transmit its services via the global satellite communications network. The equipment will comprise ground reception-and-transmission and reception antennas (stations).

As a result, the Soviet News Agency will be able to use a privately owned communications network, like the other leading world agencies—Reuter, UPI and AP.

In addition to Soviet territory, the network will cover South and a large part of North America, Europe, Africa and Asia (including Japan).

The new system will enable TASS subscribers to receive textual, facsimile, photo and voice information with a speed of 9.6 kbits per second—10 times as high as the teletype system.

Hundreds of TASS bureaus inside the country and abroad will be able to send information direct to Moscow round the clock, irrespective of weather or other conditions.

Tim Scholz, a Contel top executive, described the agreement as a "first step to be hopefully followed by many other steps."

He expressed satisfaction with the conclusion of the deal with one of the leading world agencies, which he attributed largely to the USSR's policy of glasnost.

"Contel regards the deal as a major step both from the political and financial viewpoint," Scholz added.

Results of Polluted Drinking Water Discussed

LD1403121190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 12 March, in its "Vremya" newscast, broadcasts a 2.5 minute report on water pollution in the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]. The presenter begins by noting that doctors believe that an extreme situation has been created for people in the Aral Sea area who draw their drinking water from the Amu-Darya. Today, the average length of life here is five years less than in other areas of the country, and death among mothers is probably the highest in the country here. Doctors have found traces of toxic chemicals in the milk of nursing mothers due to contaminated drinking water, the presenter notes. Infant mortality here is several times higher than in Uzbekistan as a whole. In some areas 80 children die out every 1,000 born, compared with 15 in, say, Kaluga oblast.

Only 42 percent of the population of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR has piped water, the presenter says. The pipeline from (Tulyma) to Nukus remains unfinished. Even the capital of the autonomous republic does not have purification installations, he says. Every drop of water contains an excess of sulphates, chlorides, and nitrates. The republic's government has allocated R2 a day for special food for expectant and nursing mothers who are suffering from anaemia. Foreign baby food is on sale, but people are reluctant to buy it because they do not know how to use it.

The video shows views of the Amu-Darya, women working in the fields, women and babies in maternity homes, interview with midwives, and street scenes.

Thermonuclear Reactor Installation Operational

*LD1203231590 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 11 Mar 90*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Tokamak-15, the largest thermonuclear installation in the USSR, has gone into operational mode [rabochiy rezhim]. Our correspondent reports from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.

[A. Fedorov, identified by screen caption, over video of institute workshops, showing research installations from above; Bach organ music playing throughout] To judge by all accounts, the Soviet Tokamaks are once again emerging from oblivion and physicists are speaking about them as before—with hope and optimism. Tokamak-15 has a multitude of engineering systems, from cryogenic to a superconducting magnetic system, which, like twin brothers, are similar to the construction of future thermonuclear electric power stations. The steel monster is impressive when one has a bird's eye view of it. But the installation looks most of all like a cathedral organ which is just about to burst into a Bach oratorio.

And so Tokamak-15 is ready for scientific experiments.

[Begin recording] [Fedorov, in a control room] One can predict our viewers' questions here. They will probably sound like this: Do we need thermonuclear energy? Boris Borisovich, what do you think?

[Academician B.B. Kadomtsev, deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute, identified by screen caption] Thermonuclear energy will undoubtedly be needed at the start of the next century. In the first place, oil and gas are not everlasting, whereas the reserves of thermonuclear energy are great. In the second place, thermonuclear energy is far more acceptable, from the ecological point of view, than conventional atomic power energy. [end recording]

[Fedorov] The aim of Tokamak-15 is clear: to tame the refractory nature of plasma in order to manage it as the working body of the thermonuclear reactor. To start with, however, physicists have to stoke up the furnace and heat up the plasma to 100 million degrees. That, incidentally, is several times more than the temperature at the heart of the sun. Another step follows: A reactor will be constructed upon which scientists will develop nuclear technology and ecological safety. For this, under the aegis of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority], an International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor—ITER—is being designed. The USSR, United States, Japan, and the Euratom organization of Western European countries are taking part in the co-production. Physicists say that thermonuclear power engineering will evidently emerge in the first third of the 21st century, although scientists would like this to happen earlier.

Military

Field-Training Military Exercises Scheduled

LD0903190790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1530 GMT 9 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] I now want to acquaint you with the following piece of information from TASS:

During the period 16-23 March, Kiev military okrug troops will carry out operational-tactical exercises in the Belya Tserkov-Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy-Grebenka-Shchors-Loyev-Vyshgorod area of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in order to improve field training and to work through control and coordination questions. Infantry and Air Force formations and units will be involved in the exercises.

In accordance with the Stockholm Conference document, the USSR Government has invited observers from all states that are members of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Yazov Chairs Conference on Improving Air Safety

PM0903132190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 8 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Manushkin report: "Flight Safety Conference"]

[Text] In the last year alone the crashes involving Il-76, Tu-22M, and An-26 aircraft reported in your newspaper have cost dozens of lives. The tragedy in Baku, when a military transport with assault troops aboard broke up, still prompts letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the USSR Defense Ministry. People ask "Why does flight equipment fail? Why do airmen make mistakes? What should we do to prevent any repetition?"

Aviation is probably one of the few spheres involving increased risk. Reducing the risk to a minimum is a task for those who develop aviation equipment and for those who use it. This was discussed at a flight safety conference held under the chairmanship of Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

Taking part in the conference were A.S. Systsov, minister of the aviation industry, USSR deputy defense ministers, the commanders in chief of branches of the Armed Forces, and representatives of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF], the State Commission for Flight Safety, and other ministries and departments.

Having discussed in detail the entire range of problems connected with ensuring flight safety, the conference participants submitted proposals and elaborated specific measures aimed at eradicating the causes of flying accidents.

Chief of Staff Views Spring Call-Up Problems

PM1303165390 Moscow TRUD in Russian
13 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Army General M.A. Moiseyev by V. Badurkin; time, place not indicated: "The Boycotters of Army Service: Army General M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff and USSR First Deputy Defense Minister, Considers the Problems of the Spring Draft"]

[Text] [Badurkin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, the spring draft for the Army and Navy will soon be starting. We all remember that six months ago this campaign encountered for the first time open opposition from certain informal organizations. Has the situation changed during the intervening months?

[Moiseyev] Yes, it has. But, unfortunately, not for the better. A campaign has been launched in the Baltic republics to persuade draftees to surrender their call-up papers. In Lvov the so-called Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth has declared the establishment of an "Action Committee for the Organization of the Armed

Forces of the Ukraine." The Azerbaijan People's Front and informal organizations in Armenia, Georgia, and the Baltic republics are demanding that draftees perform their service only on the territory of their own republics and that national formations and so forth be set up. In the Moldavian capital extremists have held aloft placards reading "We don't want to serve in an army of occupation" and "We want a national army," and yesterday a bonfire was built on Victory Square onto which were thrown a complete military uniform and the shirt of an Afghan veteran along with combat medals....

And the extremists' "experience" is being actively spread by emissaries of the people's fronts and other informal organizations. In Transcaucasia one can encounter envoys from the Baltic, and vice versa. Nor are Moldavia and the western oblasts of the Ukraine neglected.

[Badurkin] Do you mean therefore that the whole anti-Army campaign is planned and organized by a single center of some kind?

[Moiseyev] I hope it has not reached that point. But what we do have here is an attempt to coordinate action. Judge for yourself. In Lvov activists of the aforementioned Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth promise to take those who refuse to serve in the Armed Forces under their "protection." The same promise is also given by the anti-military organization Geneva-49, set up in the Baltic republics, which has stated that young men who do not wish to serve in the "occupation army" may surrender their call-up papers without fear. True, the way these well-wishers intend to protect those whom they are essentially urging to commit a crime is not clear. But they are clearly playing from a single score.

And what of such actions as, say, the burning of military service cards and call-up papers or their organized collection for subsequent dispatch to the republic military commissariats and the Ministry of Defense? They are carried out according to a single scenario, as it were. The calls for young men to refuse to serve in the USSR Armed Forces, for the creation of "national armies" and republic "defense ministries," for the establishment of "alternative service," or the demand "to serve where one lives" are like carbon copies of one another, albeit written in different languages....

[Badurkin] What lies behind these appeals, what is their ideological and political thrust?

[Moiseyev] They are mostly suggested or, if you wish, insinuated or dictated to immature, politically ill-prepared young people who lack clear ideological or moral guidelines by extremist, nationalistic, and even anti-Soviet forces. What is the aim, for example, of such slogans as these carried in procession in Lvov on 23 February this year by youngsters from the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth: "Glory to the servicemen of the UIA!" and "We are against the Soviet Army and for the UGA and the UIA!"? Do they realize what bloody crimes against the people, committed by the

fascist stooges and butchers of the so-called "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" and the "Ukrainian Galician Army," these initials conceal?

[Badurkin] Quite often it is argued that the military service draft "deserves" to be boycotted because of the prevalence of bullying in the Army and the Navy. How justified is this argument?

[Moiseyev] Attempts to justify people avoiding the performance of their constitutional duty by citing the potential problems of bullying are unacceptable and intolerable from the legal, moral, and other standpoints. So that such speculation is no argument at all.

I cannot, unfortunately, say that relations contrary to regulations have been completely eradicated from military life today. We have still not solved this task, although the number of cases of bullying has been cut by more than half compared with 1987. If one is talking about the Armed Forces as a whole, military collectives where this shameful phenomenon is absent are in the majority. But a lot of persistent work is required to remove it altogether.

We have recently come across a new phenomenon in our work which is, I think, closely bound up with this predraft "brainwashing." The fact is that quite often an ill-prepared, immature youth will, after coming up against difficulties in military service, start sending tearful letters home seasoned with information culled from a certain kind of publication about bullying, of which there is not a trace in his own subunit. The scheme is simple: The parents will "take away" their son from the Army or, at worst, get him transferred closer to home. His mother and father naturally sound the alarm bell, appeal to the highest authorities, send letters to the command, newspapers, magazines, television, and radio, and sometimes cross the whole country to see their son. And then they apologize for him....

Here is a fact for you to ponder: Only one in five letters about bullying sent to the "authorities," so to speak, is confirmed to any extent. Unfortunately, unverified information is very often turned into "arguments" against the military service draft.

[Badurkin] How are the republic and local organs of power reacting to the antidraft activity?

[Moiseyev] Not only are they failing to stop such action, they are actually encouraging it by passing acts of legislation contrary to the USSR Constitution. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Status of the USSR Armed Forces in the Republic and of the Military Service of Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," the Estonian Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Procedure for the Performance of Military Service by Citizens of the Estonian SSR," and the Law "On Alternative (Labor) Service by Citizens of the Latvian SSR" passed by the Latvian Supreme Soviet may be so categorized.

Citing the aforementioned republic supreme soviet acts of legislation, many rayon and city organs of power in Latvia and Estonia have passed resolutions "releasing" them from involvement in the organization of the draft. Here we have again a breach of the Law on Compulsory Military Service. How are these decisions to be regarded from a moral standpoint? After all, those who passed them are effectively shedding all responsibility for the country's defense.

Making use of certain mass media, organizations of various persuasions are carrying out extensive propaganda among the population aimed at persuading young men born in 1973 to refuse to register for the draft. All this is taking place with the toleration and sometimes the approval of local authorities. Consider carefully this following fact too. Criminal proceedings were instituted in all cases of avoidance of the active service draft last year. However, in the Baltic and Transcaucasian republics less than a handful were actually convicted for this crime (two out of 259 in the Baltic and one out of 1,146 in the Transcaucasus). Moreover, the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium has prepared a draft Decree "On Changes to the Criminal Code of the Estonian SSR" which provides for the article envisaging punishment for avoidance of the active military service draft to be excluded from the republic criminal code.

[Badurkin] It is clearly time not just to assess these actions politically but to take some kind of specific measures too....

[Moiseyev] I think that there can only be one political assessment of activity designed to disrupt military service, like anti-Army propaganda as a whole: It runs fundamentally counter to the interests of the Soviet people, exerts a destructive influence on their patriotic and international consciousness, and is directly detrimental to the cause of our homeland's defense and security. The need to resolutely thwart actions aimed at undermining the Constitution, legality, and the people's defense awareness is obvious.

It is time for the USSR Supreme Soviet to get involved in this work and to make an appropriate decision on the implementation of the USSR Constitution and the Law on Compulsory Military Service. The need for the next drafts to be implemented by decision of the head of the Soviet state is obvious. Organizations boycotting Army service should be held accountable for this with the full rigor of the law.

In two months' time we will be marking the 45th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. The approach of this notable date gives us much to think about, including lessons of the war which are not to be forgotten. One of them, which has a special relevance today, is that the unity and cohesion of the peoples and the readiness of every citizen to defend his socialist homeland are the most important source of the strength and soundness of our multinational state.

Army Participation in Harvest Questioned

PM1403134990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Mar 90 Single Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel of Justice N. Sokolskiy under the "Problems and Opinions" rubric: "The Cost of the 'Virgin Land' Battalions"]

[Text] Spring is upon us. In some places sowing has already begun in the fields. Before you know it, the harvest will be in full swing. And that means that the "virgin land" battalions will be setting off on their long journeys across the country.

Last year, motor transport subunits worked from July until well into the fall in the fields of 32 oblasts and krais in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Kazakhstan, and Belorussia and transported over 26 million tonnes of grain, vegetables, feed, and other agricultural freight. In many places rural workers sincerely thanked servicemen for their help in collecting the harvest and invited them back this year. But in other places the complete opposite happened. And therefore the question of whether the "virgin land" battalions do more good than harm remains open.

Judge for yourselves. In recent years the number of motor transport battalions assigned to harvesting has increased. Last year there were 74, whereas previously 40-60 sufficed. Why? Because they are being used less and less efficiently. Last year, each battalion transported an average of 350,000 tonnes of goods. But in 1986, for example, the battalion average was 415,000 tonnes and in 1985 600,000 tonnes. What is going on here?

Here is a report written during last year's harvest by servicemen of a motor transport subunit of the Odessa Military District: "We were sent to Saratov Oblast from distant Moldavia. We arrived at the 'Borisoglebskiy' Sovkhoz [state farm] in Fedorovskiy Rayon but it turned out that we weren't needed there. Civilian drivers from Saratov using large-capacity trucks were coping comfortably with the cereal harvest. The sovkhoz leadership used four or five of our trucks a day while the remaining 18-19 stood idle—there was no load for them. It is time to consider the fact that all this is costing the state very dear."

Letters of this kind, like the situation they describe, are unfortunately far from rare. As practice has shown, year after year some oblast leaders order truck transport without consulting kolkhozes [collective farms] or rayons and order far more than they actually need. They assure you that this decision is based on "many years of experience" and is designed to cover "eventualities..." And why shouldn't they, after all, they bear no responsibility for the surplus vehicles or their idle time.

What is the result of this generosity at someone else's expense? Last year, some kolkhozes and sovkhozes not only in Saratov Oblast but also in Voronezh, Kurgan, and Novosibirsk Oblasts, Stavropol and Krasnoyarsk

Krays, and the Bashkir and Kalmyk ASSR's [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] turned away the military motor transport subunits that arrived there. In the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] only one-half of the motor battalions were actually used. Overall, the total idle time of military vehicles was equivalent to almost 3,000 trucks doing no harvest work at all.

The military subunits command was forced to look for any work that it could find in the countryside just to make some use of the men and equipment.

It has to be said that motor transport battalions sometimes make the most bizarre journeys on the orders of high-level authorities, particularly the RSFSR and Kazakh SSR State Agroindustrial Committees. Little consideration is given to military leaders' objections there. For example, some motor transport battalions were sent to Kazakhstan all the way from the Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa Military Districts and even from the Southern Group of Forces and across Poland, which had to be paid for in foreign currency. Meanwhile, military trains carrying vehicles from the Turkestan Military District went in the opposite direction to Lipetsk and Saratov Oblasts. How can you expect any profit from this sort of involvement in the harvest?

According to the figures of the Central Financial Administration, the money earned last year transporting the harvest covered only one-half of the Defense Ministry's spending on the formation, upkeep, and redeployment of motor transport battalions. The military department was reimbursed for the 40 million discrepancy by a subsidy from centralized funds but it had to "wring" that money out of their grasp.

An equally large amount was paid to the civilian enterprises, establishments, and organizations where the reservists are registered for the time that they spend in the harvest. In conditions of economic accountability, the leaders of those enterprises and organizations are now writing letters to central organs rightly raising the question of compensation for those costs. But who should pay that compensation?

Here is what T. Khalikov, director of the "Bukhara" Agrarian Construction Association's road transport enterprise, has said on this score: "Six of our workers were drafted by the military commissariats last year for harvesting work and were paid 7,275 rubles [R]. To pay that amount you have to earn over R30,000 or else take this sum from the remaining workers' money. The reservists must earn income for someone so why should our collective suffer?"

Economically speaking it doesn't make sense to equip motor transport battalions with a large quantity of low-capacity, high-consumption vehicles for agricultural shipments. They simply cannot compete with large-capacity trucks like the KAMAZ trailer truck and others which civilian drivers use.

Much of this, I think, is due to the military department's lack of economic interest in the results of servicemen's work in harvesting. Indeed, how is it to acquire such an interest if the decades-old practice of using motor transport battalions for harvesting is not based on current legislation. This Army function is not covered either by the USSR Constitution, the USSR Law "On Compulsory Military Service," or the military regulations. All that happens is that the government adopts annual resolutions on this matter. However, the use of reservists to staff motor transport battalions and the four-five months that they spend in harvesting is contrary to the USSR Law "On Compulsory Military Service." After all, under that law, reservists may be used only for inactive duty training and musters for a period of no more than three months.

All this makes it possible to doubt the legitimacy of the presence of reservists in motor transport battalions. Perhaps it would be more expedient to form civilian truck convoys and borrow only a certain amount of equipment and spares from the Army when necessary. Meanwhile there is a paradox here: Reservists are drafted and kitted out in military uniform so as then to return to the national economy to gather in the harvest. Who needs this fancy dress ball?

In conclusion, I should like to report that the legal questions of the use of motor transport battalions for harvesting work have now been submitted by the USSR Prosecutor's Office to the USSR Council of Ministers. I hope that they will be resolved.

View of Army as Anti-Democratic Deplored

PM1403142590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Special correspondent Major Yu. Mamchur article: "The Fatherland's Soldier. Paying a Heavy Price for His Country's Victories and 'Mistakes'"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] People say that your attitude toward what your native land holds sacred defines your attitude toward the motherland. There is perfect justification for saying: Your attitude toward military service and toward soldiers defines your attitude toward the fatherland. It shows how much of a citizen you are. It shows how much of a man you are. This is because our soldiers—great heroes and great martyrs—are flesh of the fatherland's flesh.

As a matter of fact, very few people have an idea of what contemporary soldiers or officers are like. As a rule, newspaper and journal pages and movie and television screens present us with the image of someone riddled with complexes, pushed about, and bogged down in drill exercises and "bullying." In a certain literary genre, this "image" acquires not just pejorative but actually sinister overtones. On the one hand, vigorous publicity is given to the fear of an impending military coup, and the

Armed Forces—in other words, the soldiers—are presented as almost the main threat to burgeoning democracy. On the other hand, strenuous attempts are made to convince a wide audience that the Army is on the verge of total collapse....

Somebody's aspirations are behind all the attempts to distort and corrupt the Army's image in the public's mind. Be that as it may, there is one point on which there can be no doubt: The soldiers now find themselves within the sphere of political interests of the most diverse social movements, currents, and so on. You do not have to be a genius to perceive the reason why: The Army today is an important factor of stability.

A scientific analysis of the Armed Forces' position in a society which is living through a crisis is necessary in

order to prevent any confusion as to what is happening in and around the Army, around the soldiers. [passage omitted]

Correction to Yazov Interview on Spring Draft

WA1503115990

The following correction pertains to the item entitled "Yazov Calls National Army Units 'Unacceptable'" published on page 76 of the 12 March DAILY REPORT:

page 77, column two, paragraph seven, first sentence should read ...more than 6,500 people dodged the... (substituting 6,500 for 66,500).

Baltic Republics

Opposition to Independent Lithuania Noted

LD1503093290 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America
0100 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] Unfortunately, there is not full support in Lithuania itself for the proclaimed restoration of the state of Lithuania.

Yesterday there was talk at the session of the Supreme Council about a meeting in Snieckus inciting and intimidating people. Today a similar meeting was held in Klaipeda, at the sea fishing port. Speakers at the meeting expressed their dissatisfaction at the adopted political decisions. Some speakers called for a referendum of the inhabitants of Lithuania and a petition for the preservation of the Lithuanian socialist republic within the Soviet Union. Some also demanded that the Klaipeda region be included in Kaliningrad Oblast, which belongs to the Russian Federation.

But there were also sober voices proposing to unite society for the consolidation of the independent Lithuanian state.

Today as never before, Lithuania needs unity, well-wishing understanding, and concord. Both the parliament of the Republic of Lithuania and the leaders of the democratic parties and movements are urging this. Vilnius Radio, too, invites all people of Lithuania to live in concord.

Vilnius Radio Carries 14 Mar Supreme Council

Agenda Adopted

LD1403101990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 14 March begins live coverage of the fourth day of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius chaired by Council Deputy Chairman Bronius Kuzmickas.

At 0803 GMT Kuzmickas calls on Supreme Council Chairman Landsbergis to speak.

In his 13-minute address Landsbergis discusses the possibility of disturbances instigated by "forces which are against the path chosen by Lithuania." In the first place, Landsbergis says, these disturbances could center on bread supplies through strikes at bakeries and bread combines. He goes on to recommend "forms in which opposing opinions would remain opinions and not an expression of absolute confrontation." He concludes by calling on the Supreme Council and the people of Lithuania "not to look for cause for confrontation, to view things from a wider perspective."

At 0816 GMT Kuzmickas states that the proceedings in the hall have demonstrated that an opposition is coming

into being in the council, and he welcomed this phenomenon. This opposition consists mostly of the members of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

He goes on to announce that today the following problems are to be debated: an appeal to the Lithuanian people, and matters concerning the Republican Military Commissariat. Then the session will consider its further work.

The deputies adopted this agenda.

At 0830 GMT Deputy Jursenas takes the floor speaking on behalf of the Lithuanian Communist Party, he stresses that some problems with deputies could arise and should be discussed in a friendly and unofficial way and not debated at plenary sessions. He supports Landsbergis in his call for unity.

At 0834 GMT Deputy Beriozovas states that all communists will support all acts adopted by the session. The communists are against the organization of any protests or meetings; there will be always discussions on various problems but everything should be solved in a friendly manner; the Lithuanian Communist Party is for the restoration of independent Lithuania and will not deviate from its path.

At 0839 GMT Deputy Sadreika takes the floor and asks the deputies to set up a commission to draw up an appeal to the Lithuanian people.

At 0843 GMT Deputy Zigmas Vaisvila reads a draft resolution on the work of the Republican Military Commissariat. Next, the debates start. Deputies ask many questions concerning this problem: is it possible now without any danger for young people to return their military papers, what will happen with the next call-up to service in the Army in the coming spring, if the work of the Commissariat will be discontinued, and what will happen with its employees?

At 0852 GMT Landsbergis states that some kind of mechanism should be established to continue the activity of the Military Commissariat.

At 0856 GMT the debates continued. Deputy Zigmas Vaisvila proposes that no hasty decisions should be taken; many problems connected with this matter will be the subject of negotiations; corrections and amendments to the draft resolution should be introduced.

At 0905 GMT a commission is set up to deal with the draft resolution.

At 0908 GMT a draft appeal to the Lithuanian people is read. Voting by name is taken.

At 0915 GMT while the voting is taking place, Deputy Sabutis proposes that the commissions which have been set up should start their work; the presidium should meet and announce the beginning of work. Various proposals on the procedure are made. According to some deputies, a law on the government should also be discussed.

At 0930 GMT the session is adjourned until 1000 GMT.

Military Commissariats Cancelled

LD1403115190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1000 GMT on 14 March resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

The results of the vote on the appeal to the Lithuanian people are read: 126 deputies vote in support with seven deputies absent. None vote against. Following this names, of the deputies who took part in the ballot are read by Saulius Razma, chairman of the Vote Counting Commission.

At 1009 GMT Landsbergis appeals to the trade unions to get ready for a possible strike at bakeries in Vilnius. He wants to reassure people that everything will be done to prevent the strike because people work normally in the republic and so should the Vilnius bakeries.

At 1012 GMT Apanavicius of the Social Democrats states that his party has already appealed to sister parties in other countries to urge their governments to recognize the independence of Lithuania.

At 1015 GMT deputy Jankelevicz announces that his voters urged him to inform the parliament that they are against Lithuania declaring independence. These were people from Polish areas.

At 1018 GMT Deputy Saudargas tells of a visit to Cardinal Sladkevicius by deputies of the Supreme Council.

At 1020 GMT Macaitis, secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomol organization, reads a telegram declaring their dissociation from those who organize rallies against Lithuanian independence.

At 1021 GMT Landsbergis suggests that support telegrams from prominent political figures of Poland should be published in the local papers of eastern Lithuania, where mainly Polish people live.

At 1022 GMT Zigmas Vaisvila reads a draft decision cancelling the activities of the Military Commissariats in Lithuania.

Debates follow. A number of delegates are against paragraph 2 of the decision which deals with the military property on the territory of the republic. K. Motieka proposes to rewrite the paragraph.

At 1038 GMT the new version is read again before the ballot is taken. In a vote taken on paragraph 2 and whether it should be included into the text of the decision, 12 vote for, 75 vote against, and 21 abstain.

At 1042 GMT the final text is read. In a vote, 116 deputies vote for, none against, and three abstain. Thus the following text is adopted:

"The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania decides: To terminate the activity of Military Commissariats of the USSR Ministry of Defense as institutions of an alien state on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.

The decision comes into force from the moment it has been adopted."

At 1046 GMT a telegram from the general director of Vilnius bakeries assures that there are no grounds to assume that the Vilnius bakeries will stop work. The deputies applaud this announcement.

At 1054 GMT deputies vote whether to include the problem of the Radio and Television Committee on the agenda. By a majority of votes it is included.

At 1101 GMT Deputy Kazimiera Prunskiene makes a statement on the financial situation at some enterprises, stressing that the banks have been instructed to supply enterprises with the necessary funds. During the interval she will consult with bank officials and report on it later.

At 1107 GMT Shiukus, chairman of the Radio and Television Committee, takes the floor. He explains that he always has been discharging his duties conscientiously and asks to remain in his post until the new government is formed, but if the deputies want he can resign now.

At 1114 GMT deputies express the view that reorganization of the Committee should take place; the mass media have been and are still forming public opinion; old officials are occupying their posts and therefore reorganization is essential.

At 1127 GMT reception deteriorates, becoming worthless.

Media Committee Formed

LD1403152490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1300 GMT on 14 March resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council in Vilnius.

At 1301 GMT a draft decision on control and subordination over the Committee of Radio and Television is presented. The decision says that a group of deputies have formed a committee which would guide the reorganization work of the Radio and Television Committee, as well as its parliamentary subordination. More deputies are proposed to be included into the Committee. The composition of the group is such that all political parties are represented. The decision is adopted.

At 1309 GMT telegrams of support from Lithuanian organizations are read.

At 1317 GMT Antanas Terleckas, representative of the Lithuanian League of Liberty, reads a statement about the league's support to the Supreme Council. He says:

"esteemed parliament, allow me to read an appeal from the Lithuanian League of Liberty to the Lithuanian nation:

"The Lithuanian League of Liberty, a political organization which was set up during the cruel times of the occupation, gives its unconditional support to the attempts made by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania to restore real independence to the Republic of Lithuania.

"The Lithuanian League of Liberty express its full confidence in the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis. [applause]

"The Lithuanian League of Liberty regrets that in some areas the breaking of the political backbone of some part of the Lithuanian people has been successful. And it is only for this reason that several political reactionary representatives have made their way into the highest juridical institution.

"The Lithuanian League of Liberty also regrets that Deputy Algirdas Brazauskas, having rejected the proposal advanced by the honorable chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, against his will has become the banner of the reactionary political forces of Lithuania. The Lithuanian League of Liberty is firmly convinced that the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania, which has been called upon to carry out the will of Lithuanians and other nationalities living in Lithuania, will not conclude and compromise political agreements with the forces which have been assisting the invaders for 50 years in the physical and spiritual extermination of the Lithuanian nation. "14 March 1990. Lithuanian League of Liberty."

At 1320 GMT an announcement is made concerning the further work of the parliament, proposals and debates on the announcement follow.

At 1332 GMT it is proposed to continue work in the commissions and to meet again at 1530 GMT to discuss the results of the work in groups. The proposal is adopted.

At 1337 GMT there are further debates on the date of the next session. Landsbergis says that he thinks that not all deputies are aware that this is a revolution that they are carrying out, therefore, without a clear idea of what might happen next, the parliament cannot disperse for two days and leave the country without any government.

It is decided that the session will be convened at 0900 on Saturday.

Landsbergis Interviewed on Current Issues

*LD1503005290 Vilnius in English to North America
2300 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] Edvinas Butkus of Radio Vilnius met with the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis. He kindly agreed to give an interview.

Coming up next are the main points of their talk. These days Lithuania is strongly in the focus of attention of the whole world. What's the initial response from the world to the events in Lithuania, and how does Vytautas Landsbergis assess it?

[Begin recording] [Landsbergis] To my mind the response is better than we expected it to be. Various countries of the world speak of our right to independence as something which cannot be denied to us. They consider that the independence of Lithuania must be implemented and firmly established through negotiations with the Soviet Union. This approach fully coincides with the stand that we have taken and agrees well with what we are seeking. So, the position taken so promptly by most states of the world is of strong support for us.

[Announcer] Of all the world states the attitude of the two super powers—the United States and the USSR—is of utmost importance to Lithuania. How does Vytautas Landsbergis assess the first reaction from Washington and Moscow?

[Landsbergis] Both superpowers, watching each other perhaps, are more reserved than the other states of the world. But, on the other hand, the statement by the United States is also favorable to us. In a way the statement may discipline those forces which would like to resort to extreme pressure or threats to us. The statement clearly puts it that the issue of Lithuania's independence must be settled peacefully and through negotiations. In my view, the stand of the United States is more significant than that of some European states closer to us, yet smaller than the United States. The United States is to be reckoned with. Then it is gratifying to know that Australia firmly and clearly speaks up for the recognition of our independence act.

[Announcer] And what prospects does the chairman of the Supreme Council see in seeking, or just waiting, for the turning point in the relations with Moscow?

[Landsbergis] I consider that we won't have to wait long for a change in Moscow's attitude because the essential, psychological breakthrough has already come. I see the statements and opinions voiced in Moscow now more like the old tactics of putting off the settling of the question rather than attempts at aggravating or complicating the situation. We just have to wait until Mikhail Gorbachev is elected president of the USSR. Then the Congress of People's Deputies will succeed with its work, and one day the Baltic issue is sure to be debated. It may also turn out to be a separate issue of Lithuania alone, as our position is exceptional now. When we get the news of the upcoming debate we shall delegate a small group of our envoys to Moscow. Former people's deputies from Lithuania perhaps would be the best representatives. They are well-known in Moscow and their contacts might be useful at the initial stage of the negotiations. I do mean that that will be the beginning of negotiations, though Moscow might be reluctant to call them so. [end recording]

[Announcer] Vytautas Landsbergis said that he himself would most probably not take part in the initial stage of the talks in Moscow as he thought it would not be so easy for him to go there in his present status of chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania. When elections to the post of chairman were being held, Vytautas Landsbergis said he would not like to be treated as representing the majority and that he would also like to see a constructive parliamentary opposition. The problem of the opposition is getting much public attention these days. Here is what Vytautas Landsbergis thinks of the problem now:

[Begin Landsbergis recording] I find it difficult to say now how much attention the parliamentary opposition deserves at present. Perhaps it depends on how the opposition behaves. So far this formation has been more destructive than constructive. Yet I believe that parliament will cope with the problem and perhaps the opposition itself will overcome its ailments, the sense of malice, and a certain feeling of remorse. Our parliament has no experience in this field, but I hope that a more constructive disposition will soon prevail. [end recording]

[Announcer] Those were the main points of an interview given to Radio Vilnius by Chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis.

Sajudis Official Views Lithuanian Developments

PM1403114190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 90 p 1

[Interview with N.N. Medvedev, member of "Sajudis" Seimas, by S. Kiselev and D. Sabov, conducted in Moscow 13 March: "Plenipotentiary Observers?"; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] After "Sajudis" leader V. Landsbergis defeated A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, in the battle for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, the republic's parliament adopted a decision on restoring the independent Lithuanian state. The result: Deputy from Lithuania V. Antanayis announced yesterday that his republic's representatives are attending the Congress "merely as observers." What does this mean?

Our parliamentary correspondents sought explanations from N.N. Medvedev, member of the "Sajudis" Seimas.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session has suspended the powers of the USSR people's deputies from the republic. Is that so? But all the same you and Brazauskas are still here, albeit as observers...

[Medvedev] No final decision about this has yet been made. Our voters merely instructed us not to elect the USSR president. When we were leaving for the Congress, we were told: You can work in the commissions with a view to democratizing this state, but we are not vesting

you with powers to elect a president, the president can be elected by the people alone. The people themselves. Therefore only the voters themselves can recall us from being USSR people's deputies.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] We notice that you haven't taken off your deputy's badge....

[Medvedev] Indeed, since my voters empowered me to wear it. And until such time as they say "Take it off," I will not do so. As for what my comrades are saying to me.... You know, if I listened to what they say I would be constantly taking it off and putting it on, this would no longer be politics. Its proper name is rather different....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What was the fundamental difference between the programs of Deputies Landsbergis and Brazauskas as contenders for the post of chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet?

[Medvedev] Landsbergis' election program can be formulated as follows: "boldness and resolution." And Brazauskas' as "caution and a gradual approach." In other words, Landsbergis is more a politician than an economist. Brazauskas is more an economist than a politician.

You know, what Landsbergis says operates directly on the emotions. What Brazauskas says appeals to the intellect.

But they are both sure that a Lithuania without independence is a Lithuania without a future. However, "Sajudis" leader Landsbergis believes that you cannot take a couple of jumps to cross an abyss, you have to take a single desperate leap in order either to fall to your doom or to get to the other side. Brazauskas believes that there is no need to jump at all. We should feel our way and march with a firm step.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How do you explain the urgency of the decisions adopted by Lithuania's parliament?

[Medvedev] After the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision on the need to elect a president of the country, people sensed a threat to the republic's sovereignty, a threat that the USSR would be transformed into a unitary state, and an inbred fear of Stalinism stimulated emotions rather than the intellect. Once bitten, twice shy. Sometimes we see dangers where they do not exist, or else we exaggerate them. This stimulated accelerated decisionmaking, and it often does not presuppose forecasting. You need more time to make forecasts, when collective intellect operates. Certain mistakes are sometimes made when you are in a hurry.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you think that it was a mistake for the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies not to support Brazauskas' candidacy?

[Medvedev] Certainly at the present stage it would be easier for Brazauskas rather than Landsbergis to conduct dialogue with the center, as he is more familiar with the

center's habits. Many people believe that Brazauskas is not sufficiently resolute and bold, or is even a bit of a coward. That is untrue. He cannot be accused of cowardice. I always remind Lithuanians of their great Prince Vytautas: at various times he was accused of appeasing the Teutonic order, or of appeasing Moscow. But as a result he preserved his state, preserved the nation....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Why nevertheless did a majority of members of the new Lithuanian Supreme Soviet support not him but the "Sajudis" leader?

[Medvedev] "Sajudis" is not a party organization, but it is very well structured. Its structure was developed in confrontation with the Communist Party and, unfortunately, "Sajudis" has borrowed certain features of its opponent: Iron discipline, for instance, to the detriment of certain democratic norms. I would define this as instinctive democratic centralism. When the majority has decided something, few people in "Sajudis" dare uphold their own opinion. Because rumors will immediately be circulated about them that they are betraying Lithuania. True, to "Sajudis" credit, there are people within it who will literally "put their head on the block" to prevent the spread of these flaws.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How did Lithuania's population react to the election of Landsbergis?

[Medvedev] Many people have now heeded the arguments of reason. Letters are already coming in saying that presidential rule should be introduced in the republic and that Brazauskas should be nominated for the post of president. He has great prestige nevertheless: Those who claim that these letters are inspired by the Communist Party are wrong. I would remind you that Brazauskas got 92 percent of the vote in the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. That is a result without precedent in the republic.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do people in Lithuania realize that the decisions of the latest session of the republic's Supreme Soviet may have grave economic consequences?

[Medvedev] The people are now saying they are prepared to pay any price. But in my view the whole problem is that our people still do not know what it is like to be unemployed or what it is to be enterprising in the full sense of the word. They have forgotten. Brazauskas certainly takes this into account.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You said the republic without independence is a republic without a future. But nevertheless the republic without powerful economic ties is also a republic without a future....

[Medvedev] That is a normal dialectical contradiction. Those who think that political independence is conceived as the rupture of all economic links with the union must believe that the Lithuanians are very stupid people. They are no more stupid than anyone else. Lithuania

maybe has more interest than anyone in a rich Uzbekistan, a strong Urals, and a prosperous Tyumen. I envision the future union as a single East European common market—a "union of fifteen"—with gradual integration into the European and also the world market.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do people in Lithuania realize that the present decisions may hand opponents of perestroika arguments that will be used against other republics?

[Medvedev] We are constantly torn between two desires: on the one hand, to ensure our own security. On the other, not to hand trump cards to the conservatives and superconservatives. Believe me, we don't want this....

Moscow TV Reports on Lithuanian Events

LD1403225790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 14 Mar 90

[from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Dramatic events over the past few days have been unfolding not just in the Kremlin at the Congress of People's Deputies, not just at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, but also in Lithuania, at the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Our special correspondents already told you yesterday about some of these events in their first report from Vilnius. Today they have sent in other details of the events that took place in Vilnius in previous days too, and they talk about what is going on in Lithuania today.

[Begin recording] [correspondent D. Kiselev] Vilnius on the fourth day since the republic's Supreme Soviet adopted the enactment restoring the independence of the Lithuanian state. [video shows a view of the city] At first glance, there have been virtually no changes. Reaction to what is going on is mainly restrained and calm. There is order in the city, although one will not meet militiamen or military personnel in the streets. [video shows street scenes] In the capital, one cannot see any new banners, slogans, or leaflets. Admittedly, from the town of Snieckus, where there is a nuclear power station, it is reported that its population—and there are about 40,000 inhabitants there—has expressed its disagreement with the decision of the republican parliament and demanded a referendum. [video shows people arguing in the street]. But perhaps the main point of disagreement today is the election, unexpected for many, of Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sajudis, as chairman of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet. If the elections had been universal and direct, Algirdas Brazauskas, who heads the Communist Party of Lithuania, might have won. At least, that is indicated by recently published results of a public opinion poll conducted in the republic by the world-famous Gallup Service. [video shows more scenes of street arguments]

But the main event here these days is, even so, the session of the Supreme Soviet. [video shows a meeting in progress, then what appears to be a deputy's mandate

card] Republican radio and television maintain a live relay from the sittings. The second program of republican radio has been allocated to simultaneous translation into Russian. [video shows transistor radio standing on the pavement]. Every morning, several dozen enthusiasts buttonhole the deputies. [video shows small crowd]

[Unidentified woman, speaking broken Russian] We want to live all together in friendship. We want there to be freedom, and that our money should stay in Lithuania. And we must have ties with Russians and with various republics, just as it is with all peoples throughout the world. We go to see one another—both different theaters and ensembles—and to trade. That's the way things are the world over. We want friendship, to live in friendship and in peace, and to make friends with everyone.

[Kiselev] At the same time, in the hall, Vytautas Landsbergis calls for unity and asks people not to seek artificial grounds for confrontation, not to be guided by personal resentments and ambitions, but to work for the benefit of Lithuania, either in the parliamentary majority or in the constructive opposition. [video shows Landsbergis addressing the parliament]. On today's agenda is the question of halting the activities of the republic's military registration and enlistment office. Parliament decided that, in Lithuania, there should be no spring call-up into the Soviet Army. The fate of those already called up is, as is officially emphasized here, the focus of particular concern. Incidentally, the Lithuanian soldiers themselves, abandoning their units, often turn to parliament for help. [video shows soldiers in parliament]. Meanwhile, an official proposal for talks on the complete withdrawal of USSR Armed Forces from the territory of Lithuania has been sent to Moscow. [video shows final panning view of the city]

Lithuanian Council Decides on Armed Forces

LD1403190290 Moscow TASS in English 1842 GMT
14 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius March 14 TASS—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has decided to end activities by Military Commissariats in Lithuania. Lithuanian young men will no longer serve in the Soviet Armed Forces or take part in military exercises.

Under a resolution that went into effect in the middle of February, cases of Lithuanian draftees who left the Soviet Armed Forces because of violence committed against them are not to be transferred to the USSR Military Prosecutor's office without the consent of the presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

In its address to the Soviet president on March 13, the Lithuanian Parliament expressed the hope that all Lithuanian soldiers, officers and their families outside Lithuania would be guaranteed security and would be given an opportunity to return to Lithuania immediately.

Ligachev Cited on Lithuanian Independence

PM1403164890 Milan L'UNITA in Italian
13 Mar 90 p 5

[Sergio Sergi dispatch on CPSU Politburo member Yegor Ligachev 12 March remarks in Moscow: "Yegor Ligachev: 'Serious Problem in Vilnius, But We Will Not Make the Mistake of Sending In the Tanks'"]

[Text] Moscow—"In politics the first thing to do is to consider the consequences. There is a Russian proverb that says: Before entering think about how you will get out." During a pause in the Congress of Deputies proceedings Yegor Ligachev judged the Lithuanians' decision to proclaim their independence a "serious problem."

[L'UNITA] But the Lithuanians say they were annexed to the USSR by force....

[Ligachev] I have been to Lithuania twice—the first time 30 years ago, the second recently. I saw how people lived then and how they are today, how well they live now. I believe that when the people open their eyes they will understand....

[L'UNITA] How will you respond to this challenge?

[Ligachev] A decision will be made on the basis of the law, by passing the law on the peoples' self-determination.

[L'UNITA] But the Lithuanians no longer recognize the USSR's laws...

[Ligachev] We do not make forecasts about hypotheses. We will act using political methods.

[L'UNITA] Do you rule out a military intervention?

[Ligachev] Indubitably. Tanks do not help to resolve problems, and we are wise enough not to repeat mistakes. Have no doubt about that.

[L'UNITA] What do you think of the "strong president"?

[Ligachev] As a communist and a Politburo member, I am in favor of a presidential government.

[L'UNITA] With the emphasis on the word "strong"?

[Ligachev] The post of president is itself a strong concept. It is a very important measure for strengthening central authority under conditions of stormy development and in the presence of a decentralization process. But I must say—frankly, as always—that the main strength that will enable us to surmount the very difficult situation is constituted by the Soviets and the ruling party, the CPSU, especially in this transitional period. In the great entrance hall of the palace of congresses even General Boris Gromov, former commander of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, seems worried about the "Lithuania business."

[L'UNITA] Could the independence declaration change military plans?

[Ligachev] For some time Lithuania has aspired to leave the USSR, but no account has been taken of the economic situation, the political situation, and that connected with the Armed Forces. Of course it is a move that expresses the desire of Lithuania—which is still part of the USSR, however.

[L'UNITA] Are there temptations among the military to intervene?

[Ligachev] We are civilized people: this temptation does not exist.

[L'UNITA] What about the Soviet defense system?

[Ligachev] This has not yet been discussed, and we are not discussing it. We shall see....

Public Demonstration in Estonia Supports Unity

*LD1403212190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] A meeting in support of the USSR's unity has been held on the main square of the Estonian capital. It was organized by the Committee for the Defense of Civil Rights and Soviet Power in Estonia, and by public organizations and movements representing, for the most part, Russian speakers in the republic. All the speakers voiced their alarm and uncertainty about the future as a result of the processes now taking place. The committee called on the government of the republic to halt the activities of local institutions which lead to confrontation with central organs of power, with union republics, and oblasts; to rescind all basic documents which were adopted in violation of the law on economic autonomy in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic; and to reinstate subsidies for the maintenance of stable retail prices of foodstuffs.

Meetings were also held in other Estonian towns, including Narva, Kohtla-Järve, and Sillamae. They adopted an appeal to the people of the Soviet Union, the Congress of People's Deputies, and to the United Nations. The appeal expresses support for the Soyuz group of deputies. The appeal to the United Nations calls for all actions aimed at destabilizing the USSR to be condemned.

More on Demonstrations

*LD1403164490 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish
1545 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] [Announcer] There will be elections in Estonia on Sunday, and before the elections there are demonstrations taking place in Tallinn. About 50,000 Russians are expressing their concern over the development toward an increasingly independent Estonia.

[Reporter Anders Eriksson] The demonstration here is the biggest so far carried out by the Russian-speaking

part of the population. Freedom Square in central Tallinn is absolutely full of people. According to the organizers' own calculations, 50,000 people are taking part, with slogans such as: "Estonia is and shall remain Soviet;" and: "The Soviet Union is united and indivisible."

The head of one of the war material industries here in Tallinn, Vladimir Yarovoy, said in his speech to the masses of people that the Estonian people have been deceived by their nationalist leaders, and that it is now time for the Russian part of the population to take more active measures. Yarovoy, who is also a member of the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow, did not, however, specify what measures are concerned.

Today's demonstration shows that the Russian population feels growing anxiety over what is going to happen to them now that Estonia is taking one step after another toward increased independence:

[Begin recording of unidentified woman in Russian fading to Swedish translation] Above all I fear for my child's sake. What kind of country will she be living in in the future?

On Sunday, elections will take place in Estonia for the republic's Supreme Soviet. According to opinion polls conducted so far, the forces striving for a free Estonia will be the winners in the elections. In view of this prospect, the big Moscow-controlled factories were closed two hours earlier than usual. The employees were urged to take part in the demonstrations to protect their own, and by all means, also their bosses' positions. But at the same time this is an expression of opinion which the new political leaders, those who will be elected on Sunday, cannot ignore.

Anders Eriksson, Tallinn.

Estonian Congress Ends; Issues Appeals

*LD1303112190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1000 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Text] The Congress of Estonia has ended in Tallinn. The delegates to it discussed and adopted a number of documents, including declarations on ways to restore Estonian statehood, on the Estonian state border, and on the attitude to the Armed Forces of the USSR. The question of the relationship with the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], elections to which are planned for 18 March, was also touched upon during the debates. The majority of delegates consider that cooperation with this body of state power—albeit an occupying power, from their point of view—is necessary, since this will make it possible to implement speedily the aim of achieving independence which has been set.

Also adopted at the congress was an appeal to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and to the Russian-speaking population of the republic, and greetings were sent to the new leadership of the Lithuanian SSR. They

did not manage without obviously provocative and irresponsible calls, either. The proposal by several participants in the debates to undermine the spring call-up to service to the USSR Armed Forces ought to be classed among these. But there were also statements disapproving of this action, if only because there is no mechanism for legal defense of objectors should criminal charges be brought.

Also, the demand that Estonia be restored immediately within its prewar borders seems not quite sensible in the point of view some of the delegates, since this is fraught with territorial disputes with two neighboring Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] oblasts, Leningrad and Pskov oblasts.

Latvian Council of Ministers Announces Changes *180050001*

[Editorial Report] Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian on 18 February published on page 1, three decrees of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, all effective 1 March 1990, on personnel changes in the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers. The first decree released Miyervald Leonidovich Raman from his duties as deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers in connection with his retirement. The second one released Yanis Avgustovich Lantsers from his duties as deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers in connection with his transfer to other work, and the third one, included Yanis Avgustovich Lantsers, chairman of the Latvian Tseltnieks Construction and Construction Materials Industry Association, in the staff of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers.

Caucasus

Georgian Opposition Parties Hold Conference *PM1503111990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian* *15 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 8*

[Besik Urigashvili report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Georgian 'Informals' Conference"]

[Text] Tbilisi—A conference of representatives of opposition parties and sociopolitical organizations has opened in Tbilisi. Representatives of Georgia's creative unions and scientific intelligentsia are also taking part in its work.

The conference was organized by highly radical political organizations who describe themselves as the "hard-line opposition." It was noted that the main thing at the present time is to consolidate all opposition forces in order to achieve the main aim—the restoration of Georgia's state independence.

During the conference's work it is planned to create a working organ to coordinate the efforts of all opposition

parties and movements in this direction; this body has been instructed to prepare for a congress involving all political opposition forces within the republic.

Calls for Election Boycott

LD1403184390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1811 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] Tbilisi, 14 Mar—A conference of all informal political parties and public organizations of Georgia, which is under way for the second day here, adopted a document today which declares the existing legislative and judicial structure of this Soviet Transcaucasian republic "illegal." The present status of Georgia is described in the document as "a state deprived of sovereignty."

Those taking part in the conference called for a boycott of the upcoming elections to the republican parliament, for creation of a "national coordinating party forum," and the formation of "a transitional coalition-opposition government with determination of its status by universal, direct, and secret ballot."

Georgian Parliament Condemns Annexation

LD1003101790 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 10 Mar 90 p 2

["Report by foreign staff correspondents: "Fourth Soviet Republic Protests"]

[Text] The parliament of the Soviet republic of Georgia yesterday condemned its forcible annexation to the Soviet Union and demanded negotiations on restoration of its independence, a local news agency reported.

Georgia becomes the fourth Soviet republic after Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to take parliamentary action condemning its inclusion in the Soviet Union.

The newly-elected Lithuanian parliament will meet in special session tomorrow and is expected to declare independence from Moscow.

It wants to pre-empt any move to block its path to self-rule by Mr. Gorbachev, who is expected to be given the powers of an executive president by the Congress of People's Deputies, which opens in Moscow on Monday.

Georgia was annexed between 1801-1864 and became briefly independent between 1917-1921.

Georgian Assembly Forms 'Greens' Party

LD1303214590 Moscow TASS in English 1721 GMT
13 Mar 90

["By TASS correspondent Rimma Shevchenko"]

[Text] Tbilisi March 13 TASS—At a constituent assembly here today, Georgian Greens formed a party, uniting about 6,000 people. Its motto is ecological safety, democracy and non-violence.

The new organisation's immediate task is to establish contacts with Greens in other countries, said the Georgian Greens leader, Zurab Zhvaniya, a 27-year-old biologist.

The local Greens recently attended the European conference "Greens in Parliament" in Stockholm.

Prior to the establishment of the party, the Greens of this Transcaucasian republic received an official observer status at the European Parliament.

Georgian Higher Schools Oust Party, Komsomol

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[Correspondent N. Mikeladze report: "An 'Autonomous' Decision"]

[Text] The academic council of Tbilisi's I. Dzhavakhishvili State University deemed it inexpedient to have party and Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] committees within the university's precincts. A

few days later the Tbilisi State University's Party Committee made the same decision.

The resolution passed says that, in keeping with the principles of the university's autonomy and deeming it inexpedient to have the headquarters of political parties and social organizations located within the university precincts, the university party committee supports the academic council's decision.

There are still communists at Tbilisi State University, just as there are Komsomol members. Does this mean that the organizations do actually exist? As yet it is unclear whether meetings of members of political parties, including the Communist Party, will be held in the future, and how people retaining their CPSU and Komsomol membership cards will pay subscriptions. These questions are in the process of being decided. Meanwhile reports have come in from the Georgian Technical University (formerly the Polytechnical Institute), the Agricultural and Medical Institutes, and a number of other higher educational establishments that similar decisions about party and Komsomol committees have been made there.

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